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Abstract 
 
Ample behavioral evidence has shown that the ability to attribute false beliefs as part of 
Theory of Mind (ToM) and the ability to inhibit a prepotent response are correlated in both 
children and adults. Lesion and functional imaging studies have indicated that both 
cognitive processes might even be supported by common areas of the brain. Some 
controversy also exists over whether there are areas in the brain that are specifically 
dedicated to the attribution of beliefs or whether these areas may also be engaged in other 
processes such as inhibitory control. Among these candidate regions are the right 
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and the medial prefrontal cortex (PFC). To date however, 
no imaging study has investigated both false-belief reasoning and inhibitory control in the 
same set of subjects using an equal set of picture stimuli.  
This is what the present study attempted to do. A classical false belief task was used 
to study false-belief reasoning, whereas a Go / No-go paradigm was employed to probe 
inhibitory control. After an initial pilot experiment, a total of 12 subjects took part in the 
main study that was conducted in a high-field 3-Tesla functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) scanner.  
A subsequent random-effects analysis of the group data revealed common activity 
for both false-belief reasoning and inhibitory control in the bilateral TPJ, dorsal medial 
PFC, and right middle temporal gyrus. This result indicates that inhibitory control and 
false-belief reasoning may both rely on common underlying processes such as attention 
reorienting and conflict detection and inhibition. Additionally, the results show that false-
belief reasoning may also require self-referential processes mediated by ventral medial 
PFC. Furthermore, this result yields the assumption that neither the right TPJ nor dorsal 
medial PFC may constitute a specific ToM module.  
The current results are also discussed with respect to existing and future ToM and 
executive functioning training methods for children. Also, developmental disorders such as 
autism and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) are discussed in light of the 
novel results presented.  
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1. General Introduction 
 
“If there is any one secret of success, it lies in the ability to get the other person's point of 
view and see things from that person's angle as well as from your own.” 
Henry Ford  
More than 30 years ago, two behavioral scientists opened a new chapter in research on 
social cognition with their study of primates’ cognitive abilities (Premack & Woodruff, 
1978). Their study investigated for the first time the chimpanzee’s ability to impute mental 
states to itself and others. Starting with Premack and Woodruff, this ability has 
subsequently been referred to as “Theory of Mind” (ToM). 
Since then, researchers have tried to clarify the cognitive underpinnings of human 
ToM and its development across the life span. The investigation of the neural basis of ToM 
reasoning was sparked some 20 years ago when functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) emerged as an innovative technology to identify the underlying neural networks of 
behavioral phenomena.  
Imaging studies using fMRI have subsequently identified a number of areas in the 
brain that seem to play a prominent role in ToM reasoning. These are, among other 
candidate regions, the medial part of the prefrontal cortex and a region at the junction of 
the temporal and the parietal cortices. 
At this point, conflicting accounts exist over whether any of these regions may 
constitute the neural correlate of a specific ToM module. Studies with patients suffering 
from lesions in these regions resulted in inconsistent findings. Some imaging studies hint 
that the ToM areas specified above may also subserve other cognitive abilities, among 
these especially inhibitory control. Behavioral studies seem to support this view. In 3 year 
olds, performance in inhibitory tasks predicts ToM performance and vice-versa (Carlson & 
Moses, 2001). Some studies show that people with autism, a lifelong developmental 
disorder with a severe impairment in social functioning, are impaired in both inhibitory 
control and ToM reasoning. By contrast, children suffering from ADHD show impaired 
executive functioning while possessing relatively intact ToM reasoning abilities. 
However, no imaging study has directly and properly compared inhibitory control and 
belief-reasoning. This is what the present study has attempted to achieve. Using a Go / 
No-go task, we investigated inhibitory control. Within the same experimental session with 
General Introduction 
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similar stimulus material and within the same subjects, we presented short cartoon stories 
that yielded false- or true-belief reasoning. The results from the study presented here may 
help clarify the relationship between inhibitory control and ToM, reveal common and 
distinct neural networks, and approve or reject accounts of specific ToM modules in the 
brain. 
The following introductory part of this thesis will be separated into four larger 
sections. First, the development of ToM reasoning and its neural correlates will be 
delineated. This is followed by a section about the properties of inhibitory control and 
associated brain regions. Following this, the relationship between belief-reasoning and 
inhibitory control will be described on the behavioral as well as the neural level. The 
introductory part is concluded with a description of the present study’s aim. 
 
ToM Reasoning 
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2. Theory of Mind (ToM) Reasoning 
 
2.1 Development of ToM Reasoning 
 
2.1.1 Cognitive Developments Preceding Belief-Reasoning 
 
The term theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability to attribute mental states such as 
intentions, desires and beliefs to oneself and to others and allows us to predict and explain 
the behavior of ourselves and others. Ample research has shown that the understanding 
of intentions and desires precedes the understanding of beliefs that emerges at roughly 3 
to 4 years of age (Frith & Frith, 2003; Wellman et al., 2001; Wellman & Cross, 2001; 
Wellman & Liu, 2004). 
Before the acquisition of actual belief understanding, infants achieve a variety of 
cognitive abilities that can be regarded as a prerequisite for attributing beliefs. The 
following paragraph delineates some of the major steps in human ontogenetic 
development and their relevance to the emergence of a ToM. 
One of the first cognitive achievements that is innate to newborns is the preference 
for human faces as opposed to other objects (Johnson, 2003). Also, newborns are able to 
imitate facial expressions of others (Legerstee, 1991). Interestingly, these expressions are 
only imitated when the expressions are conducted by a human and not when they are 
simulated by two objects. At about 6 months of age, infants are able to differentiate 
between mechanical and biological motion. This finding is derived from observations 
showing that infants at that age direct significantly more attention to a point light display 
that mimics human motion as opposed to a display depicting non-biological motion (Moore 
et al., 2007). Also at around the age of 6 months, infants react with surprise when an 
object moves on its own compared to when the object is moved by a human (Spelke et al., 
1995). At the end of the first year of life, dyadic interactions give way to triadic interactions 
which involve the infant, another person and an object to which the common attention is 
directed (“joint attention”; Butterworth & Jarrett, 1991). In socially ambiguous situations, 
infants now tend to use social cues such as an adult’s facial expression in order to 
evaluate the situation. This cognitive achievement is also called “social referencing” 
(Carpenter et al., 1998). In an ingenious experiment, Gergely, Nadasdy, Csirba, & Biro 
(1995) were able to show that infants between the ages of 9 and 12 months are able to 
identify an agent’s goal and interpret its actions based on this goal. In the experiment, 
infants reacted with surprise when an agent moving towards another object jumped over 
an invisible hurdle. A study conducted by Onishi, Baillargeon, & Leslie (2007) even gave 
rise to the assumption that infants as young as 15 months may predict actions based on 
ToM Reasoning 
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another person’s belief. However, Sodian & Thoermer (2008) were able to show that this 
finding may be due to situational and behavioral clues. They argue that knowledge 
formation which results in later belief-reasoning capacities may form gradually in the 
second year of life based on the integration of situational clues. 
A milestone in the development of social cognition takes place at the age of 18 
months, when toddlers are able to understand the concept of pretence, which has been 
regarded by some as a first sign of mentalizing (Frith & Frith, 2003). This concept requires 
the decoupling of representations of real events from representations of thoughts. A 
toddler who has successfully adapted the concept of pretence will now appreciate her 
mother picking up a banana and pretending to use a phone (Leslie, 1994). Other 
researchers, however, argue that pretence play may not be a sign of early mentalizing. 
Rather, children may understand pretence on a mere operational level (Sodian & 
Thoermer, 2006).   
First signs of empathic behavior in kids emerge at the end of the second year of life 
when children try to help others who experience a mishap. Some researchers tend to 
interpret this behavior as an early sign of the representation of others’ mental states 
(Perner & Davies, 1991). At about 15 to 18 months of age, children are able to imitate an 
action that a protagonist has started but stopped soon thereafter. This finding suggests 
that children of that age develop an understanding of others’ intentions (Bellagamba et al., 
2006). 
The understanding that other people have desires that differ from their own emerges 
in the second half of the third year of life. Children now start to understand the relationship 
between desires, the results of an action and emotional reactions. As such they 
understand that a protagonist will not be happy if a person catches a ball although the 
protagonist intended to throw it to another person (Wellman & Woolley, 1990).  
 
2.1.2 The Development of Belief-Reasoning and Its Investigation 
 
First accounts of understanding other individuals’ beliefs have been reported for children 
at the age of about 3 years. Children’s cognitive achievements prior the emergence of 
belief understanding seem to be a crucial prerequisite for belief-reasoning (Frith & Frith, 
2003). Some of these achievements have been mentioned in the section above in more 
detail. Among these are the ability to discriminate biological from mechanical agents, 
focussing attention towards an object that another person has focused attention to (joint-
attention), a preference for social stimuli, an understanding of pretence, and the ability to 
represent others’ intentions and desires. 
ToM Reasoning 
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At about 3 to 4 years of age then, some children are able to pass tasks that require a 
discrimination between reality and belief. One of the first systematic studies of the 
development of this ability to attribute beliefs was conducted by Wimmer & Perner (1983). 
Their experimental task dubbed “Maxi and the chocolate” has been used in similar 
versions in many experiments conducted in the years thereafter. A variant of this task will 
also be used in the present study as a test of false-belief understanding. In the classic 
paradigm, the puppet or cartoon character Maxi puts a chocolate into a cupboard and 
leaves the room. After Maxi has left, his mother puts the chocolate from one cupboard into 
another. Maxi returns to the room and starts looking for the chocolate. The children in the 
experiment are then asked where Maxi will look for his chocolate. In order to successfully 
master this task, the child is required to attend to Maxi’s belief and not to pay attention to 
the actual location of the chocolate. Another task in which an object is not transferred to a 
new location is referred to as the true-belief condition. In order to answer this type of task 
correctly, no separation of reality and belief has to be conducted. As such, true-belief tasks 
can be answered based on the actual state of affairs.  
A variant of the “Maxi and the chocolate” task is the so called “Sally-Anne paradigm” 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). In this classic paradigm, Sally puts an object into a box and 
leaves the room. Anne then moves the object to a different location. When Sally enters the 
room again, the subject is asked where the object is in reality (reality question) and where 
Sally will look for the object (target question). The authors assume that a subject 
possesses the ability to attribute false beliefs if both test questions are answered correctly. 
In a different experimental paradigm (“crayon task”) by Gopnik & Astington (1988), 
children at ages three to five years are shown deceptive objects (e.g., a Smarties box). 
Then the true content of the object is revealed to them (crayons, for instance). The 
children are then asked what they thought the object had contained and what another child 
would have thought the object had contained. In order to answer these questions correctly, 
children have to understand that others possess beliefs that differ from their own (false-
belief understanding). Results show that most children at age three are unable to pass the 
test questions while most children at age five answer the questions correctly.  
Sodian & Frith (1992) used a different type of task to investigate belief 
understanding in children. In their “sabotage-deception task”, children are presented with 
two puppets that are introduced as either friend or foe. A piece of candy is put into a box 
that can be locked and children are instructed to help the friend and never the foe. In the 
sabotage condition this can be achieved by either locking the box or keeping it unlocked. 
In the deception condition, however, this can only be achieved by telling a lie to the foe. 
Thus, the deception condition can only be solved when possessing the ability to 
understand and manipulate beliefs. Results in this experiment showed that autistic 
ToM Reasoning 
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children compared to healthy controls scored significantly worse in the deception 
condition, indicating a compromised ability to attribute beliefs. Scores in the sabotage task 
were equally high for both autistic and healthy children, indicating that both groups had 
understood the task. 
Call & Tomasello (1999) have developed yet another task to assess false-belief 
understanding in both humans and apes. Their task does not require language. In a first 
set of control trials, the subject learns that another person (“communicator”) will point to a 
container that contains an object. In their crucial false-belief task, someone hides an object 
in one of two identical containers with the communicator watching. The communicator 
leaves the scene while the hider switches the location of the containers. The person 
returns and now points to the container that he falsely believes contains the object. The 
subject is then given the opportunity to find the hidden object. In order to solve this task, 
the subject has to realize that the person pointing possesses a false belief about the true 
state of affairs. This non-verbal task is mastered by most three year old humans but not by 
apes. 
To date, dozens of studies have investigated the emergence of belief understanding 
in children. In an extensive meta-analysis, Wellman et al. (2001) included 178 studies from 
77 reports that had used false-belief tasks. Their results suggest that age and not other 
factors such as task demands or cultural influences impact false-belief understanding. 
Wellman et al.’s (2001) analysis shows that children at about 44 months of age score 
approximately 50 % correct in false-belief tasks. Wellman and colleagues point out that 
task demands, particularly executive functions, seem only to play a role in the expression 
of false-belief understanding at an intermediate level of false-belief understanding.  
As mentioned above, children between the ages of roughly 3 and 5 years acquire 
the ability to impute beliefs to oneself and others. This ability, however, is limited to so 
called first-order false-belief tasks that require a false-belief attribution to another person. 
Second-order tasks on the other hand require the attribution of a belief about another 
person’s belief. These types of false-belief tasks are typically mastered by children at the 
age of some 5 or 6 years (Sullivan et al., 1994). 
Relatively little research has been dedicated to the further course of ToM 
development. This may be due to the fact that virtually all healthy subjects older than 
some 7 or 8 years pass standard ToM tasks such as the Sally-Anne paradigm. Therefore, 
some researchers have developed ToM tasks that may be better suited to tap more 
advanced ToM reasoning and to avoid the ceiling effect of simple ToM tasks in adults. In a 
study that investigated the ability to attribute intentions in young adults and older adults, 
Happe, Winner, & Brownell (1998) used short stories including double bluffs, mistakes, 
persuasions and white lies. These stories were then followed by several questions that 
ToM Reasoning 
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required the subjects to infer about a protagonist’s intentions. Interestingly, the group of 
older adults with a mean age of 73 years performed significantly better in ToM tasks than 
the group of young adults with a mean age of 22 and a half years. The authors argue that 
this finding may indicate that social and non-social reasoning rely on distinct mechanisms 
because non-social reasoning usually declines with age (Zelazo et al., 2004).  
An opposite pattern of results was found in a study by McKinnon & Moscovitch 
(2007). The authors compared a group of older adults (mean age= 78 years) to a group of 
younger adults (mean age= 20 years) by using first- and second-order belief stories about 
complex social situations such as social faux pas. Their results showed that older subjects 
performed significantly worse than younger subjects in second-order ToM tasks. In first-
order tasks, however, younger and older subjects performed at an equal level. McKinnon 
and Moscovitch argue that declining executive control may account for older adults’ poor 
performance in second order belief tasks.  
In sum, various cognitive achievements precede the ability to reason about beliefs 
which emerges at about 3 to 4 years of age. Among these possible prerequisites is the 
ability to distinguish biological from mechanical movements, showing a preference for 
social stimuli, engaging in joint attention, understanding pretence, and the ability to reason 
about others’ intentions and desires. In order to capture the developmental course of 
belief-reasoning researchers have come up with numerous different tasks such as 
Wimmer & Perner’s (1983) “Maxi and the chocolate” task. Converging evidence now 
suggests that the vast majority of children are able to reason about beliefs at about age 6. 
To date, accounts of belief-reasoning abilities through adulthood and old age remain 
scarce and at times contradictory. 
The neural correlates of ToM reasoning are described in the following section. 
 
2.2 Neural Correlates of ToM Reasoning 
 
An abundance of behavioral studies, some of which have been delineated in the above 
section, have investigated the properties of ToM reasoning and its precursors in humans 
and other species. Since the early 1990’s, the emergence of fMRI has evoked yet another 
field of scientific investigation: social neuroscience. Next to other phenomena from the 
social realm, social neuroscience is dedicated to the investigation of ToM and related 
concepts by means of functional imaging. By identifying neural correlates of behavioral 
phenomena, researchers attempt to identify, among others, the processes that enable us 
to attribute mental states. Besides imaging techniques, social neuroscience also uses 
results from lesion studies. Several studies with patients suffering from brain lesions have 
ToM Reasoning 
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helped in identifying brain regions related to ToM reasoning. A selection of these studies 
will be discussed next, followed by a paragraph on the imaging of mental state attribution. 
 
2.2.1 ToM: Results from Lesion Studies 
 
Results from lesion studies provide an elegant way to speculate about the nature of ToM 
reasoning and underlying brain regions. Lesions in distinct brain areas that cause an 
impairment in ToM reasoning but not in other cognitive abilities could theoretically indicate 
that this very region may constitute a specific region for ToM reasoning. A distinct lesion 
that results in an impairment in ToM reasoning as well as in other cognitive impairments 
may on the other hand indicate that this region could theoretically constitute the neural 
correlate of a cognitive mechanism underlying both ToM reasoning and other specific 
cognitive mechanisms. 
The first study of a person suffering from cognitive deficits resulting from brain injury 
dates back to the famous case of railroad worker Phineas Gage. In 1848, Gage 
experienced massive damage of the bilateral medial frontal cortex caused by an iron rod 
that had been propelled through his head (Damasio et al., 1994; Stone, 1999). 
Miraculously surviving the incident, Gage subsequently showed impulsive behaviour, a 
lack of ability to plan future actions ahead of time, and little consideration for the people 
around him. It can only be speculated here whether next to the historically described 
personality changes, Gage may also have suffered from an impairment in his ability to 
infer others’ mental states. As we will see later, an area in the medial frontal cortex that is 
also likely to have been damaged in Gage seems to play a crucial role in ToM reasoning. 
A digital reconstruction of Gage’s lesion is depicted in figure 2.1. 
ToM Reasoning 
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Figure 2.1. Digital reconstruction of brain damage to railroad worker Phineas Gage due to an iron 
rod propelled through his head. This picture shows that the medial part of the frontal cortex, an area 
associated with ToM reasoning, had also been affected. Historical accounts whether Gage had 
subsequently suffered from an inability to impute mental states, however, are vague. Picture taken 
from Damasio et al. (1994). Reprinted with permission from AAAS. 
 
So far, only a small number of controlled lesion studies on ToM reasoning have been 
conducted. However, these studies point to a prominent role of a small number of 
candidate regions involved in ToM reasoning. 
Fine, Lumsden, & Blair (2001) report the case of B.M., a patient suffering from 
congenital left amygdala damage who was diagnosed as an adult with schizophrenia and 
Asperger’s syndrome. In the study, five measures of false-belief understanding were 
administered to the patient, two of which required first-order false-belief understanding, 
three of which required second-order false-belief understanding. The false-belief 
measures utilized were commonly used tasks such as Baron-Cohen’s Sally-Anne 
paradigm (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). Interestingly, the subject B.M. passed the two first-
order false-belief tasks but failed in all second-order false-belief tasks. However, the 
patient managed to correctly answer the control questions contained in all five stories. This 
indicates that the poor performance shown was not due to general task demands such as 
story comprehension or memory. In an additional test of advanced ToM reasoning (Happe 
et al., 1998), the patient also scored below the score that would have been expected from 
a comparison group. Due to these results, the authors argue for a prominent role of the 
ToM Reasoning 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 17 
amygdala either as a prerequisite for the development of belief-reasoning (B.M.’s 
amygdala lesion was caused by a congenital or early lesion to the amygdala) or as a 
crucial component of a neural circuitry for ToM reasoning. In this regard the authors note 
that the amygdala has extensive interconnections with the medial prefrontal cortex and the 
superior temporal sulcus. As the following lesion studies suggest, both of these structures 
also seem to play an important role in mentalizing. 
In one of these studies, 31 patients with unilateral damage to various parts of the 
frontal lobes were investigated and compared to a control group of 31 healthy subjects 
(Rowe et al., 2001). Subjects were presented with newly constructed first and second-
order false-belief stories that treated topics such as going to a restaurant or going grocery 
shopping. These stories were followed by a false-belief question and an inference 
question to assess the ability to draw inferences without a belief-reasoning component. 
The task also contained a fact question that tested if the subject had understood the 
events leading to a false belief, and a memory question testing whether the subject had an 
intact memory for story details. Compared to the control group, the patients with damage 
to the frontal lobes showed a significant impairment in both first- and second-order false-
belief questions. The group of patients with right-frontal lesions showed no impairment in 
any of the control questions. Patients with left-frontal lesions, however, showed a slight 
impairment in the inference questions. However, covariate analyses showed that this 
impairment was independent of ToM performance. The results obtained in this study 
indicate that the prefrontal cortex plays a crucial role in the expression of ToM. 
Another study compared a group of 19 patients with frontal lesions to a group of 13 
patients with non-frontal lesions and a group of 14 controls (Stuss et al., 2001b). The 
group of frontal patients differed in the location of their lesion with 7 patients suffering from 
bi-frontal medial lesions, 4 people having right frontal lesions and 8 patients suffering from 
left frontal regions. The subjects’ task in all conditions was to point to a cup underneath 
which an object had been hidden. One of the conditions in the experiment, the deception 
task, required the subject not to pick a cup that a “deceiving” assistant was pointing to, 
thus requiring the subjects to attribute a false belief. In the deception task administered, 
only the patients with damage to the medial part of the frontal cortex were significantly 
impaired when compared to the group of non-frontal patients and healthy controls. Once 
again, these results indicate a dominant role of the frontal cortex as part of a neural false-
belief reasoning network. Moreover, the study’s authors were able to show that the medial 
areas of the frontal cortex in particular seem to be of special importance for the ability to 
infer others’ beliefs.  
Another study, however, stemming from the data of one patient only, found no 
impairment of belief-reasoning after extensive damage to the bilateral medial frontal cortex 
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(Bird et al., 2004). The patient presented in this study suffered from a dysexecutive 
syndrome including problems in planning and memory. Yet when presented with a battery 
of false-belief tasks such as the Sally-Anne paradigm or Happe’s advanced ToM tasks 
(Happe et al., 1996), the patient achieved a level of performance that was well in the range 
of healthy subjects. Based on the results of this single-subject study, the authors argue 
that the medial frontal gyrus may not necessarily constitute a part of the neural ToM 
network. This finding is in clear contradiction to most lesion studies and neuroimaging 
studies. The authors then also note that the stroke patient’s lesion may not have involved 
all areas of the medial frontal lobe implicated in ToM reasoning and suggest further 
studies. 
Another candidate region as part of a network for ToM is the temporo-parietal 
junction (TPJ), an area at the border of the temporal and the parietal cortices, located 
mostly in Brodmann Areas (BA) 39, 40 and 41 and partly comprising the angular gyrus, 
supramarginal gyrus and superior temporal gyrus. Some researchers also refer to this 
region as the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS; Frith & Frith, 2003). In a study by 
Samson, Apperly, Chiavarino, & Humphreys (2004) three patients with damage to the left 
TPJ participated in a story- based and a video-based version of a false-belief reasoning 
task. In the video-based task (unlike in the story-based task), none of the three subjects 
had any difficulties with the control questions included in the task. However, none of the 
subjects scored above chance level in either the story-based or the video-based belief 
task. These results indicate that the left TPJ may be a necessary component of the ability 
to infer others’ mental states and that the observed compromised ToM reasoning 
performance may not have been due to general task demands. 
A study by Apperly, Samson, Chiavarino, & Humphreys (2004a) with 12 brain-
damaged patients with circumscribed lesions in either the left TPJ or the prefrontal cortex 
used the same stimulus material as in the study presented above (Samson et al., 2004). 
The authors found that 3 patients with left TPJ lesions as well as 4 patients with prefrontal 
lesions performed only at chance level in both false-belief tasks. However, only the 
patients with the prefrontal lesions also showed an impairment in a working memory 
control task. The authors argue that prefrontal patients may fail in false-belief tasks due to 
the executive demands of the task, while left TPJ patients fail not because of the 
processing demands of the task but because the left TPJ constitutes a crucial part of a 
neural belief-reasoning network. The authors also explicitly note that this finding does not 
mean that the right TPJ is not an essential part of a ToM network. To this point however, 
no lesion study has investigated belief-reasoning performance in subjects with 
circumscribed lesions to the right TPJ. Nevertheless, most neuroimaging studies 
investigating belief-reasoning have consistently found significant activity in this anatomic 
ToM Reasoning 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 19 
region when comparing false-belief to control tasks. This finding will be discussed in more 
detail in the following section. 
A novel method of studying social cognition is transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS). This non-invasive method elicits activity in neuron populations by applying a rapidly 
changing magnetic field. This technique is related to lesion studies as it can also “turn off” 
circumscribed areas of the brain. As such, it can demonstrate causal relationships 
between affected brain regions and related behavioral phenomena. Therefore, lesion 
studies and TMS share the same methodological background. In one of the first TMS 
studies regarding ToM reasoning, Costa, Torriero, Oliveri, & Caltagirone (2008) applied 
magnetic currents onto 11 healthy subjects. The magnetic pulses were applied over the 
right/left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex as well as over the right TPJ. Subjects were then 
administered written false-belief stories as well as faux-pas stories as a measure of 
advanced false-belief reasoning. Compared to control tasks during which no magnetic 
pulses were sent from the head coil (sham condition), subjects showed longer reaction 
times in both false-belief tasks. In the faux-pas task only, subjects also showed 
significantly poorer accuracy compared to the sham condition. In concordance with 
previous lesion studies, the results of this first TMS study point to a prominent role of the 
prefrontal cortex and the TPJ in belief-reasoning. This view is corroborated by 
neuroimaging studies that will be delineated in the following section. 
To conclude, most lesion studies and one TMS study have investigated patients with 
damage to a small number of circumscribed areas. The studies presented here were able 
to show that especially the prefrontal medial cortex and the TPJ seem to play a crucial role 
in ToM reasoning. The role of the amygdala is less clear; only one single-subject study 
with a patient suffering from congenital amygdala damage has explicitly investigated 
belief-reasoning. It could be that the amygdala plays a role in the emergence of belief-
reasoning but not in its expression in adulthood. Also, a number of important structures 
such as the right TPJ or more circumscribed areas of the frontal cortex (e.g., the anterior 
cingulate cortex) have not yet been investigated in lesion studies but were commonly 
found in neuroimaging studies and, as far as the right TPJ is concerned, in the only TMS 
study so far. 
 
2.2.2 ToM: Results from Neuroimaging Studies 
 
Neuroimaging studies of ToM reasoning and related concepts emerged with the invention 
of modern functional imaging techniques. These methods have helped identify areas 
associated with the attribution of mental states. The identification of brain regions involved 
in ToM reasoning can help to shed light on issues such as the development of mentalizing, 
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the question over whether a specific ToM module exists and on the debate over cognitive 
processes supporting the attribution of mental states. Also, neuroimaging techniques 
provide further insight on disorders such as autism, a severe developmental disorder 
associated with a frequent impairment in ToM reasoning. 
 
2.2.2.1 PET Studies 
 
Positron emission tomography (PET) is one of the methods used in the functional imaging 
of ToM. This technology is able to measure activity of the brain by detecting gamma rays 
that are emitted whenever an uptake of glucose takes place in the nerve cell. In order to 
obtain this indirect measure of neural activity, radioactive tracer isotopes have to be 
introduced into the subject’s body. PET has a spatial resolution of some 4 to 8 mm and a 
temporal resolution of approximately 1 second. Although PET requires the injection of 
possibly harmful radioactive substances, it yields better images compared to fMRI in areas 
that are susceptible to scanner artefacts such as the amygdala or the orbitofrontal cortex 
(D'Esposito, 2000). 
In one of the first PET studies investigating belief-reasoning, short stories followed by 
questions were presented to 6 healthy subjects (Fletcher et al., 1995). The belief-
reasoning condition required the attribution of false beliefs. Two other conditions served as 
control tasks. One of these, the physical stories condition, was similar to the belief-
reasoning condition in terms of content and complexity. However, it did not require the 
attribution of mental states. The second control condition consisted of unlinked sentences 
that were not connected to each other in terms of content. Results revealed significantly 
more activity for the false-belief condition as well as for the physical stories condition in the 
temporal poles, the left superior temporal gyrus and the posterior cingulate cortex when 
compared to the unlinked sentences condition. Since the condition “physical stories” did 
not require the attribution of mental states, the areas mentioned above did not constitute a 
neural correlate of belief attribution. Therefore the conditions belief-reasoning and physical 
stories were compared as well in order to isolate a specific mentalizing component. 
Significantly higher activity for the belief-reasoning condition was found only in the left 
medial frontal gyrus (BA 8). These results point to a prominent role of the medial prefrontal 
cortex for the attribution of false beliefs. 
A different type of task in an attempt to study belief-reasoning was used by Goel, 
Grafman, Sadato, & Hallett (1995). In their PET study, subjects had to attend to visual and 
semantic properties of commonly used objects presented on a screen. These tasks served 
as control conditions and did not require the attribution of mental states. In the ToM task, 
subjects had to infer whether a person living in the 15th century such as Christopher 
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Columbus would have already known these objects. When comparing this ToM condition 
to the control conditions, significantly increased activity for the ToM condition was found in 
left medial prefrontal lobe (BA 9), the left TPJ and in the temporal poles. Although the 
brain areas related to belief-reasoning reported here are in line with previous findings, the 
authors may have failed to actually measure belief attribution. It may possibly be sufficient 
to recall historic knowledge about life in the 15th century without having to infer another 
person’s mental state. 
A more recent PET study investigated ToM reasoning with yet another fairly unusual 
mentalizing task (Calarge et al., 2003). In this experiment, subjects were asked to make 
up a story about an unknown woman sitting on a bench crying. After 30 seconds of 
reading the instructions and planning their narrative, subjects were given 100 seconds to 
speak and tell their made up story. This “ToM” story was then compared to a control 
condition during which subjects had to read out loud a story presented on a screen. When 
subtracting the activation in the control task from activation in the ToM task, the authors 
found activity in the medial frontal cortex (BA 10, 32), the superior frontal cortex (BA 6, 8, 
9, 32), the right anterior cingulate (BA 24, 32) and the right cerebellum. According to the 
authors, these areas seem to be related to ToM reasoning and show once again the 
importance of the prefrontal cortex for ToM reasoning. However, it is unclear which 
component of ToM has been investigated here. No information is given as to whether the 
task presented requires the attribution of intentions, emotions, desires, or beliefs. The 
possibility exists that the task presented, making up a story, may not even have tapped 
ToM reasoning at all but rather only have required the engagement of other cognitive 
abilities such a episodic memory recall, working memory or language production. 
While PET studies on ToM and especially belief-reasoning are relatively scarce, a 
larger amount of fMRI studies investigating the inferring of mental states has been 
conducted. A selection of fMRI studies will be presented next. 
 
2.2.2.2 FMRI Studies 
 
FMRI measures the so called hemodynamic response. The hemodynamic response is a 
measure of neural activity (Logothetis et al., 2001) and describes the process during which 
oxygen is released to active neurons. Oxygenated (diamagnetic) and deoxygenated 
(paramagnetic) hemoglobin have differing magnetic properties. The resulting difference in 
magnetic susceptibility can then be detected in an fMRI scanner by applying a strong 
magnetic field to the human cortex. This procedure does not rely on radiation which is 
inherent in other procedures such as computer tomography or PET and is therefore 
harmless to human tissue. FMRI scanning has become the most commonly used imaging 
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technique due to its wide availability and its excellent spatial resolution of some 2 to 6 
millimeters.  
One of the first fMRI studies investigating ToM reasoning was conducted by 
Gallagher et al. (2000). In the first of two ToM conditions subjects were presented with 
written stories followed by questions that required the attribution of false beliefs. This 
condition was compared to two control stories (physical stories and unlinked sentences) 
that did not require any mentalizing. In the second ToM condition subjects were presented 
with cartoons depicting events that required the attribution of mental states. Unfortunately 
it is unclear whether the cartoons of this second ToM condition actually required the 
attribution of false beliefs or simply the attribution of desires or intentions. The ToM 
cartoons were compared to cartoons with no mentalizing component or to cartoons that 
consisted of jumbled pictures. When comparing the first ToM condition to the control 
stories, significantly increased activity for the ToM condition was found in the medial 
prefrontal cortex (BA 8, 9), the temporal poles (BA 38) and bilateral TPJ (BA 39, 40). The 
comparison of ToM cartoons against non-ToM cartoons revealed increased activity in the 
medial prefrontal cortex (BA 8), the right middle frontal gyrus (BA 6), the right TPJ (BA 40), 
and precuneus (BA 7, 31). When comparing both ToM conditions as well as the control 
conditions against baseline, only the medial prefrontal cortex (BA 9) was uniquely 
activated by the ToM task. Although not all of the tasks used by Gallagher et al. may have 
tapped belief-reasoning, these results point once again to a strong involvement of the 
medial prefrontal cortex in the attribution of beliefs. 
The same set of belief stories and control stories as in Gallagher et al.’s study 
(physical stories and unlinked sentences) were also used to investigate belief-reasoning in 
a study by Gobbini, Koralek, Bryan, Montgomery, & Haxby (2007). In addition to using 
these stories, the authors also compared activity related to animations of intentional 
movements of geometric shapes to movements of geometrical shapes with random 
movements. Significantly increased activity in the false belief stories compared to the 
physical stories was revealed in medial prefrontal cortex (PFC; BAs 9 and 10), bilateral 
TPJ, left precuneus, and the bilateral temporal poles. Possibly, these areas might 
constitute components of a hypothesized neural network supporting the attribution of 
beliefs. A differing network for attributing intentions and goals based on actions as 
executed by geometrical shapes was revealed by subtracting activity in the random 
movement condition from activity in the intentional movement condition. This comparison 
revealed increased activity in the bilateral ventral lateral PFC (BA 45), bilateral superior 
temporal sulcus, bilateral temporal poles, precuneus, bilateral inferior parietal lobule and 
the medial PFC (BA 9). Taken together, these findings point to a belief-reasoning network 
consisting of the temporal poles, precuneus and the ventral medial PFC. The data also 
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suggest that the attribution of intentions may be supported by a network that additionally 
includes the inferior parietal lobule and superior temporal sulcus and that this network 
does not recruit the bilateral TPJ. 
Stories requiring the attribution of a false belief were also used in a study conducted 
by Saxe & Kanwisher (2003; experiment 2). The false-belief task contained in this study 
was subsequently compared to a false photograph task. The false photograph stories 
utilized in the study were logically similar to false-belief stories but did not include any 
social content. Significantly increased activity in the false-belief condition across all 21 
subjects was revealed in the bilateral TPJ, precuneus, superior medial PFC, the frontal 
poles and the right superior temporal sulcus. A subsequent ROI analysis showed that the 
bilateral TPJ was not activated by a condition that merely described the physical 
appearance of a person. Taken together, the authors argue that their findings provide 
strong support that the bilateral TPJ plays a specific role in the attribution of beliefs. 
A subsequent fMRI study by Saxe & Wexler (2005) presented short stories 
describing a protagonist’s social background. This was followed by a description of the 
protagonist’s desire and a story outcome. Saxe & Wexler’s study focused on four regions 
of the brain that have frequently been found in other studies investigating ToM reasoning. 
These were the left and right TPJ, the medial prefrontal cortex and the posterior cingulate 
cortex. All of these regions were introduced into a ROI-analysis. A significant increase in 
brain activity for the description of a protagonist’s desire compared to the description of the 
protagonist’s social background was only found in the right TPJ and not in any of the other 
areas. Also, only the right TPJ showed no differing activation when the protagonist’s social 
background was changed to a background that was unfamiliar to the subject. Due to these 
observations, the authors claim that the right TPJ may constitute a specific region for the 
attribution of mental states. However, results from this study only apply to the attribution of 
intentions; the attribution of beliefs was not required at any given point. 
Another study conducted by the same research group underscored the important 
role of the right TPJ for mental state attribution (Saxe & Powell, 2006). However, this time 
the posterior cingulate also responded selectively for mental state attribution. Once again, 
the subjects were presented with short stories that either described a protagonist’s thought 
(ToM condition), his physical appearance (control condition) or a bodily sensation (control 
condition) experienced by the protagonist. The bilateral TPJ, posterior cingulate and 
ventral, lateral and middle medial prefrontal cortex were introduced into a subsequent ROI 
analysis. Compared to both control conditions, the ToM condition was associated with 
significantly increased activity in the bilateral TPJ and the posterior cingulate. The medial 
prefrontal cortex showed no significant activation related to the attribution of mental states. 
Based on these results, the authors claim that the medial prefrontal cortex may not be 
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selective to the attribution of mental states but rather that it may be involved in a broader 
representation of socially or emotionally relevant information about other individuals. This 
study also raises some doubt over whether the ToM condition presented here may actually 
have tapped belief-reasoning. The subjects merely read stories without having to answer 
any questions concerning the story. Thus, the authors were unable to probe story 
comprehension or the actual attribution of mental states. Further, some of the stories did 
not even include beliefs but referred to concepts that the authors vaguely describe as 
“thoughts” or “reasoning”. 
A commonly used task in behavioral studies assessing belief-reasoning is the Sally-
Anne paradigm that requires the attribution of false beliefs (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). 
False-belief tasks are regarded as the crucial test for the ability to attribute beliefs. A 
variant of the latter task was used for the first time in an fMRI experiment by Sommer et al. 
(2007). A total of 16 healthy subjects took part in the experiment. In their false-belief 
condition, subjects were shown cartoon stories consisting of 7 pictures each that depicted 
the transfer of an object without one of the protagonists watching. In the last picture the 
protagonist was shown looking for the object in one of the containers. Subjects were then 
asked whether they had expected the cartoon character looking into that container. Thus, 
this condition required the attribution of a false belief to the story character. In the true-
belief condition, however, no decoupling between reality and a false belief was required. In 
this condition, the cartoon character looking for the object was also watching when the 
object was transferred from one container to the other. Thus, both conditions were virtually 
identical in story content and visual stimulation except for the fact that the false-belief 
condition required the attribution of a false belief. By subtracting the activation in the true-
belief condition from activation in the false-belief condition, the authors identified areas 
related to a process that separates mental states from the real state of affairs. This 
decoupling of mentality and reality is a crucial component in the attribution of false beliefs. 
Activity for this decoupling mechanism was revealed in the dorsal part of the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC; BA 32), right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 9), right middle 
frontal gyrus (BA 6), right lateral ventral frontal cortex (BA 10), right TPJ (BA 39), right 
middle temporal gyrus (BA 21), and precuneus (BA 7). This result emphasizes once again 
the importance of the prefrontal cortex and the right TPJ for belief-reasoning. The authors 
in this study also investigated common neural networks for false-belief and true-belief 
reasoning. The authors claim that brain areas dedicated specifically to belief-reasoning 
should theoretically show increased activity in both conditions when compared to baseline 
activity. Therefore a conjunction analysis was conducted that revealed common activity in 
superior, middle and inferior frontal gyrus but not in areas previously identified in 
mentalizing such as the TPJ or the anterior ventral medial frontal cortex. However, this 
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finding is based on the assumption that the true-belief condition used in this study would 
also tap the attribution of beliefs, albeit in this case the attribution of a true-belief. 
Nevertheless, it may also be argued that this condition did not require the attribution of 
belief at all. Subjects could also answer the task by simply memorizing the true location of 
the object and comparing it to the location where the protagonist is looking for the object. 
This strategy may not require the attribution of a mental state. The subtraction of activity in 
the true-belief condition from activity in the false-belief condition, as done in this study, 
may therefore be sufficient to isolate activation dedicated the attribution of beliefs. Imaging 
data from the Sommer et al. (2007) study are depicted in figure 2.2. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Two lateral views at MNI coordinates x = -6 and x = 43 of significantly increased activity 
in three comparisons conducted in a study by Sommer et al. (2007). Significantly increased activity 
in the contrast False-Belief > True-Belief is depicted in red shading, significantly increased activity 
in the contrast True-Belief > False-Belief is shown in green shading. Areas in yellow color depict 
common activation for the two contrasts False-Belief > Baseline and True-Belief > Baseline. Picture 
reprinted from Sommer et al. (2007) with permission from Elsevier. 
 
Unlike Sommer et al.’s non-verbal cartoon study, an fMRI study conducted by Perner, 
Aichhorn, Kronbichler, Staffen, & Ladurner  (2006) used verbal stories to investigate the 
neural correlates of belief-reasoning. Therefore the authors presented written false belief 
stories to the subjects. These were contrasted to three control conditions: a false photo 
task, a false sign task and a temporal change control task. A false sign task was utilized as 
an additional control task because according to Perner et al., the false photograph task 
may not capture an understanding of perspective differences that is part of a false-belief 
task. However, this understanding of perspective differences may also be included in the 
false-sign task. False sign tasks, unlike false photograph tasks, may be genuinely false 
while still including non-mental objects. When comparing the false-belief task to the false 
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photo task, significantly increased activity in the false-belief task was revealed in the 
bilateral TPJ, the right middle and superior temporal gyrus, precuneus and medial PFC 
(BA 9). Compared to the false sign task, however, significantly increased activity for the 
false-belief task was only revealed in the right TPJ. Due to these results, the authors argue 
that the right TPJ may indeed constitute a specific area for the processing of mental 
states. 
To summarize, several imaging studies have investigated the neural correlates of 
ToM reasoning. Although a relatively circumscribed array of brain regions have emerged 
as possible components of a neural ToM network, it remains unclear what some of the 
studies presented here have truly investigated. First of all, the experimental tasks used 
here ranged widely from viewing cartoons, to making up stories to merely reading stories. 
It is likely that although ToM reasoning may have been tapped in most studies presented 
here, the brain activation measured may also have included other processes such as 
working memory, language and so forth due to insufficiently controlled comparison tasks. 
Secondly, and more importantly, it remains unclear whether some of the studies actually 
investigated the attribution of beliefs or rather the attribution of intentions, desires or 
emotions. Some studies did not even state which kind of attribution they wanted to study. 
The attribution of desires, intentions and emotions differs from the attribution of beliefs. In 
the development of ToM, the attribution of desires, intentions and emotions precedes the 
ability to attribute beliefs (Sodian & Thoermer, 2006). It is likely that these two types of 
mental state attribution even depend on distinct neural networks.  
Most likely, only five studies have so far managed to actually isolate the neural 
correlate of belief-reasoning in carefully controlled paradigms. These are the studies 
conducted by Fletcher et al. (1995), Gallagher et al. (2000; story condition only), Perner et 
al. (2006), Gobbini et al. (2007), and Sommer et al. (2007). Their results point to a number 
of candidate regions for the attribution of beliefs. These are the bilateral TPJ (BAs 39, 40), 
the medial prefrontal cortex (BAs 9, 10, 32) and perhaps the temporal poles (BA 38). 
Interestingly, these results are corroborated by the results stemming from lesion studies as 
well as from the only TMS study conducted so far. These studies have also, with only few 
exceptions, underscored the importance of the left TPJ and the medial prefrontal cortex for 
ToM and possibly belief-reasoning. No lesion study has yet investigated the role of the 
right TPJ. 
Areas in proximity of the candidate regions mentioned above for a possible neural 
network for belief-reasoning have also been discussed as possible components of a mirror 
neuron network. The mirror neuron system, its relation to the ToM reasoning system, and 
theories on the underlying mechanisms of belief-reasoning are discussed in more detail in 
the following section. 
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2.3 The Mirror Neuron System, Simulation Theory and Theory Theory 
 
In 1992, di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolati (1992) discovered a class of 
neurons in the macaque brain that responded not only when performing a goal directed 
action but also when the primates watched an experimenter perform that action. These 
neurons located in area F5 within the ventral premotor cortex of the primate’s brain have 
been dubbed “mirror neurons”. Next to areas in inferior frontal cortex, mirror neurons in the 
primate brain have also been identified in the anterior part of the anterior frontal cortex 
(Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006). In a unique series of experiments, Umilta et al. (2001) were 
able to show that mirror neurons in the macaque brain fire not only when the monkey 
observes and executes an action, but also when the actions observed are partially hidden, 
thus requiring the monkey to anticipate the intended goal of the action observed. Also, the 
same class of neurons in the premotor cortex fires when the primates hear a sound that is 
associated with a previously observed or executed action (Kohler et al., 2002). These 
findings seem to indicate that at least macaques infer the outcome of an intended action 
by simulating the action in the very brain areas supporting the actual execution of that 
action.  
In the human brain, recruitment of the posterior inferior frontal gyrus and the rostral 
inferior parietal lobe has frequently been observed during motor action observation and 
execution (Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). These areas in the human 
brain may thus represent the human homologue of the macaque’s mirror neuron system 
(MNS). The posterior STS on the other hand may provide the main visual input to the MNS 
(Allison et al., 2000) and receive back motor efference copies from the MNS in order to 
match predicted motor plans to the visually observed action (Iacoboni et al., 2001; 
Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006). This network between the MNS and the STS may support the 
neural basis of imitation. 
It has been suggested that the human MNS may also represent the basis for the 
attribution of mental states (Lieberman, 2007). However, none of the areas identified as 
part of the human MNS have so far been identified in any functional imaging study 
investigating mental state attribution. Although there is some evidence that the macaques’ 
MNS is involved when predicting intended motor actions (Umilta et al., 2001), there is no 
evidence to this point that this may also be true for the attribution of beliefs. Besides that, 
several studies suggest that primates may not even be able to attribute beliefs (Call & 
Tomasello, 2008; Herrmann et al., 2007). 
As studies with human subjects have suggested, there is no empirical evidence to 
date that humans might predict the intentions, desires and beliefs of other individuals by 
means of simulation. This is, however, assumed in simulation theory (ST). ST basically 
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assumes that attributing mental states to other individuals is achieved by using the own 
mind as a model (Apperly, 2008). After having worked out the other person’s initial set of 
mental states (which differs at least in part from our own mindset), these mental states 
could then be modelled in our own mind using mechanisms used for guiding our own 
behaviour. Based on this model, the behavior of others could then be predicted. Although 
empirical data from imaging experiments are unable to confirm the assumptions made by 
advocates of ST, some behavioral results seem to be in favor of ST. For instance, it has 
been reported that even infants who are only a few days old spontaneously imitate the 
facial expressions displayed by an adult (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977; Meltzoff & Moore, 1983). 
According to the authors, this finding cannot be explained by innate mechanisms or 
instrumental learning but only by a matching mechanism requiring the simulation of others’ 
behaviors. 
Theory theory (TT) on the other hand makes different assumptions about the 
underlying mechanisms of mental state attribution. According to TT, a set of concepts or 
theories exists for the various aspects of ToM (desires, beliefs, etc.). These concepts are 
connected to each other by means of rules about how these concepts influence each other 
(e.g., Apperly, 2008; Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Saxe, 2005). However, it remains unclear 
whether these concepts or representations could be represented in the brain as symbols, 
algorithms or even language of thought. One of the advocates of TT is Perner (1993), who 
proposes a representational theory of mind that is required for mental state attribution. 
According to his model, representations represent something as “being a certain way”. In 
the case of the “Maxi and the chocolate” task which is almost identical to the task used in 
the present study, Maxi forms a representation about the chocolate being in a certain 
location. This representation is kept up although the chocolate is transferred to a different 
location. The subject subsequently has to understand that by looking for the chocolate in 
its original location, Maxi is guided by a representation of the real situation and not the real 
situation per se.  
In an ingenious experiment, Perner & Howes (1992) attempted to test the 
assumptions implied in ST and TT. In one part of this experiment, 32 children between the 
ages of 4,10 and 6,4 years were shown dolls enacting a short story. In this story the two 
characters John and Mary return home with a box of chocolates. Since Mary has to leave 
John tells her that he will put the chocolate either in the top or the bottom drawer. After 
Mary has left he puts the chocolate in the top drawer and leaves. In the meantime their 
mother transfers the chocolate from the top to the bottom drawer. In the following test 
questions the subject is asked where John thinks the chocolate is (think question), 
whether John says he knows where the chocolate is when he is asked (self-reflection 
question) and what Mary will say when she is asked whether John knows where the 
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chocolate is. The study’s results showed that the self-reflection question was a lot more 
difficult to answer for the subjects than the think question. This result clearly contradicts 
the view that children might attempt to answer the task by simulation. If children simulated 
John’s belief, they should in theory be able not only to think that John believes the 
chocolate is in its original location but also to think that he is convinced that it is there. This 
result therefore speaks against accounts of simulation as a means of attributing mental 
states and favors a representational theory of mind.  
Another developmental experiment has come to a similar conclusion (Gopnik & 
Astington, 1988). This study used the so called “Crayon task” in which 3 to 5 year old 
children were shown a deceptive container (e.g., a Smarties box) and were asked what 
they thought it contained. The true content of the object was then revealed to them (e.g., 
crayons). Children were then asked what they thought the object was when they first saw 
it (representational change question). Also, the children were asked what other children 
thought the object contained (false belief question). Results showed that the 3 to 5 year 
children had as many difficulties in the false-belief question as they did in the 
representational change question. This result suggests that the children cannot form 
representations of objects. Furthermore, the observed deficit in the representational 
change question also suggests that this deficit is not due to a lack of understanding about 
how other people form beliefs. Therefore, Gopnik & Astington argue that the ability to 
represent a representation is at the core of understanding false beliefs. 
Furthermore, TT also implies that a specified cognitive mechanism responsible for 
the forming and maintenance of representations may exist. ST on the other hand does not 
imply such a distinct mechanism. This mechanism assumed in TT may be related to a 
distinct area in the brain supporting this cognitive process. Various imaging studies in the 
past have thus attempted to identify such a specific mentalizing module in the brain. The 
right TPJ and parts of the medial PFC have been mentioned in some of these studies as 
candidate regions for a ToM reasoning module in the brain. The issue of a specific ToM 
module is discussed in more detail in chapter 4.6. 
Besides exclusive accounts of TT and ST, other theories have proposed that ToM 
abilities may rely on assumptions made by both ST and TT. These hybrid accounts 
propose that people may rely in some instances on simulation, while others instances 
could require the use of concepts as proposed by TT (see also Stich & Nichols, 1997). 
The imaging results of the study presented in this thesis may help to further support 
or refute assumptions made by either ST or TT. Significant activity for the attribution of 
false beliefs in areas associated with the human MNS could theoretically be seen as 
supporting evidence for ST.  
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The following section will review empirical data on executive functioning. As we shall 
see later, especially inhibitory control (IC) as one of the parts of executive functioning 
seems to be partially involved in the emergence and the expression of belief-reasoning. 
This is of special importance as the study presented here aims to shed light on the 
connection between IC and belief-reasoning in healthy adults. 
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3. Inhibitory Control 
 
Generally speaking, executive functioning (EF) refers to the cognitive processes 
underlying goal-directed behavior (Sodian & Hülsken, 2005). EF encompasses a variety of 
different cognitive concepts such as inhibitory control (IC), planning, working memory, 
coordination and control of action sequences, and attention shifting (Carlson et al., 2005). 
Several studies investigating the relationship between EF and belief-reasoning have found 
that the strongest correlations for these concepts exist for IC (Kain & Perner, 2005). IC is 
defined as the ability to suppress actions that are unwanted and to select actions that are 
goal-directed (Simmonds et al., 2008). The following paragraph delineates the 
development of EF with special emphasis on IC. Also, experimental paradigms used to 
assess IC are reviewed. This is followed by a paragraph on the neural networks of IC. 
 
3.1 Development and Measurement of Executive Functioning and IC  
 
Young children are often described by their care-takers as present-oriented, impulsive, 
and stimulus-bound. As they grow older, children show improved planning skills, better 
error detection, and a behavior that is more goal-directed while representing multiple 
aspects of their goals (Zelazo et al., 2004). This observation by lay people is 
complemented by empirical data. A large body of research has found a U-shaped curve 
for the development of EF (Carlson, 2003; Carlson, 2005; Carlson et al., 2005; Rubia et 
al., 2006; Zelazo et al., 2004) with EF improving from childhood throughout adulthood and 
declining in old age. This finding is also true for IC (Bedard et al., 2002). Pronounced 
changes in the development of EF and IC take place especially during infancy.  
Using an extensive battery of EF tasks, Carlson (2005) investigated the development 
of various aspects in children from ages 2 to 6 years. The results showed a significant 
increase in virtually all tasks administered with age. Further analyses were able to show 
that these changes were not related to the children’s verbal ability. Carlson argues that 
these changes might reflect structural and functional maturation of the brain as well as 
children’s increased exposure to social experiences independent of task-rule 
comprehension or verbal abilities. 
These behavioral data are complemented by biological data showing maturational 
changes in the brain such as synaptic pruning and reorganization as well as changes in 
the gray matter / white matter ratio due to myelination processes (Huttenlocher & 
Dabholkar, 1997).    
A variety of tasks have so far been used to study IC across the life span. In young 
children the so called Bear/Dragon task is widely used to assess IC. In this task, the child 
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is asked to do what a “nice” bear puppet tells them to do (e.g., “touch your nose”) and to 
refrain from doing what a “naughty” dragon puppet asks from them (Reed et al., 1984). In 
order to master this task, the child has to successfully suppress a response required by 
one of the characters. 
A more advanced task that is related to but more difficult than the Bear/Dragon task 
is the “Simon says” task (Strommen, 1973). In this task children are required to execute a 
behavior such as touching the feet only if the experimenter starts the command with the 
words “Simon says”. For all other instances the child is required to remain still. Once 
again, this test requires children to inhibit a prepotent response and thus serves as a 
measure for response inhibition. 
A frequently used test to assess IC abilities in children and also in adults is the 
Dimensional Change Card Sorting (DCCS) task (Zelazo et al., 2003). In this task the 
subject has to sort a stack of cards depicting one of two objects (a rabbit or a boat, for 
instance) presented in one of two colors (e.g., blue or red) according to shape. After 
several trials sorting by shape, the subject is then asked to start sorting the cards 
according to color. The rules are then changed back and forth several times. In order to 
solve this task, the children have to inhibit a previously valid behavioral rule and adopt a 
new behavioral strategy. 
Another task similar to the DCCS task but more difficult is the Wisconsion Card 
Sorting Task (WCST). This test measures task switching and response suppression 
(Buchsbaum et al., 2005). In this test, the subject has to sort a stack of cards according to 
either color, shape, or number. The experimenter secretly determines the sorting rules and 
only tells the subject whether he or she has made an error or sorted correctly. This rule is 
then changed after 10 correct trials. Again, the experimenter does not state the new rule 
but keeps giving the subject feedback about his or her actions. Subjects lacking cognitive 
flexibility and IC will tend to keep sorting cards according to the original rule.  
Another task that is predominantly used in adults is the Stroop task (Adleman et al., 
2002; Stroop, 1935; Stuss et al., 2001a). In the original version of the task subjects are 
required to read the written meaning of a colored word or to name the color of a colored 
word. This task leads to increased reaction times and more errors compared to words that 
have a congruent color and meaning. To solve the task, a prepotent answer has to be 
overridden in favor of an alternative response. Thus, the Stroop task serves as a measure 
of response inhibition. 
The most widely used task to study IC, however, is the so called Go / No-go 
paradigm (Simmonds et al., 2008). The original Go / No-go task involves two stimuli: A Go 
stimulus and a No-go stimulus. Subjects are instructed to press a button as quickly as 
possible whenever a Go stimulus is presented. Whenever a No-go stimulus appears, 
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subjects are asked to refrain from any response. In order to elicit a prepotent tendency to 
also falsely react to a No-go stimulus, there is usually a larger number of Go stimuli than 
No-go stimuli. The classic Go / No-go task measures IC with little demands on other 
cognitive processes such as working memory. Variants of the Go / No-go paradigm exist 
that also require other cognitive concepts to varying extents. For example, in one 
frequently used variant of the task, two stimuli are alternately presented on a screen 
(Garavan et al., 2006; Kelly et al., 2004). The subject is then required to press a button 
whenever the stimuli alternate, but to refrain from doing so if two identical stimuli are 
presented successively. This procedure measures inhibitory control but may also include, 
albeit to a lesser extent, working memory demands.  
The next section deals with brain areas associated with IC. As we shall see in one of 
the subsequent sections of this paper, some substantial overlap exists between areas 
associated with IC and areas related to belief-reasoning. 
 
3.2 Neural Correlates of IC 
 
3.2.1 IC: Results from Lesion Studies 
 
Lesion studies provide an elegant way to show causal relationships between 
circumscribed brain regions and corresponding cognitive concepts. Lesion studies have 
shown that particularly the prefrontal cortex plays an important role in IC.  
Stuss et al. (2001a) compared the performance of 51 patients with frontal and non-
frontal lesions to 26 healthy matched controls in the Stroop interference task, a measure of 
IC. No significant impairment in the task was found for the group of patients with non-
frontal regions when compared to the control group. All patients with frontal lesions, 
however, showed a significant impairment in the task when compared to the controls. 
Among the group of patients with frontal lesions, damage to the non-cingulate superior 
medial frontal lobe was revealed to have the greatest effect on Stroop performance. These 
results point to a particular role of the superior medial cortex in IC. 
This latter finding was corroborated by a study with 23 patients with focal lesions that 
were compared to a group of 19 healthy controls (Floden & Stuss, 2006). In order to 
measure IC performance, a Stop signal task was used. In this task, subjects had to press 
a button when a stimulus appeared (Go stimulus). Subjects had to withhold a response 
when the stimulus was accompanied by a tone (No-go stimulus). The results showed that 
among the patient group, those with lesions to the superior medial frontal gyrus of the right 
hemisphere showed the greatest impairment in the task. Results from both studies 
presented here indicate that the frontal cortex might be a key region supporting IC. The 
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right superior medial part of the frontal cortex in particular seems to be of special 
importance for response inhibition.  
Another lesion study by Samson et al. (2004) investigated three patients with 
circumscribed lesions to the left TPJ. Of these three patients, only one patient was 
significantly impaired in measures of IC when compared to healthy controls. Unfortunately, 
no lesion study has so far investigated IC performance after circumscribed right TPJ 
lesions. Therefore, lesion studies (unlike imaging studies) cannot yield reliable evidence 
as to whether the TPJ could be implicated in IC. 
Taken together, lesion studies suggest that the superior medial cortex may play an 
especially prominent role in IC. 
Neuroimaging studies of IC corroborate this finding. However, imaging studies also 
point to other important areas related to IC, such as the TPJ. Results from imaging studies 
with respect to IC are presented in the following section. 
 
3.2.2 Results from Neuroimaging Studies 
 
A large number of studies using fMRI have investigated the neural correlates of IC (Blasi 
et al., 2006; Casey et al., 1997; Ciesielski et al., 2006; Garavan et al., 2006; Kelly et al., 
2004; Liddle et al., 2001; Menon et al., 2001; Mostofsky et al., 2003; Stevens et al., 2007; 
Wager et al., 2005; Watanabe et al., 2002). The following section contains a selection of 
studies that are of importance to the study presented in this thesis. Also, the results of 
meta-analyses of response inhibition will be delineated. 
An fMRI study that utilized a Go / No-go paradigm in order to investigate response 
inhibition was conducted by Kelly et al. (2004). In this study, subjects viewed the letters X 
and Y that were presented successively on a screen for 700 to 1100ms with a 100ms 
inter-stimulus interval. Subjects were instructed to press a button after every letter unless 
one of the letters was repeated. In that case subjects were instructed to withhold a 
response. A No-go stimulus was presented here approximately every 11s. In order to find 
brain areas associated with response inhibition, the events during which a successful 
response-inhibition for a No-go trial had occurred were contrasted with successful Go 
trials. Activity related to IC was found in a largely right-hemispheric network consisting of 
areas such as the dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; BA 9, 46), middle frontal gyrus 
(BA 9, 10), medial frontal gyrus (BA 8, 24), bilateral TPJ (BA 40), precuneus (BA 7), and 
several subcortical regions.  
Similar activity in a largely right-hemispheric network was found in other studies 
investigating the neural correlate of response inhibition. This result is also depicted in 
several meta-analyses combining previous studies on response inhibition. 
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In 2005, Buchsbaum et al. (2005) conducted a meta-analysis of studies that had 
used a Go / No-go paradigm to investigate IC. A total of 18 studies were introduced into an 
analysis based on activation-likelihood-estimation (ALE). In ALE, areas of brain activation 
concurring across several studies are estimated. In the present meta-analysis, highly 
lateralized activation related to IC was revealed in the right frontal cortex, encompassing 
the DLPFC (BA 9, 46), the inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44, 46) and the medial frontal gyrus 
(BA 6). Activity was also found in a small cluster in the left middle frontal gyrus (BA 46). 
Activity in non-frontal areas was revealed in the right TPJ (BA 40). 
A more recent meta-analysis that also investigated brain activity related to IC as 
measured in Go/No-go tasks was able to confirm the above results (Simmonds et al., 
2008). Common patterns of activation for 11 IC studies were revealed by also using an 
ALE method. Once again, activation related to IC was found in a largely right-hemispheric 
network consisting of superior frontal gyrus (BA 9), middle frontal gyrus (BA 6, 10), inferior 
frontal gyrus (BA 9, 44), superior medial frontal cortex (BA 6, 32) bilateral TPJ (BA 40), 
and subcortical structures. Results from the Simmonds et al. (2008) meta-analysis are 
depicted in figure 3.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Results from the activation-likelihood-estimation (ALE) meta-analysis of 11 IC studies 
by Simmonds et al. (2008). Brain areas associated with IC are depicted in red. All of the studies 
included in the meta-analysis had used a Go / No-go paradigm to measure response inhibition. 
Numbers above each slice refer to corresponding Talairach coordinates. As can be seen here, IC-
related activity is found in a largely right-hemispheric fronto-parietal network. This picture is taken 
from Simmonds et al. (2008). Reprinted with permission from Elsevier. 
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Taken together, a close examination of fMRI studies and meta-analyses dealing with the 
neural correlates of IC reveals surprisingly homogeneous patterns of activation. Firstly, 
virtually all studies report activation in a largely right-hemispheric network. Also, almost all 
studies find activation in quite similar fronto-parietal areas. Among these are the medial 
prefrontal cortex (BA 8, 9, 10, 32), the DLPFC (BA 9, 46) and areas either in or in the 
vicinity of the TPJ bilaterally (BA 39, 40). Lesion studies, probably due to their scarcity and 
focus on the frontal cortex, are only able to corroborate this view regarding the superior 
medial frontal cortex.  
The role of the right TPJ in IC and other cognitive concepts has been scrutinized in 
more detail in a meta-analysis by Decety & Lamm (2007). This meta-analysis included 18 
studies on IC (or attention reorienting, as it is referred to in the meta-analysis) and 24 
studies on ToM reasoning. Interestingly, Decety & Lamm’s meta-analysis found largely 
overlapping activity in the right TPJ region for both concepts.  
This finding and a large body of other functional and behavioral data, especially from 
developmental studies, give rise to the assumption that IC and belief-reasoning may be 
closely related. Evidence and hypotheses regarding a possible connection between belief-
reasoning on the one hand and IC on the other hand will be discussed in the next section. 
In addition, the study presented in this thesis is aimed at clarifying a possible connection 
between belief-reasoning and IC. 
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4. ToM and Inhibitory Control 
 
At first glance, EF including IC and the ability to attribute mental states seem to describe 
two quite different concepts. However, developmental psychologists discovered that both 
concepts show surprisingly similar developmental courses with significant improvements 
between the ages of 3 and 6 years (Bedard et al., 2002; Wellman et al., 2001; Wellman & 
Liu, 2004; Zelazo et al., 2003; Zelazo et al., 2004). Subsequent behavioral studies were 
able to find strong correlations between belief-reasoning and EF. For instance, a meta-
analysis by Perner & Lang (1999) found a mean effect size of 1.08 for the correlation 
between EF and general ToM reasoning in children.  
Evidence for this connection comes from behavioral studies which will be discussed 
in more detail in this section. Furthermore, the following paragraph will examine evidence 
for a ToM / IC connection stemming from observations of children suffering from autism 
and ADHD. Neuroimaging results complement this finding and will also be delineated. 
These scientific data have also sparked hypotheses trying to explain this possible 
connection. Several of these hypotheses will thus be mentioned in the following section as 
well. Special emphasis is dedicated to IC, which among EF shows the strongest 
correlation with ToM reasoning.  
        
4.1 Behavioral Results Concerning the ToM / IC Connection in Childhood 
 
4.1.1 Correlational Data 
 
The observation of a similar developmental timetable for IC and the ability to attribute 
mental states has led to several studies that investigated the relationship between the two 
latter concepts. A lot of this work has examined the connection in preschoolers at ages 3 
to 6 years. 
In an extensive study by Carlson et al. (2001), 107 children between the ages of 3 
and 4 years were administered a battery of tasks including both measures of belief-
reasoning and IC. Among the belief-reasoning task were two tests of false-belief 
understanding. IC was assessed by using tasks such as the Stroop task, the Bear / 
Dragon task or the DCCS task. The authors found a strong correlation for performance in 
the IC and the belief-reasoning tasks (r = 0.66; p ≤ .001). This correlation remained 
significant even after controlling for factors such as age, verbal ability and gender.  
Among the IC tasks administered, the tasks requiring the suppression of a prepotent 
response (conflict task; e.g., the Bear / Dragon task) were revealed to have a higher 
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predictive influence on ToM performance compared to tasks requiring the delay of a 
prepotent response (delay task; e.g., executing a motor response after a delay). 
A subsequent study examined the connection between ToM and IC in 47 children 
ages 3 to 5 years (Carlson et al., 2002). This time, general intelligence as well as working 
memory capacity was assessed in addition to measures of verbal ability. Once again, a 
strong connection was found between performance in belief-reasoning tasks and 
performance in IC tasks. Interestingly, this connection remained strong once the factors 
working memory, verbal ability and even general intelligence were controlled for. This 
finding emphasizes the special relationship between IC and the ability to attribute beliefs. 
Among EF, IC seems to be the only sufficient factor to explain the relationship between 
belief-reasoning and EF. 
A similar result was also found in a study that examined IC, false-belief reasoning 
and other cognitive concepts in 69 children between the ages of 37 and 65 months of age 
(Müller et al., 2005). As a measure of IC, the authors used the DCCS task. The “crayon 
task” as used in a study by Gopnik & Astington (1988) was used to assess false-belief 
understanding. The results showed that the performance in the IC task was correlated to 
performance in the false-belief task. This correlation remained robust even after the 
factors age and verbal ability had been cancelled out.  
A strong correlation between measures of IC (among them the Bear / Dragon task 
and a simple Go / No-go task) and false-belief understanding (as measured with standard 
false-belief tasks such as the Sally-Anne paradigm) was also found in a study by Flynn 
(2007). The children between the ages of 3 and 4 years were tested monthly on all 
measures over a period of 6 months. This longitudinal approach revealed that early IC 
competence predicted later false-belief performance. Interestingly, the same was not true 
for the opposite direction: the mastery of early false-belief understanding did not predict 
later IC performance. This finding may provide strong support for the hypothesis that IC is 
a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of false-belief reasoning. 
Taken together, correlational data provide strong support for a relationship between 
IC and belief-reasoning in childhood. Although only a few studies were exemplarily 
delineated here, this finding has been replicated in several other studies as well (Carlson 
et al., 2004; Hughes & Ensor, 2007; Perner et al., 2002a; Perner & Lang, 1999). 
Interestingly, this strong relationship between IC and belief-reasoning has also been 
found in children from various cultural backgrounds. Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee 
(2006) compared U.S. preschoolers with an age-matched group of Chinese preschoolers. 
For the U.S. preschoolers, the same sample was used as in the previously described 
study by Carlson et al. (2001). Performance in IC tasks proved to be a strong predictor for 
false-belief performance in both samples. The Chinese sample, however, had significantly 
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higher scores in the IC battery. Nevertheless, the Chinese preschoolers had false-belief 
reasoning scores that were comparable to the American sample. The authors argue that 
this result may indicate that other factors along with IC abilities may also play a role in the 
emergence of belief-reasoning. Since most Chinese children do not have any siblings due 
to China’s “one child policy”, they may be less exposed to social interactions and thus 
learn less about others’ mental states. It could therefore be that the number of siblings 
constitutes a factor for ToM development. 
Another study investigated the belief-reasoning / IC connection in preschoolers from 
Germany, Costa Rica and Cameroon (Chasiotis et al., 2007). A correlation between 
conflict inhibition and belief-reasoning was found across all three cultures. Delay inhibition 
tasks, however, were not related to false-belief performance, as shown in a previous study 
by Carlson et al. (2001).   
 
4.1.2 Training Effects 
 
An ingenious study corroborating findings of a strong relation between IC and belief 
understanding comes from Kloo & Perner (2003). Instead of taking on a correlational 
approach, the authors investigated the effects of training in either a measure of IC or a 
false-belief task. Seventy-four children between the ages of 3,0 and 4,7 years took part in 
the experiment. The children were assigned to one of three groups. Each of these groups 
then received training in false-belief stories, the DCCS task (a measure of IC), or in a 
number conservation task (control group). The training sessions started one week after a 
pre-test session. The training consisted of two training sessions within a week and were 
followed by a post-test session one week after the last training. Post- and pre-test 
sessions consisted of an assessment of performance in all three task batteries (false-
belief, IC, number conservation). A comparison of post- and pre-test results revealed that 
training in the DCCS task significantly improved performance both in the DCCS task itself 
as well as in the false-belief tasks. Also, the children who received training in the false-
belief tasks showed significantly improved performance in the DCCS task. The children 
who were trained in the control task did not show any significant improvement in either 
task. This exciting finding has shown for the first time a causal relationship between IC and 
belief-reasoning that cannot be attributed to mere maturational processes or to general 
training effects in both tasks. Nevertheless, this finding cannot explain the processes 
mediating this connection. However, the authors tentatively propose that both the IC and 
the false-belief tasks might as basic processes require the re-description of objects as 
different things. 
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As has been specified in this paragraph, an abundance of correlational data as well 
as one training study point to a strong relationship between IC and belief-reasoning in 
early childhood. Fewer studies have investigated this connection in adulthood. These 
studies will be discussed in the following section. 
 
4.2 Adults and the ToM / IC Connection 
 
One of the first studies that investigated the relationship between inhibition and ToM 
reasoning in adults was conducted by Chasiotis & Kiessling (2004). In this study, ToM 
reasoning in adults between the ages of 17 and 59 years was assessed with auditorily 
presented stories that contained social interactions. At the end of each story subjects had 
to answer questions that required the attribution of desires, emotions and beliefs to the 
story’s protagonists. In order to measure IC abilities, subjects performed a computer game 
that required the suppression of a prepotent answer. The results revealed a significant 
correlation between IC and ToM reasoning in the adult group. This correlation was similar 
to results from studies with preschoolers. However, according to the authors these 
correlations were somewhat smaller compared to previous children’s studies.  
Another study compared a group of older individuals between 62 and 90 years of 
age to a group of younger subjects between the ages of 18 and 26 years (German & 
Hehman, 2006). Both groups were assessed in their EF abilities by using a battery of 
different tests, including measures of IC such as the Stroop task and the Day / Night task. 
In the Day / Night task, subjects are required to say the opposite of what is shown on a 
card. If a picture of the moon is depicted, subjects have to say “day”. A picture of the sun 
on the other hand requires the answer “night”. In order to measure false-belief reasoning 
abilities, subjects were prompted to answer questions regarding written stories. Only the 
false-belief condition required the subjects to attribute mental states, not so the true-belief 
condition. The difficulty of the belief stories was altered by varying the protagonist’s desire 
to either approach or avoid a certain goal. By doing this, the authors claim to have varied 
the amount of executive demands posed in the belief story. The results revealed that both 
the younger and the older group of subjects showed poorer performance in the belief task 
with increasing executive demands. Moreover, this effect was significantly increased in the 
group of older subjects. Also, regression analyses including the results from the EF battery 
showed that especially measures of IC and processing speed were able to explain the 
most variance in accuracy and processing speed in the belief-reasoning task. These 
results indicate that compromised IC in particular could explain poor belief-reasoning 
abilities in old age. A decline in belief-reasoning abilities in old age has also been 
described in previous studies (e.g., Maylor et al., 2002; McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007).  
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Taken together, behavioral studies indicate that IC and belief-reasoning are strongly 
connected. This connection has been confirmed in young children and in young and old 
adults. Theories trying to explain a hypothesized connection between IC and belief-
reasoning are presented next. 
 
4.3 Hypotheses Regarding the ToM / IC Relationship 
 
Various theories have been suggested trying to explain the strong empirical evidence 
indicating a connection between IC and belief-reasoning. 
One prominent theory is referred to as “emergence theory” (Carlson et al., 2002; 
Perner & Lang, 1999; Sabbagh et al., 2006). According to this theory, IC is a necessary 
prerequisite for the development of belief attribution. The theory suggests that it is 
necessary for a child to inhibit his or her impulses and to be able to attend to new 
situations in order to pay attention to other people’s mental states. It also assumes that IC 
is not necessary anymore for attributing beliefs once a child has acquired a fully efficient 
ToM. Emergence theory states that from this point on, ToM reasoning modules may work 
independently of EF abilities such as IC.  
Richer versions of emergence theory suggest that IC may be necessary in order to 
become exposed to social situations during which the children can then learn about 
discrepancies between mental states and reality. This view is backed by a study that found 
advanced IC abilities in Chinese preschoolers when compared to U.S. preschoolers 
(Sabbagh et al., 2006). Although IC abilities predicted belief-reasoning performance in 
both samples, Chinese preschoolers showed no superior belief-reasoning abilities. The 
authors argue that this finding may be due to the fact that U.S. preschoolers grow up with 
more siblings and are thus exposed to more everyday social experiences in which they 
can learn about others’ mental states. Further evidence comes from a longitudinal study 
showing that early IC performance predicts later belief-reasoning performance in children 
between 3 and 4 years of age (Flynn, 2007). Early belief-reasoning abilities on the other 
hand did not emerge as a predictor for IC performance. Emergence theory can thus 
account for some of the behavioral results that show a relationship between IC and belief-
reasoning in 3 to 5 year old children. However, it cannot account for findings that IC 
performance and belief-reasoning abilities are also correlated in adulthood and old age 
(German & Hehman, 2006; McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007) 
Another theory, dubbed “expression” or “performance” theory attempts to explain the 
connection between IC and belief-reasoning from childhood to old age (Kloo & Perner, 
2003; Perner & Lang, 1999; Siegal & Varley, 2002). Expression theory proposes that 
belief-reasoning tasks require the suppression of the true state of affairs in favor of one’s 
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own or others’ mental states by means of IC (Hughes & Russell, 1993; Russell et al., 
1991). As such it is argued that young children may possess a concept of belief long 
before they actually are able to use it. Only their poor IC abilities may hamper the 
expression of their ability to attribute mental states.  
Expression theory therefore implies that decreasing inhibitory demands in belief-
reasoning tasks could actually improve children’s belief-reasoning performance. However, 
this prediction of expression theory is not true. Explanation versions of false-belief tasks 
with little to no inhibitory demands are as hard for children as the original task versions 
(Hughes, 1998; Perner et al., 2002a; Perner & Lang, 1999). It could be that only children 
at an intermediate belief-reasoning level with intermediate IC abilities are aided by 
decreasing inhibitory task demands (Wellman et al., 2001). This hypothesis has not been 
tested empirically, though. Further, according to the expression theory, a lack of inhibitory 
control and thus belief-reasoning would imply that young children will typically answer a 
false-belief question with the actual state of reality. This, however, has not been observed 
either. As a matter of fact, children who do not pass false-beliefs tasks yet answer 
questions about false-beliefs at chance level, suggesting that they do not possess any 
concept of mental states at all (Wellman et al., 2001). Due to several arguments against 
expression theory, this theory has little explanatory power regarding the relation between 
IC and the attribution of beliefs.  
Another theory suggests that belief-reasoning may be a prerequisite for IC (Perner, 
1998; Perner & Lang, 1999). According to this theory, children first have to understand that 
mental states have causal power, meaning that these states are the driving force behind 
people’s actions. IC on the other hand requires the subject to realize that a tendency 
exists towards executing a wrong action and that this action needs to be inhibited. Hence, 
this tendency within exhibits causal power as well. The understanding that mental states 
possess causal power may therefore also foster IC, which requires an understanding of 
causal power as well. Evidence for this theory comes from the finding that hyperactive 
children suffering from an impairment in IC show relatively unimpaired belief-reasoning 
abilities (Sodian et al., 2003).  
More advanced theories concerning the IC / belief-reasoning relation propose a bi-
directional relationship between the two latter concepts. The acquisition of a ToM in this 
theory may lead to improved IC which then facilitates mental state attribution, especially in 
situations with high inhibitory demands (Sodian & Hülsken, 2005).  
Yet another class of more elaborate theories has focused on various components 
underlying the attribution of mental states. According to these theories, mental state 
attribution is supposed to require a core ToM system (“ToM Mechanism; ToMM;) as well 
as a co-opted system, also referred to as a “selection processor” (Leslie et al., 2004; 
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Leslie et al., 2005). This selection processor is related to IC. According to this theory, the 
maturation of belief-reasoning abilities may rely on an improvement in IC skills with the 
core belief-reasoning system remaining relatively stable. However, accounts that belief-
reasoning performance in early childhood is not facilitated by lowering executive task 
demands oppose this view (Leslie et al., 2004; Wellman et al., 2001). The power of this 
approach lies nevertheless in its ability to explain instances of compromised belief-
reasoning capacities while showing intact IC as well as of relatively intact belief-reasoning 
with compromised IC, as found in children with ADHD (Sodian et al., 2003). 
In sum, a series of hypotheses has attempted to explain results suggesting a strong 
relation between belief-reasoning and IC. So far no hypothesis has been able to 
sufficiently account for all existing behavioral results. More elaborate hypothesis may be 
needed to explain and predict phenomena related to the connection between IC and 
belief-reasoning. This matter will be discussed in more detail with respect to the present 
study’s results in the discussion section of this paper. 
As briefly mentioned in the previous section, individuals with disorders such as 
autism or ADHD show deficits to varying extents in either belief-reasoning or IC, 
corroborating findings of an IC / belief-reasoning connection. Systematic investigations of 
impaired IC and belief-reasoning functioning in autism and ADHD can provide insights 
about the relation between the two latter concepts. Findings from patients with 
compromised IC / belief-reasoning abilities will be discussed next. 
 
4.4 Autism and ADHD: a Case in Point for the ToM / IC Connection? 
 
4.4.1 Autism 
 
Autism is a severe developmental disorder with a prevalence between 0.16 to 0.22 % 
(Sodian & Thoermer, 2006). The main symptom in autism is a dysfunction in verbal and 
non-verbal communication. Patients suffering from autism are unable to understand and 
cope with the requirements of the social world. Another hallmark of autism is a frequently 
observed engagement in stereotyped behaviors. A subgroup of autistic spectrum disorders 
(ASD) is Asperger’s syndrome. Patients with Asperger’s also show impaired social 
interactions but are not impaired in their verbal and cognitive development. This disorder 
has also been referred to by some as “high-functioning autism”.    
It has been found that patients suffering from ASD show a severe impairment in their 
ability to attribute beliefs. In one of the first studies involving autistic children, Baron-Cohen 
et al. (1985) presented the Sally-Anne paradigm to healthy children, to children with 
Down’s syndrome and to autistic children. Compared to the children with Down’s 
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syndrome and to healthy controls, children with autism were significantly impaired in their 
ability to attribute false beliefs.  
A similar result was found in a study by Sodian & Frith (1992). In this study, 
performance in the sabotage-deception task (a measure of false-belief reasoning) was 
compared between healthy, mentally retarded and autistic children. Compared to healthy 
controls and mentally retarded children, autistic children performed significantly worse 
when required to tell a lie in order to deceive another person. Since autistic children were 
equally able to physically manipulate the protagonist’s behavior, this impairment is not 
likely to be due to general task demands.  
Several studies have also shown that patients suffering from ASD are significantly 
impaired in measures of EF (Hill & Bird, 2006; McEvoy et al., 1993). Evidence for this 
finding is now considered quite robust (Hughes, 2002). For instance, a study conducted by 
Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers (1991) was able to show that, compared to healthy 
children, autistic children with an IQ in the normal range were significantly impaired in the 
WCST, a measure of IC. A review article by Pennington & Ozonoff (1996) found that 13 
out of 14 studies assessing EF in autistic children showed a significant EF dysfunction. 
These behavioral findings suggest that the observed impairment in autistic individuals’ 
belief-reasoning abilities could be related to their poor EF abilities.  
While several behavioral studies have investigated EF and belief-reasoning in ASD 
patients, there are only a small number of functional imaging studies that have 
investigated ASD patients. One such imaging study investigated the attribution of mental 
states. Compared to controls, autistic patients showed significantly less activity in medial 
prefrontal cortex (BA 9) and bilateral TPJ in a task requiring the attribution of mental states 
(Castelli et al., 2002). Another belief-reasoning study by Nieminen-von Wendt et al. (2003) 
found less activation that was less wide-spread compared to controls in the medial 
prefrontal cortex.  
Some EF tasks in autistic patients show a similar pattern. In an EF task requiring the 
subject to switch between stimulus-oriented and stimulus-dependent phases, autistic 
subjects showed abnormal patterns of activation in the medial PFC when compared to 
healthy controls (Gilbert et al., 2008).  
Hence, preliminary empirical findings suggest that ToM deficits in autistic patients 
may be mediated by the medial PFC. This abnormal functioning is also likely to be 
reflected in an impairment in EF. 
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4.4.2 ADHD 
 
An impairment in EF is the cardinal symptom of yet another developmental disorder, 
ADHD. This disorder has its onset in childhood and a world-wide prevalence of some 5%. 
It is estimated that about 60% of children diagnosed with ADHD maintain this disorder 
through adulthood (Polanczyk et al., 2007). ADHD symptoms include EF deficits such as 
inattention, impulsive behavior, hyperactivity, distractability and an impairment in inhibitory 
control (Sodian et al., 2003). This finding has been tested empirically and has been 
confirmed in a large number of studies (Hughes et al., 1998; Hughes, 2002; Seidman et 
al., 1997). Naturally, this finding has led to the speculation that children diagnosed with 
ADHD may also be impaired in their ability to attribute beliefs. This assumption is derived 
from the finding in healthy subjects that the performance in IC tasks and belief-reasoning 
are highly correlated. Hence, several studies have investigated this hypothesis by testing 
subjects with ADHD and healthy controls in measures of belief-reasoning and IC.  
In a study by Perner, Kain, & Barchfeld (2002b), 24 children at risk of ADHD were 
compared to a group of 22 non-ADHD children. The children’s ages ranged between 4 ½ 
and 6 ½ years. The children were assessed in their ability to attribute beliefs with a variety 
of second-order ToM tasks, including measures of false belief. Also, they were 
administered several tests of EF, including tests for IC. As expected, the group of ADHD 
children showed a significant impairment in several EF tasks. However, they showed no 
impairment at all in second-order ToM reasoning performance. The authors argue that this 
finding speaks against accounts that EF may serve as a prerequisite for later belief-
reasoning. This finding of unimpaired mental state attribution despite significant EF 
impairment is accounted for by the theory that the ability to attribute mental states could 
lead to improved IC (Sodian et al., 2003).  
A study conducted by Sodian & Hülsken (2005) found similar results. In this study, 
32 children with ADHD were compared to 101 normally-developing controls. Children were 
administered a battery of ToM tasks, including a second-order false-belief task. Also, 
children were assessed with several measures of IC. With the exception of a task that 
required the understanding of epistemic states, children with ADHD showed no different 
performance compared to healthy controls in measures of second-order ToM reasoning. 
However, children with ADHD were significantly impaired to controls in IC tasks. The 
authors argue that poor performance in the epistemic state attribution task as a measure 
of ToM reasoning may have been due to the relatively high inhibitory demands of the task. 
It is suggested then that children diagnosed with ADHD may be able to attribute mental 
states but that they are unable express this ability in some tasks due to high inhibitory task 
demands. This finding is best accounted for by the theory that the acquisition of a ToM 
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leads to better inhibitory skills. These IC abilities could then in turn help to apply mental 
state knowledge in the social environment. 
Imaging experiments have also investigated the neural correlate of the observed EF 
deficit in ADHD. According to one of these studies, the frequently observed EF impairment 
in ADHD seems to be associated with dysfunctional patterns of activation in anterior 
cingulate cortex, DLPFC and inferior PFC (Dickstein et al., 2006). 
Summing up, results of compromised IC and/or belief-reasoning in ADHD and autism 
can help collect evidence for or against some of the previously discussed theories 
concerning the connection between IC and the attribution of beliefs. As has been 
delineated here, ToM reasoning deficits in autism could be due to poor IC abilities that are 
mediated by the medial PFC or vice versa. Children with ADHD, however, show EF 
deficits in spite of relatively intact mental state attribution. It seems as if children with 
ADHD are only impaired in ToM tasks that require relatively high inhibitory demands.  
In addition to behavioral results stemming from both healthy subjects and impaired 
individuals, results from neuroimaging and lesion studies may help shed further light on 
the IC / belief-reasoning dispute. This evidence is given in the following section. 
 
4.5 Neural Correlates of IC and ToM 
 
Functional imaging and lesion studies have attempted to clarify the strong behavioral 
connection between IC and belief-reasoning. Lesion studies provide a powerful tool to 
draw causal conclusions about the impact of circumscribed brain regions for IC and belief-
reasoning. Functional imaging studies on the other hand can give helpful hints about the 
nature of the belief-reasoning / IC relation by investigating the degree of overlapping brain 
activity for both concepts.  
 
4.5.1 Brain Lesions and Their Effects on ToM and IC 
 
A small number of studies have tested patients with brain lesions both in their ability to 
attribute mental states as well as in their ability to inhibit prepotent responses. The focus in 
these studies has been primarily on the PFC. 
One of the first such study assessed belief-reasoning and IC in a group of 31 
patients with unilateral frontal brain damage (Rowe et al., 2001). Performance in a false-
belief test and measures of executive control (e.g., Stroop task, WCST) was compared to 
a group of healthy controls. Patients with right-sided as well as left-sided lesions were 
significantly impaired in their ability to attribute beliefs. However, both the patient and the 
control group were able to answer control questions that did not require the attribution of 
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mental states. Thus, the observed belief-reasoning deficit seems not to have been due to 
general task demands. Also, the patient group showed a significant impairment in nearly 
all measures of EF, including measures of IC, when compared to the healthy controls. 
Although the patients with PFC lesions showed an impairment in both EF and belief-
reasoning, these two may not be causally related. This was shown in a subsequent 
analysis of covariance. According to this analysis, EF and belief-reasoning deficits were 
independent of each other. The authors argue that this result indicates that a specialized 
ToM module that is not related to EF may exist in the frontal lobes. 
Another study also investigated belief-reasoning and IC in 12 patients with brain 
lesions (Apperly et al., 2004). Among those, 4 patients had widespread lesions in the 
bilateral PFC. Compared to controls, these patients showed a significant impairment in 
their ability to attribute beliefs (as assessed with a story- and video based false-belief task) 
that was accompanied by a significant EF impairment (including a measure of IC). Thus, 
results from this lesion study indicate that the PFC supports both EF as well as belief 
attribution. However, the data of this study are not able to clarify whether one function 
possibly underlies the other or whether a part of the PFC might serve as a modularized 
area for belief attribution. 
The same study also included three subjects with lesions to the left TPJ. 
Interestingly, these subjects were significantly impaired in their ability to attribute beliefs. 
Nevertheless, two of the three patients showed relatively unimpaired EF abilities.  
Viewed as a whole, these results indicate that the PFC is likely to be one of the 
regions responsible for IC and belief-reasoning. Unfortunately, differing lesion sites 
throughout the PFC as well as only vague descriptions of the lesion sites do not yield a 
more exact localisation for either function. Also, the results are not clear enough to make 
an assumption about whether there might be a module for belief-reasoning in the PFC. 
More solid evidence exists for the left TPJ. As a dissociation for this region has been found 
for EF and belief-reasoning, it could be that this region is indeed specifically activated in 
belief-reasoning tasks (Apperly et al., 2004). 
Further data concerning common networks for belief-reasoning and IC come from 
imaging studies. These data and their relevance to modular accounts of belief-reasoning 
are outlined in the following paragraph. 
 
4.5.2 Neuroimaging of IC and ToM 
 
Neuroimaging results concerning activity related to IC and belief-reasoning have been 
described in detail in two previous sections of this thesis. Surprisingly consistent activation 
ToM and Inhibitory Control 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 48 
within each cognitive concept has been reported in single studies and meta-analyses 
alike. 
As far as IC is concerned, several regions have emerged as possible key regions for 
response inhibition. A close examination of available literature reveals that most single 
studies found activity in a largely right-hemispheric network consisting of the medial PFC 
(BA 6, 8, 9, 32), the DLPFC (BA 9, 46) and the TPJ (BA 39, 40). The TPJ seems to be one 
of the few regions that is activated bilaterally for IC. Two recent meta-analyses have come 
to a similar conclusion (Buchsbaum et al., 2005; Simmonds et al., 2008). According to 
these analyses, commonly observed activity for IC is found in the medial PFC (BA 6, 8, 
32), the bilateral TPJ (BA 39, 40), right DLPFC (BA 9) and right inferior frontal gyrus (BA 
44). Generally speaking, there is converging evidence that three key regions seem to play 
a crucial role for response inhibition. These are the medial PFC (BA 6, 8, 32), the right 
DLPFC (BA 9) and the TPJ bilaterally with emphasis on the right hemisphere (BA 39, 40). 
Relatively consistent activation patterns have been identified for belief-reasoning as 
well, although these studies have used a tremendous variety of different tasks. Across 
virtually all studies, only two key regions have been consistently activated in the attribution 
of mental states (Kain & Perner, 2005; Perner & Aichhorn, 2008; Saxe et al., 2004). These 
are the medial PFC (encompassing BAs 9, 10, 32) and the bilateral TPJ (BA 39, 40). 
Although some researchers have claimed that the temporal poles might also constitute a 
key region for belief-reasoning (Frith & Frith, 2003; Gallagher & Frith, 2003), more recent 
studies have not reported any activity in this area (e.g., Sommer et al., 2007). No meta-
analysis has so far been dedicated to belief-reasoning at the whole brain level.  
A comparison between areas associated with belief-reasoning and areas implicated 
in IC shows quite clearly that both the medial PFC as well as the TPJ bilaterally are 
implicated in the attribution of beliefs and IC alike. Only the right DLPFC as a key region 
for IC is not as commonly activated in studies investigating belief-reasoning.  
A thorough meta-analysis has investigated activity for both IC and ToM reasoning in 
the right TPJ (Decety & Lamm, 2007). This was done in order to compare the exact 
localisation of TPJ activity in both cognitive concepts. For their meta-analysis, the authors 
included 18 studies related to IC (“attention reorienting”) and 24 studies related to ToM 
reasoning. Results showed a substantial overlap for both concepts in the right TPJ region 
(see figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1. Activity in the right TPJ region stemming from a meta-analysis including 18 studies 
related to attention reorienting (left image) and 24 studies related to ToM reasoning (right image). 
Image taken from Decety et al. (2007). Reprinted with permission from SAGE publications. 
 
So far, no meta-analysis has investigated activity associated with belief-reasoning and IC 
in the medial PFC. However, a careful examination of relevant studies reveals that medial 
PFC activity related to IC seems to be slightly posterior to areas commonly activated by 
belief-reasoning. While most studies investigating IC report activity in and around BAs 6, 
8, 32, activity related to belief-reasoning seems to be restricted to the more anterior BAs 8, 
9, 10 and 32. However, this interpretation especially concerning the medial PFC has to be 
treated carefully. Also it seems impossible to draw any conclusions about the nature of the 
IC / belief-reasoning connection based on the results available. All imaging data used to 
compare the two concepts stem from largely differing studies. Firstly, results are compared 
based on differing sample groups. Also, even the modalities used to compare activations 
in both concepts vary. While most studies have used fMRI, some of the data originate from 
PET experiments. Even though most data stem from fMRI experiments, scanners of 
differing field strengths have been used to provide data. This may result in differing 
activation. Furthermore, neither belief-reasoning studies nor IC studies have used similar 
paradigms. Belief-reasoning studies have used paradigms that sometimes may not have 
tapped belief-reasoning at all. Instead, the attribution of intentions or desires may have 
been measured. The same is true for IC studies. While some studies have used Go / No-
go studies, other studies have used Stroop tasks or card sorting tasks, thus requiring 
differing extents of other concepts such as working memory or verbal ability. Last but not 
least, differing analyses of imaging data may have yielded differing activations. 
Based on data stemming from largely differing paradigms, some researchers have 
nevertheless attempted to make assumptions about the connection between belief-
reasoning and IC. For instance, Saxe et al. (2004) have claimed that “[…] belief attribution 
– even of false beliefs - appears to rely on distinct neural mechanisms from those 
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responsible for response conflict, selection, and inhibitory control.”(Saxe et al., 2004; p. 
101). Others have interpreted existing results differently. Concerning the right TPJ, Decety 
et al. (2007; p. 583) have claimed that “[…] the TPJ implements a component that is not 
domain-specific in social cognition but is rather a more general and powerful 
computational process that operates in many other contexts besides theory of mind.” 
Clearly, these differing interpretations of the same data call for studies that 
investigate both belief-reasoning and IC in one single study. Valid inferences about the 
belief-reasoning / IC connection on the neural level can only be drawn from such a 
methodological approach. 
 
4.6 Evidence for an Independent ToM Module 
 
Results from neuroimaging studies have also been used to clarify whether regions in the 
brain exist that are specific for belief-reasoning, as has frequently been suggested in some 
studies.  
In order for a region to qualify as a specialized region for attributing beliefs (“belief-
reasoning module”), two criteria should be met: generality and specificity (Saxe et al., 
2004). According to the generality criterion, a candidate region should always show 
increased activity to all experimental paradigms requiring the attribution of beliefs. The 
specificity criterion on the other hand asks that such a region is only active during belief-
reasoning and not during other mental operations. For instance, a specialized belief-
reasoning area should not be activated during reasoning about non-mental states or 
because of the paradigm containing social stimuli. In order to meet the specificity criterion, 
control conditions in an experiment should only differ to the respective belief-reasoning 
condition with regard to the attribution of beliefs. All other parameters need to be held 
constant. The so called subtraction logic may only be applied under these circumstances. 
According to this procedure, subtracting the control condition from the belief-reasoning 
condition will result in an area dedicated to the attribution of beliefs. This region would then 
qualify as a belief-reasoning module if it showed increased activity in all other tasks 
requiring the attribution of beliefs (generality) and if no other cognitive process were to be 
associated with activity in this region (specificity). 
One research group has frequently reported to have found a region in the brain that 
meets both criteria to be a belief-reasoning module (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & 
Powell, 2006; Saxe & Wexler, 2005). The belief-reasoning tasks used by this group 
frequently revealed activity in the right TPJ. According to these results, the generality 
criterion seems to be met by the right TPJ. Saxe and colleagues have also claimed that no 
other cognitive concept would be associated with activity in a similar area. Therefore they 
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claim that the right TPJ also meets the specificity criterion and therefore constitutes a 
highly-specialized belief-reasoning module. This view, however, is not shared by other 
researchers who report activity in a similar region in the right TPJ for other cognitive 
concepts independent of mental state attribution (Corbetta et al., 2008; Decety & Lamm, 
2007). 
The dispute over whether the right TPJ or another region qualify as a belief-
reasoning module is exacerbated by a methodological problem. Areas identified as neural 
correlates of belief-reasoning and areas identified as correlates of other cognitive concepts 
stem from different studies. As has been stated above, this methodological flaw can only 
yield vague assumptions about a possible ToM module. Due to several methodological 
considerations, this approach cannot answer the question of whether activity in regions 
related to concepts other than belief-reasoning might overlap with a possible belief-
reasoning region. Data stemming from different studies are therefore unable to serve as 
evidence for meeting the specificity criterion. However, this criterion has to be met in order 
for a brain region to qualify as a belief-reasoning module. 
Clearly, this methodological dilemma can only be solved by investigating belief-
reasoning and another related cognitive concept within a single study. This procedure can 
account for differing sample groups, differing paradigms, differing analyses and differing 
scanning properties. One of the cognitive concepts related to belief-reasoning with 
possible overlapping brain activity in the vividly disputed right TPJ is IC. Thus, single 
studies investigating both IC and belief-reasoning may help shed light on the nature of the 
IC / belief-reasoning connection and on the ToM modularity dispute. 
Two studies have so far attempted to investigate both concepts in a single study. 
These studies will be presented next.  
 
4.7 Investigating IC and Belief-Reasoning in a Single Study 
 
The first fMRI study that attempted to investigate belief-reasoning and EF in one single 
study using a within-subjects design was conducted by Saxe, Schulz, & Jiang (2006). 
Their main experiment was preceded by a reference experiment, which consisted of a 
response selection task and a ToM task.  
The response selection task required subjects to press a button corresponding to 
one line that differed in length from three other lines presented on a screen. In a 
compatible condition of this task, subjects had to press a button that corresponded to the 
actual target location. In the incompatible condition of the task, subjects were required to 
press a button that was shifted two locations from the actual target position. A schematic 
depiction of the response selection task of the reference experiment is shown in figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2. The response selection task used in a study by Saxe et al. (2006). In the compatible 
condition, subjects had to press a button that referred to a line differing in length from the other 
presented lines. In the incompatible condition, subjects had to press a button that was shifted two 
locations from the location showing the line that differed in length. This figure is taken from Saxe et 
al. (2006). Reprinted with permission from Psychology Press. 
 
Conditions were presented in a block design. A ToM reasoning task was also included in 
the reference experiment. This ToM task consisted of written false photograph stories and 
belief stories that were followed by questions that the subject had to answer. An outline of 
Saxe et al.’s ToM task is presented in figure 4.3. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. The ToM reasoning task in Saxe et al.’s (2006) reference experiment is depicted here. 
In both conditions, subjects were required to complete sentences by pressing one of two buttons. In 
the false-belief condition subjects had to attribute a mental state to a protagonist. The false-
photograph condition on the other hand required no such decoupling between a mental state and 
reality. Reproduced from Saxe et al. (2006) with permission from Psychology Press. 
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In Saxe et al.’s reference experiment, activation in the incompatible response selection 
condition was greater than in the compatible response selection condition in regions such 
as bilateral intraparietal sulcus, pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), bilateral frontal 
gyrus, and right middle temporal gyrus. Activity in the belief condition was greater than in 
the false photograph condition in bilateral TPJ, medial PFC, posterior cingulate, bilateral 
amygdala, and right superior temporal gyrus. The authors claim not to have found any 
overlapping brain regions. Unfortunately, their paper does not show significant activation 
from the group analyses rendered on a template brain. Instead, activation patterns of four 
individual subjects were depicted on a template brain. Also, the authors fail to specify 
respective Brodmann areas. 
Results from the reference experiment as described above were then used to tailor 
individual ROIs for the main experiment. During the main experiment, subjects watched a 
false-belief cartoon during which a chocolate bar moved from one box into another box or 
back into its original location. A girl was either watching this or turning away as the bar 
moved again to one of the two boxes. In one condition (“ToM condition”) subjects were 
then asked where they thought the girl thinks that the chocolate was. Another condition 
(“response selection”) asked subjects to apply one of two algorithms to solve the task 
(algorithm 1: “girl facing, then pick last box”; algorithm 2: “girl looking away, pick first box” 
and vice versa). A schematic outline of both tasks in the main experiment is depicted in 
figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4. Outline of the response selection task and the ToM task in Saxe et al.’s (2006) main 
experiment. Both tasks used the exact same visual stimuli. The stimuli presented showed a girl 
either facing or looking away as a chocolate bar was moved from one box (known to the girl) back 
to the same location or to the other box. In the ToM task subjects were instructed to press a button 
corresponding to the box where the girl would think the chocolate bar was. In the response 
selection task subjects were instructed to press buttons according to one of two rules. Rule one, for 
example, required subjects to press a button corresponding to the location of the last box 
containing the chocolate bar, but to do so only if the girl was facing the two boxes. If the girl was not 
facing the boxes subjects were instructed to press a button corresponding to the first box containing 
the chocolate bar. Reproduced from Saxe et al. (2006) with permission from Psychology Press. 
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Saxe et al.’s ROI analysis revealed activity in a common neural network for both 
conditions consisting of regions such as medial PFC, bilateral parietal sulcus, the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) and the left TPJ. Only the right TPJ showed significantly higher 
activation in the ToM condition compared to the algorithm task. According to the authors, 
this finding may support the claim that belief-reasoning relies on executive control but that 
it also requires the recruitment of a specific region, namely the right TPJ. This region 
seems to support the representation of others’ beliefs.  
With their main experiment, Saxe et al. investigated the recruitment of one aspect of 
EF in belief-reasoning: response selection. However, response selection is quite different 
than IC. Unlike IC, response selection does not require the suppression of a prepotent 
response. Therefore, the main experiment does not yield any valid evidence about 
possible contributions of inhibitory control to belief-reasoning. Their reference experiment, 
however, may have tapped IC by requiring subjects to inhibit a prepotent response in the 
incompatible condition of the reference EF experiment. Unfortunately, the belief tasks and 
the EF tasks varied largely which makes it hard to deduct hypotheses about the 
connections between ToM and IC based on these results. Differing results in this 
experiment, for example, may have been due to the largely differing stimuli used. Also, the 
use of a lengthy blocked design may not be suited to build up a prepotent response in 
subjects. 
Furthermore, the authors claimed that this result shows that the right TPJ may 
constitute a highly specialized belief-reasoning module. However, this was done under the 
assumption that no other cognitive process elicits activity in the same brain region. 
Although this was the case in their study, other processes that were not investigated here 
might yield similar patterns of activation.  
A study that has shown just that in a single experiment has recently been conducted  
(Mitchell, 2008). The study attempted to investigate whether the right TPJ is really specific 
for belief-reasoning. As other studies have suggested, the same region seems to be 
engaged in attention reorienting as well (Corbetta et al., 2000; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; 
Serences et al., 2005). An fMRI study was therefore conducted that investigated both 
attentional reorienting and belief-reasoning in one single study. An attentional cueing task 
was used to study attentional reorienting. In this task, subjects had to press a button 
indicating the location of a visual object. This location was cued in 75% and miscued in 
25% of all cases. To study belief-reasoning, the same task as in the reference experiment 
in Saxe et al. (2006; false-belief versus false photograph) was used. The results revealed 
activity related to belief-reasoning in the right TPJ, medial PFC, and the precuneus. 
Attentional reorienting was associated with activity only in the right TPJ region. This 
activation, however, was virtually identical to right TPJ activity associated with belief-
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reasoning. Results from Mitchell’s study in the right TPJ superimposed on a standard brain 
are depicted in figure 4.5. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Activation in the right TPJ region in a study conducted by Mitchell (2008). Two lateral 
views at MNI coordinates x = 57 and x = 60 are shown. Depicted in the color yellow is activity 
related to belief-reasoning. Blue areas refer to significantly increased activity associated with 
attentional reorienting as revealed in an attentional cueing task. The green area refers to activity 
related to both attentional reorienting and belief-reasoning. Reproduced from Mitchell (2008) with 
permission from Oxford journals. 
 
Based on these results, Mitchell argues that the right TPJ is not specific for ToM 
reasoning. As another cognitive process shows activity in the same region, the specificity 
assumption for the right TPJ cannot be upheld. The author then proposes that both 
attentional reorienting and belief-reasoning rely on common processes that need to be 
further investigated. 
For the reasons stated above, Saxe et al.’s (2006) attempt to prove that the right TPJ 
constitutes a specific ToM module was clearly flawed. Mitchell (2008) on the other hand 
has presented solid evidence that other cognitive processes may also engage a region in 
the right TPJ that is identical to activity elicited by the attribution of beliefs. However, 
Mitchell’s study was unable to find activity in the medial PFC, a region that is frequently 
activated in response inhibition tasks. Last but not least, visual stimulation between his 
tasks varied largely, which may also have caused the observed differences in activation. 
The study presented in this thesis attempts to account for some of the flaws 
contained in previous studies attempting to investigate IC and belief-reasoning in a single 
imaging study. This attempt is outlined in the following paragraph. 
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4.8 Aim of the Present Study 
 
The ability to attribute beliefs as well as the ability to inhibit a prepotent response are 
closely related. First hints towards this assumption stemmed from observations that both 
cognitive abilities share a common developmental timetable in childhood. Behavioral 
studies in children have then provided solid evidence that both concepts are indeed 
strongly correlated. IC is the strongest predictor for later false-belief reasoning, far above 
several other factors such as working memory or verbal ability (Perner & Lang, 1999). 
Also, training in IC abilities significantly improves false-belief performance in young 
children and vice versa (Kloo & Perner, 2003). A close behavioral relation between belief-
reasoning and IC has been found across many different cultures (Chasiotis et al., 2007; 
Sabbagh et al., 2006). Furthermore, there is evidence that this close relationship persists 
throughout adulthood and old age. Compromised belief-reasoning in old age seems to be 
related to weakening IC functions (German & Hehman, 2006; McKinnon & Moscovitch, 
2007). Further evidence indicating a strong connection between the attribution of beliefs 
and IC comes from developmental disorders with an impairment in one or both concepts. 
In autism, for example, a frequently observed disability to infer others’ mental states is 
accompanied with compromised EF abilities (Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996). Compromised 
IC is also one of the cardinal symptoms in ADHD. However, belief-reasoning abilities in 
this disorder are widely intact, suggesting a complex interaction between belief-reasoning 
and IC (Sodian et al., 2003). 
Functional imaging and lesion studies have corroborated the view of a close 
relationship between IC and belief-reasoning. Lesions in the medial PFC result in an 
impairment of both belief attribution and IC (Rowe et al., 2001). Lesions in the left TPJ, 
however, seem only to have an effect on belief-reasoning (Samson et al., 2004). 
Functional imaging of both processes indicates an overlap of associated brain regions in 
medial PFC and the bilateral TPJ. This observation, however, is based on largely differing 
studies that have for the most part failed to scrutinize both cognitive processes in a single 
study. Only the results of such combined studies are suitable to test the various 
hypotheses regarding the nature of the belief-reasoning / IC connection. Such studies 
would also help to clarify whether some brain regions may qualify as specialized belief-
reasoning modules. Although two previous studies have attempted such a methodological 
approach, only one of them (Mitchell, 2008) may have actually tapped IC. Results of this 
study indicate that the right TPJ, a former candidate region for a belief-reasoning module, 
is also engaged in other processes independent of mental state attribution. Nevertheless, 
this study used stimuli that differed largely across the different conditions. It is undeniable 
that the activation found in this study may have been due to differing stimulus properties. 
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Also, Mitchell’s study was unable to show IC-related activity in the medial PFC, a region 
frequently reported as a neural correlate of response inhibition. 
The study presented in this thesis will therefore try to further clarify the connection 
between belief-reasoning and IC. This is done by investigating both concepts in a single 
study by means of a within-subjects design. Also, this study attempts to account for 
methodological flaws that have become apparent in previous studies. Stimuli will be used 
this time that only differ marginally between conditions in terms of visual properties. Also, 
the most commonly used task for response inhibition, a Go / No-go task, is taken to 
assess IC. In order to measure neural activity related to belief-reasoning, a false-belief 
task will be used. The false-belief task is the crucial task to measure the ability to attribute 
beliefs. Results from this study can help clarify the nature of the belief-reasoning / IC 
relationship in adulthood. However, the results stemming from this study are unable to 
make any assumption about this relationship in childhood or how either of these concepts 
influences the other during their emergence in childhood. A possible overlap between 
brain activity related to the two cognitive processes can indicate how closely these are 
related to each other. Largely overlapping areas of activation, for instance, could indicate 
that the ability to inhibit a response is possibly an essential component of belief-reasoning 
or even vice versa. Regions that are explicitly activated by belief-reasoning on the other 
hand could qualify as candidate regions for a belief-reasoning module. This of course 
would also entail clarifying the role of the right TPJ as a hypothesized belief-reasoning 
module. While some researchers claim that this region does indeed constitute a specific 
area for belief-reasoning, others have claimed that this exact region also supports other 
cognitive processes. Finding concurring activity for both IC and belief-reasoning in the 
right TPJ would contradict accounts of the right TPJ serving a specialized area for ToM 
reasoning. 
Last but not least, this study’s results could also help replicate findings of a previous 
belief-reasoning study that had used a false-belief task and compared it to a true-belief 
task (Sommer et al., 2007). Both of Sommer et al.’s tasks were modelled according to the 
Sally-Anne paradigm. An almost identical approach was used in this study. 
Based on previous studies investigating belief-reasoning and IC, I suggest the 
following hypotheses for the present study: 
 
- Increased brain activity in the false-belief condition compared to the true-belief condition 
is likely to be found in the following areas: bilateral TPJ, medial PFC. This hypothesis is 
based on a large array of imaging studies that have found concurring activity in these 
areas. 
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- Neural correlates of IC (as reflected in the contrast No-go > Go) are likely to be located in 
a largely right-lateralized network consisting of the DLPFC, the bilateral TPJ and the 
medial PFC. Based on previous results it is suggested that medial PFC activity related to 
false-belief reasoning is slightly anterior to IC-related medial PFC activity. 
 
- Resulting overlapping activity for IC and belief-reasoning is expected in areas such as 
the right TPJ and possibly parts of the medial PFC. This would indicate that basic 
processes exist that support both belief-reasoning and IC. 
 
- In addition, it seems unlikely that the right TPJ could only be implicated in this study’s 
belief-reasoning condition. Based on results from previous studies, the right TPJ is likely to 
be implicated in this study’s IC condition as well. This could refute accounts of the right 
TPJ as a specialized ToM module.  
 
- No hypotheses can be made at this point about the role of the left TPJ in both belief-
reasoning and IC. Although lesion studies point to a crucial role of the left TPJ in belief-
reasoning, only few imaging studies have reported activity in this area. Also, accounts of 
left TPJ activity during IC tasks are inconsistent across the studies reviewed here. Thus, 
the results from this thesis may clarify the role of the left TPJ in both IC and the attribution 
of beliefs. 
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5. Methods 
 
The following methods section begins with a brief description of fMRI, the imaging 
technique used in this study. The subject characteristics and the experimental design will 
be specified next. This is followed by a description of the statistical analysis of behavioral 
and functional imaging data. 
 
5.1 FMRI imaging 
 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) as used in the present study is based on 
the measurement of an electro-magnetic field which can be measured in all atomic 
particles with an odd number of protons (Goebel & Kriegeskorte, 2004). This magnetic 
field is induced by protons revolving around their axis, a property that has also been 
dubbed “spin”. A common element in biological tissue that possesses only one proton is 
hydrogen.  
By applying a strong static magnetic field to the tissue in the scanner, these spins 
are aligned on a common axis. In the present study a magnetic field of 3 Teslas was used, 
which is equal to about the 60,000 fold amount of the earth’s magnetic field. 
The application of another temporary electro-magnetic pulse at radio-frequency 
causes a slight tilting of the proton’s circular movement. This type of movement is referred 
to as “precession”. All protons now circulate around a common axis. Then the previously 
applied short electro-magnetic pulse is halted. This causes a decay of the former magnetic 
field which was previously aligned transversally towards the static magnetic field. This 
mechanism is referred to as transverse (T2) relaxation. The time for the decay of the 
transverse magnetic field is shorter in biological tissue compared to most non-biological 
tissue. Therefore, the time for transverse relaxation in biological tissue has also been 
called T2*. The time for transverse magnetic field decay due to the on- and offset of an 
electro-magnetic stimulus is influenced by the type of tissue or molecules contained in a 
certain area. The same is true for the brain. Hemoglobin as a crucial component of the 
blood that is able to bind to oxygen and release it to the nerve cells as neural activity 
demands energy in the form of oxygen and glucose. 
Interestingly, neural activity in nerve cells is related to an increase in oxygenated 
hemoglobin that takes place several seconds after the neural activity. This may be 
regarded as an anticipatory mechanism to prepare the affected nerve cell for further 
activity. Thus, active nerve cells in the brain show an increase of oxygenated hemoglobin 
that is also depicted in a characteristical T2* time that differs significantly from the T2* time 
of de-oxygenated hemoglobin. This mechanism leads to a specific signal that can be 
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detected after the offset of the previously described radio-frequency pulse and yields 
information about the underlying ratio of de-oxygenated and oxygenated hemoglobin in the 
brain tissue investigated. This effect is referred to as the Blood-Oxygen-Level-Dependant 
(BOLD) effect and was first discovered by Ogawa, Lee, Kay, & Tank (1990). A combined 
study including local field potential measurements, single- and multi unit spiking activity 
measurements and BOLD-dependant fMRI showed that the BOLD signal serves as a 
reliable estimate of underlying neural activity elicited by a stimulus (Logothetis et al., 
2001). The BOLD response shows a specific time course that is also depicted in figure 
5.1. After a stimulus has been presented to a subject, this will cause a so called “initial dip” 
of the measured magnetic signal in affected brain regions after some 2 seconds. 
Unfortunately, this dip cannot be measured properly in fMRI as of yet. However, the 
following positive BOLD response that is related to an increase of oxygenated hemoglobin 
can be measured. The signal obtained reaches its maximum some 6 to 8 seconds after 
stimulus onset. After about 12 seconds the BOLD response will go into a so-called 
“undershoot” and retreat back to its baseline.  
In scientific fMRI experiments, the BOLD response measured is then associated with 
its respective experimental condition (also referred to as “regressor”) which is specified as 
a series of time points with specific durations. Comparisons in terms of neural activity 
between conditions can now be conducted statistically by comparing regressor-related 
estimates of the BOLD response. 
The statistic analysis of the current study’s imaging data is described in more detail 
in chapter 5.6.2.2. 
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Figure 5.1. Blood-Oxygen-Level-Dependant (BOLD) response as measured in fMRI. After an “initial 
dip” some 2 seconds after stimulus onset, the BOLD response reaches its peak after about 6 to 8 
seconds. This overshoot related to an increase of oxygenated hemoglobin is called “positive BOLD-
response”. Before retreating back to its baseline after approximately 12 seconds, the BOLD 
response briefly dips below baseline (“undershoot”).  
 
The following section will describe the subject sample and properties of the experimental 
design, followed by detailed specifications about the analysis of obtained data. 
 
5.2 Pilot Experiment 
 
Prior to the actual experiment, a pilot experiment was conducted. In this pilot experiment 9 
subjects (M = 23.8 years; range 23-24; 3 male) conducted several experiments in a 3-
Tesla Siemens Allegra Head Scanner (Siemens Inc., Erlangen, Germany). The same 
scanner was also used in the subsequent main experiment. The purpose of the pilot 
experiment was to test whether the paradigms used to measure IC-related and belief 
reasoning-related would result in a BOLD signal that would be sufficient for further 
comparisons. During the pilot experiment in the fMRI scanner, different picture 
presentation durations, different inter-trial interval lengths as well as differing numbers and 
arrays of pictures were presented in order to find an optimal paradigm measuring the 
underlying BOLD-response. In the subsequent analysis of the data from the pilot 
experiment, different analysis approaches of data analysis were used in order to find the 
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optimal analysis for rendering statistical estimates of the BOLD signal attributable to 
observed behavioral phenomena. 
The different approaches testing for both optimal stimuli presentation as well as 
optimal statistical analysis thereof resulted in an experimental design and analysis that 
was subsequently used in the main experiment. The properties of this experimental design 
as well as the statistical analysis used in the main experiment are presented in the 
following chapters of this methods section. None of the subject data from the pilot 
experiment were used in the analysis presented in the following sections. 
 
5.3 Subjects 
 
Twelve subjects (M = 23.7 years, range 23-24; 5 male) with no reported history of 
neurological or psychiatric impairment participated in the study. All subjects had either 
normal or corrected to normal vision. All participants were right-handed. Subjects were 
recruited from the University of Regensburg student body. A rough estimate of general 
intelligence was assessed with the German version of the culture fair intelligence test 
(CFT-1; Cattell et al., 1997). Mean intelligence as measured by the CFT-1 in the subject 
group was 117.73 (SD = 10.67). All participants gave their written informed consent for 
participation (appendix A).  
 
5.4 Experimental Design 
 
Every subject conducted both a belief-reasoning experiment and an IC experiment. Both 
experiments were administered within a single session in the fMRI scanner.  
Prior to the actual experiments in the scanner, subjects were shown a standardized 
paper instruction about the upcoming tasks (see appendix B). Also, all subjects received a 
training session on a standard personal computer outside the scanner that consisted of 12 
belief-reasoning trials and 20 IC trials.  
Half of the subjects were then randomly assigned to start with the belief-reasoning 
experiment, the other half started with the IC experiment first. FMRI scanning was not 
interrupted between the first and the second experiment in order to prevent 
inhomogeneities of the scanner’s magnetic field. Between the two experimental tasks the 
subjects were shown a fixation cross at the center of the screen for 40 seconds. This was 
followed by a 12-second instruction for the subsequent task. After completion of functional 
T2* image acquisition, a structural image of the subject’s brain was obtained. 
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Entire scanning time including functional and structural image acquisition for every 
subject was approximately 32 minutes (belief-reasoning experiment: 10 min., IC 
experiment: 15 min., structural image acquisition: 7 min.). 
After completing the experiment, subjects were administered the CFT-1 paper-pencil 
test as a rough measure of general intelligence abilities. 
The Belief-Reasoning experiment and the IC experiment are described in more detail 
in the following two paragraphs. 
 
5.4.1 Belief-Reasoning Experiment 
 
In each trial, we presented a non-verbal cartoon story consisting of 3 pictures each. Each 
story showed a protagonist acting on the basis of a correct (true-belief) or incorrect (false -
belief) representation of reality. 
A total of 10 different story plots (consisting of differing protagonists, objects, and 
hiding places) were used in this experiment. 
Stories were modelled according to the Sally-Anne paradigm (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1985).  
The first picture showed two children in a room with one of the children putting an 
object into an empty container such as box or a basket. The second picture showed that 
one of the children had either left the room (false-belief condition) or had remained in the 
room (true-belief condition) with the other child transferring the previous object from one 
hiding place to the other. In the third picture the child that had either left (false-belief 
condition) or stayed in the room (true-belief condition) was shown searching for the object 
in one of the two hiding places present in the room. Subjects were instructed to press a 
button with the left index finger of their right hand if they had expected the behavior of the 
child or to press a different button with the right middle finger if they had not expected the 
child’s behavior. Cartoon characters showed an expected behavior in 50% of all trials. We 
instructed the subjects to press the button as accurately and as quickly as possible after 
the onset of the third picture. Subjects were instructed to do so within the presentation 
time of the third picture.  
Every picture appeared on the screen for 2000ms. The fixation period between trials 
varied between 2000 and 3000ms in order to jitter the trial onset time, thus rendering an 
average trial length of 8500ms. The stimulus shown during the fixation period was made 
up out of a scrambled story picture in order to prevent changes in brain activity that could 
be attributed to differing visual properties of the fixation stimulus compared to the visual 
stimuli of the actual story (e.g., contrast, luminance). 
A schematic outline of both belief-reasoning conditions is depicted in figure 5.2. 
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Thirty-five true-belief (TB) trials and 35 false-belief (FB) trials were randomly 
presented within the belief task. Thus, the belief-reasoning experiment lasted 
approximately 10 minutes. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Course of the false-belief and the true-belief condition of the belief-reasoning 
experiment with respective durations. Subjects were instructed to indicate with the press of a button 
whether they had expected the person who either left or stayed in the room to perform the behavior 
shown in the third picture. 
 
5.4.2 Inhibitory Control Experiment 
 
As an IC task, a classical Go / No-go paradigm was used. Subjects were shown the 
identical pictures that were also used as the second picture in the belief-reasoning task 
(thus showing one or two children in a room). Pictures were randomly drawn from 10 
different story plots, thus differing in terms of story characters, objects, and hiding places. 
Pictures were separated by a fixation period (consisting of a scrambled story picture). 
Subjects were instructed to press a button with the index finger of their right hand 
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whenever the number of children in the present picture differed from the number of 
children in the previous picture (Go condition). Subjects were told to refrain from pressing 
a button if the number of children shown in the picture was the same as in the previous 
picture (No-go condition). Stimuli were presented for 1000ms each with a fixation period 
between pictures that varied between 3000 and 4000ms in order to jitter the trial onset 
time. Thus, average trial length was 4500ms. A schematic outline of the IC experiment is 
shown in figure 5.3.  
A total of 160 Go trials and 40 No-go trials were randomly presented. Hence, the 
ratio between Go and No-go trials was 4:1. This was done in order to build up a prepotent 
tendency to respond with a button press to No-go trials as well. The IC experiment lasted 
about 15 minutes. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3. The two conditions of the inhibitory control experiment (inside the grey frame) and 
respective stimulus durations. The Go condition showed a number of children different from the 
previous picture and required subjects to press a button with their right index finger. In the No-go 
condition the number of children in the present picture was the same as in the previous picture. 
Subjects were instructed to withhold a response in this condition. 
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Both the belief-reasoning and the IC experiment were generated with Presentation 11.3 
software (Neurobehavioral Systems Inc., Albany, CA). Behavioral data such as reaction 
times and accuracy were also recorded with Presentation 11.3. Inside the scanner, 
responses were retrieved with a LUMItouch optical response device (Photon Control, 
Burnaby, Canada). Stimuli were back-projected onto a mirror inside the scanner with a D-
ILA LCD Projector (JVC Corp., Yokohama, Japan).  
 
5.5 FMRI Set Up and Design 
 
A 3-Tesla Siemens Allegra Head Scanner (Siemens Inc., Erlangen, Germany) was used to 
record imaging data. The scanner acquired echo-planar-imaging (EPI) sequences using 
fast gradients. During T2* data acquisition, 32 slices (whole brain; slice thickness = 3mm, 
no skip) were recorded in interleaved order with a Time-to-Repeat (TR) of 2000ms, a 
Time-to-Echo (TE) of 30ms, a flip angle of 90°, a Field-of-View (FoV) of 192 x 192 mm and 
a voxel size of 3 x 3 x 3 mm. A total of 790 images were recorded in the entire experiment. 
A structural image was recorded from every subject at the end of functional data 
acquisition. These T1-weighted images were obtained using an MPRAGE (Magnetization 
Prepared Rapid Acquisition Gradient Echo) pulse sequence (TR = 2250ms, TE = 3.93ms, 
flip angle = 9°, FoV = 256 x 256 mm) scanning 160 slices with isotropic voxels of 1 x 1 x 1 
mm. 
 
5.6 Data Analysis 
 
5.6.1 Behavioral Data 
 
Accuracies and response times for performance in the belief-reasoning experiment were 
compared statistically between conditions by using paired t-tests at a statistical 
significance level of p = .05. SPSS 16 (SPSS Corp., Chicago, IL) software was used for 
the latter analyses. As the No-go condition of the IC experiment did not require a button 
press, no statistical comparisons between the Go and the No-go condition were 
conducted. 
 
5.6.2 Functional Data 
 
All images obtained in the scanner were preprocessed and analyzed statistically with 
SPM5 software (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm5/), a free program that is 
based on Matlab 7.0 software (The MathWorks, Natick, MA).  
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Preprocessing and analyzing steps will be described next. 
 
5.6.2.1 Preprocessing 
 
a) DICOM to NIFTI Transformation 
 
Functional and structural imaging data in the scanner were recorded in DICOM (Digital 
Imaging and Communications in Medicine) format. In order to preprocess and analyze 
these data in a format recognizable by SPM5, these data were transformed to NIfTI 
(Neuroimaging Informatics Technology Initiative) format. 
 
b) Slice Timing 
 
Next, all functional data were slice timed. This routine accounts for the fact that an entire 
scan of the brain takes several seconds to record (time-to-repeat (TR); 2 seconds in the 
present study). This leads to the problem that all picture slices recorded within this time-
frame are measured at differing time points. As slices were recorded in an interleaved 
fashion (meaning that slices with an even number were recorded first), adjacent slices 
were measured with a time difference of TR / 2, which equals 1000ms in the present case. 
However, each slice needs to correspond to the same point in time for further analysis. 
Thus, the slice timing routine slightly shifts the original data. This results in new data 
estimates simulating that all slices were recorded at the same time. 
 
c) Realignment 
 
This routine accounts for motion artefacts. Functional images were realigned to one 
functional image. To achieve this, a least squares approach was used and images were 
spatially transformed using 3 parameters for translation and 3 parameters for rotation. 
These parameters were acquired during the scanning session. A functional mean image 
was written in this routine for further use in the next preprocessing routine. 
 
d) Coregistration 
 
In this preprocessing step, parameters were estimated that are needed to realign the 
functional and the structural images. To facilitate this procedure, the necessary 
parameters were estimated for realigning the structural image to the previously estimated 
functional mean image. 
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e) Normalization 
 
Structural brain properties differ largely across subjects. In order to introduce single-
subject data into a group analysis, the individual imaging data have to be altered for 
comparisons across subjects. In the present study, functional images were normalized into 
a standard space as defined by a template structural brain image. Here, a standard 
template brain (“T1.mni”) contained in SPM5 was used. This template represents the 
average of 152 structural brain images from different subjects as recorded at the Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI). Also in this step, functional images were re-written to voxels 
measuring 2 x 2 x 2 mm. 
 
f) Smoothing 
 
In this routine, voxels were spatially smoothed by applying a Gaussian kernel of a 
specified width. In the present study a full-width half maximum (FWHM) of 8 mm was 
used. Smoothing increases the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and accounts for inter-
individual functional and anatomical differences. 
 
5.6.2.2 Statistical Analysis 
 
Events of Interest / Design Matrix 
 
In this first step after preprocessing, time intervals (regressors) of particular interest to the 
study were specified first. This was conducted on single-subject level. A so-called event-
related design was used in this study. Unlike block-designed studies, this approach 
investigates BOLD-signal changes related to relatively short time-periods. In the present 
study, events of interest lasted for 1000ms. So called events of no interest were also 
included in the analysis. These events within the experiment were of no particular interest 
for later comparisons but improve the signal to noise ratio by accounting for variance 
related to the underlying BOLD-signal. 
Events of interest as well as events of no interest were then synchronized with 
corresponding functional images. Also, 6 motion parameters for translation and rotation 
were included in the statistical analysis for further explanation of variance. All of the above 
information made up the so-called design matrix. 
In the belief-reasoning experiment, trials for the false-belief and the true-belief 
condition were separated. In order to capture false- and true-belief reasoning, a regressor 
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lasting 1000ms was defined as starting 500ms after the onset of the second picture. In the 
false-belief condition, this second picture showed a child transferring an object with the 
other child having left the room. In the true-belief condition, the second picture showed a 
child transferring an object with the other child watching. All 70 false-belief and true-belief 
trials were introduced into the subsequent statistical analysis. 
For the IC experiment, Go and No-go trials were modelled separately. In addition, 
only correct trials in both conditions were introduced into the analysis for further 
comparisons. However, missing Go trials and No-go false alarms were also included 
separately in the design matrix as events of no interest. In both the Go and the No-go 
condition, the 1000ms presentation time of the picture stimuli was specified as a 
regressor. 
Regressors from the belief-reasoning experiment and the IC experiment were all 
introduced into the same statistical model. 
 
General Linear Model-Estimation 
 
Statistical significance on single subject level for the previously compiled model was 
subsequently estimated. This was done by means of multiple t-tests based on the 
assumptions of the General Linear Model (GLM). In the GLM the equation Y = X * ß + e is 
assumed for every voxel. Y stands for the imaging data obtained, X stands for the 
specifications of the design matrix and ß stands for to be determined parameters (thus the 
BOLD signal change attributed to the experimental paradigm). The variable e stands for 
errors that cannot be accounted for by the other variables X and ß.   
Subsequent results were then computed based on the ßs estimated according to the 
GLM.  
 
Results 
 
After the estimation of the ß parameters on single subject level, these results were 
introduced into a group analysis. For this purpose a random-effects analysis was 
conducted. This type of group-analysis accounts for inter-individual anatomical and 
functional variability. As such, a random effects analysis is more conservative than the 
analysis of group data in a fixed-effects analysis. In fixed-effects analyses, variability 
between subjects is ignored, therefore no inferences beyond the specific subjects at the 
specific time of data acquisition may be drawn. Because a random-effects analysis was 
conducted here, it allows for inferences beyond the specific subject sample investigated in 
this study. 
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In the results routine, time intervals (regressors) that were previously specified in the 
design matrix were now contrasted with other regressors of interest. One-tailed t-tests 
were utilized for comparisons between conditions. A cluster defining threshold of T > 5 
(equal to p ≤ .0001) was set for the comparisons True-Belief > Baseline and False-Belief > 
Baseline. This conservative threshold was chosen because of the expected strong 
activations typically revealed in comparisons against baseline. For the comparisons False-
Belief > True-Belief and No-Go > Go a cluster-defining threshold of T > 4 (equals p ≤ .001) 
was defined. Significant activation of a cluster was reported if the corrected p-value of a 
cluster did not surpass .05. 
Significant results were ultimately displayed on template images that are part of the 
SPM5 software package.  
Results from the group analysis will be described in detail in the following section. 
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6. Results 
 
6.1 Behavioral Results 
 
In both the false-belief and the true-belief condition of the belief-reasoning experiment 
subjects were asked if they had expected the protagonist’s behavior. In the false-belief 
condition, subjects answered this question correctly in 95.5% (SD = 3.3%) of all trials (33.4 
(SD = 1.16) out of 35 trials). In the true-belief condition, average accuracy was 96.4% (SD 
= 2.1%) or 33.7 (SD = .75) trials. A comparison of accuracy in both conditions by means of 
a paired t-test revealed no statistically significant difference between the two conditions (t 
(df=11) = 0.979; p = .349, n.s.).  
Average accuracy in the IC experiment was assessed for the conditions Go and No-
go. Mean accuracy in the Go condition was 96.3% (SD = 2.1%), equalling an average of 
154.1 (SD = 3.3) correct trials out of 160 Go trials presented. In the No-go condition 
subjects showed a mean accuracy (i.e. refraining from button press) of 89.8% (SD = 
12.0%) or 35.9 (SD = 4.8) correct trials out of 40 No-go trials presented in the experiment. 
There was a statistical tendency for higher accuracy in the Go condition when compared 
to the No-go condition (t (df=11) = 1.997; p = .071). Accuracy in the belief-reasoning and 
the IC experiment is shown in figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1. Accuracy and corresponding standard deviations in percent of correct trials for the false-
belief (FB), the true-belief (TB), the Go, and the No-go condition. Paired t-tests revealed no 
significant difference in accuracy between the FB and the TB condition. However, there was a 
statistical tendency towards higher accuracies in the Go condition when compared to the No-go 
condition (t (df=11) = 1.997; p = .071). 
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Mean reaction time in the false-belief condition of the belief-reasoning experiment was 
754.9ms (SD = 148.9ms). In the true-belief condition, average reaction time across all 
subjects was 744.8ms (SD = 150.1ms). This difference was not significant as revealed by 
a paired t-test (t (df=11) = 1.144; p = .277, n.s.).  
In the IC experiment, mean reaction time in correct Go trials was 534.0ms (SD = 
64.3ms). No response times were recorded for the No-go trials as they did not require any 
buttons to be pressed. 
Reaction times in the belief-reasoning and the IC experiment are displayed in figure 
6.2. 
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Figure 6.2. This figure depicts reaction times (RTs) and standard deviations for the false-belief (FB) 
and the true-belief (TB) condition in the belief-reasoning experiment as well as for correct Go trials 
in the IC experiment. There was no significant difference in RTs between the FB and the TB 
condition. No RTs were assessed for correct No-go trials since the No-go condition required the 
withholding of a response. 
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6.2 Functional Imaging Results 
 
Functional imaging results in the belief-reasoning and the IC experiment are described in 
more detail in the following section. Also, a graphical comparison of brain areas 
associated with false-belief reasoning and brain areas involved in IC will be presented. All 
results presented in this section stem from the random effects group analysis based on the 
individual results of the 12 subjects participating in this study. 
 
6.2.1 Belief-Reasoning Experiment 
 
6.2.1.1 True-belief > Baseline 
 
Baseline activity was subtracted from activity in the true-belief condition in order to reveal 
brain areas associated with cognitive processes required for solving the true-belief task. 
Mastery of this task does not require a separation between reality and the protagonist’s 
belief (decoupling). Therefore, this contrast should in theory not contain brain activity 
specifically dedicated to the decoupling between mentality and reality. Significant activity 
in this comparison was found in the following areas: bilateral TPJ, bilateral medial frontal 
gyrus, bilateral superior frontal gyrus, bilateral inferior frontal gyrus, right middle temporal 
gyrus, bilateral postcentral gyrus, left precentral gyrus, left thalamus and bilateral 
precuneus. Significant activity in this comparison is reported at a voxel-wise threshold of T 
= 5 and a corrected p-value of p ≤ .05 (cluster-level). Table 6.1 contains corresponding 
BAs, cluster sizes, peak MNI coordinates and T-values. Figure 6.3 shows significant brain 
activity for this contrast on a template brain. 
This activity is also depicted in figure 6.5 (green and yellow shading) together with 
activity in the False-Belief > Baseline comparison (red and yellow shading).
Results 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 75 
Table 6.1. Significantly increased brain activity related to the contrast True-belief > Baseline. This 
table includes information on the name and hemisphere of activated brain regions as well as 
associated Brodmann areas, cluster sizes in voxels, MNI coordinates, and T-values for each 
cluster’s peak voxel.  
 
True-Belief > Baseline 
Hemisphere & region Brodmann 
areas 
Cluster size in 
voxelsa  
MNI coordinates 
   x       y       z 
T-valuesb  
L precentral gyrus, L postcentral 
gyrus, L supramarginal gyrus, L 
angular gyrus, L inferior parietal 
lobule (includes TPJ region) 
1, 2, 3, 4, 
39, 40 
5298 -32  -20 72 15.68 
R middle temporal gyrus, R 
superior temporal gyrus, R middle 
occipital gyrus (includes TPJ 
region) 
37, 39, 40 2146 60 -40 6 11.27 
R postcentral gyrus 1, 2 721 62 -18 44 9.67 
R inferior frontal gyrus 44, 45 936 52 8 46 9.20 
L thalamus N/A 233 -12 -14 4 9.16 
L inferior frontal gyrus, L 
precentral gyrus 
9, 44, 45 679 -56 0 42 9.13 
Bil. superior frontal gyrus, bil. 
medial frontal gyrus 
6, 8 357 0 20 60 8.47 
Bil. precuneus 7 586 6 -66 58 7.04 
 
Notes. a Voxel sizes amounted to 2 x 2 x 2 mm. 
           
b T-values are given at a corrected p-value of p ≤.05. 
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Figure 6.3. Significantly increased brain activity in the true-belief condition when compared to 
baseline. Activity is shown on a template brain at a voxel-wise threshold of T = 5 and a corrected p-
value of p ≤ .05 on cluster-level. A detailed description of activated brain areas can be found in 
table 6.1. 
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6.2.1.2 False-Belief > Baseline 
 
In this comparison activity related to the baseline of the entire experiment (i.e. average 
brain activity in the experiment minus activity related to the regressor “false-belief”) was 
subtracted from activity in the false-belief condition. This was done in order to identify 
areas related to false-belief reasoning. This includes activity related to a decoupling 
between reality and a protagonist’s false belief as well as activity related to more general 
task demands. These general task demands are also likely to be present when solving a 
true-belief task. 
Significant activity in the comparison False-Belief > Baseline at a voxel-wise 
threshold of T = 5 and a corrected p-value of p ≤ .05 on cluster-level was found in the 
following prominent areas: bilateral TPJ, left superior parietal lobule, bilateral middle 
occipital gyrus, left precentral gyrus, left postcentral gyrus, right middle and superior 
temporal gyrus, bilateral middle frontal gyrus, left inferior frontal gyrus, right superior 
frontal gyrus, and right precuneus. 
Corresponding BAs, cluster sizes (in number of voxels), peak MNI coordinates and 
T-values are specified in table 6.2. Significant brain activity superimposed on a 
standardized brain template is depicted in figure 6.4. Figure 6.5 shows the same activation 
in red and yellow shading on a template brain together with significant activity in the 
comparison True-Belief > Baseline (green and yellow shading). 
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Table 6.2. Brain activity as revealed in the contrast False-Belief > Baseline. Given in this chart are 
the names and hemisphere information for every active brain region as well as corresponding 
Brodmann areas, cluster sizes, MNI coordinates, and T-values of each cluster’s peak voxel. 
 
False-Belief > Baseline 
Hemisphere & region Brodmann 
areas 
Cluster size in 
voxelsa  
MNI coordinates 
   x       y       z 
T-valuesb  
L precentral gyrus, L postcentral 
gyrus, L middle occipital gyrus, L 
supramarginal gyrus, L angular 
gyrus, L inferior parietal lobule, L 
superior parietal lobule (includes 
TPJ region)  
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 7, 8, 39, 
40 
8935 -46 -80 16 13.05 
R middle temporal gyrus, R 
superior temporal gyrus, R middle 
occipital gyrus 
22, 37, 39 2599 64 -36 0 13.04 
R inferior frontal gyrus, R middle 
frontal gyrus 
9, 44, 45 2095 18 -4 2 12.38 
L inferior frontal gyrus, L middle 
frontal gyrus, L thalamus 
9, 44, 45 2730 -44 22 44 9.78 
R supramarginal gyrus, R inferior 
parietal lobule (includes TPJ 
region) 
40 1433 50 -50 32 9.44 
R superior frontal gyrus, R middle 
frontal gyrus 
6 136 14 -10 70 8.84 
L middle frontal gyrus 10 127 -48 46 -14 8.01 
 
Notes. a Voxel sizes amounted to 2 x 2 x 2 mm. 
           
b T-values are given at a corrected p-value of p ≤.05.
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Figure 6.4. Significantly increased brain activity in the false-belief condition when compared to 
baseline. Activity is shown on a template brain at a voxel-wise threshold of T = 5 and a corrected p-
value of p ≤ .05 (cluster-level). For a description of activated brain areas, please refer to table 6.2. 
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Figure 6.5. Brain activity in the contrast False-Belief > Baseline (red shading) and True-Belief > 
Baseline (green shading) at a voxel-wise threshold of T = 5 and a corrected p-value of p ≤ .05 
(cluster-level). Areas in yellow shading show activity in both comparisons. A detailed description of 
active brain areas in the contrasts False-Belief > Baseline and True-Belief > Baseline can be found 
in tables 6.1 and 6.2, respectively. 
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6.2.1.3 False-Belief > True-Belief 
 
A direct statistical comparison was conducted in order to identify brain areas related to a 
mere decoupling between an individual’s false belief and the true state of reality. This was 
achieved by subtracting brain activity associated with the true-belief condition from brain 
activity related to the false-belief condition. For this comparison a voxel-wise threshold of T 
= 4 and a p-value of p ≤ .05 on cluster level was used. Significant activity in this 
comparison was revealed in the bilateral TPJ, bilateral middle frontal gyrus, left precentral 
gyrus, bilateral medial frontal gyrus, bilateral middle temporal gyrus, left thalamus, bilateral 
precuneus, and bilateral superior frontal gyrus. BAs, cluster sizes, peak MNI coordinates 
and T-values corresponding to the above areas are delineated in table 6.3. Figure 6.6 
displays significant brain activity for the latter contrast superimposed on a standard brain. 
Sectional views of significant clusters of activity are shown in the subsequent figure 6.7. 
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Table 6.3. Brain regions showing significantly increased activity in the contrast False-Belief > True-
Belief. The table contains the names and hemisphere of every activated cluster, associated 
Brodmann areas, cluster sizes, MNI coordinates, and T-values for each cluster’s peak voxel. 
 
False-Belief > True-Belief 
Hemisphere & region Brodmann 
areas 
Cluster size in 
voxelsa  
MNI coordinates 
   x       y       z 
T-valuesb  
L middle frontal gyrus, L 
precentral gyrus 
8, 9 523 -42 22 42 10.04 
R middle frontal gyrus 6, 8 129 32 4 52 9.12 
R supramarginal gyrus, R inferior 
parietal lobule (incl. TPJ region) 
40 505 52 -50 38 8.92 
Bil. medial frontal gyrus 9, 10 269 6 66 22 7.06 
R middle temporal gyrus 21 161 66 -36 -2 6.89 
L supramarginal gyrus, L inferior 
parietal lobule (incl. TPJ region) 
39, 40 543 -52 -50 32 6.89 
L middle frontal gyrus 10 182 -40 52 -4 6.86 
L middle temporal gyrus 21 89 -64 -38 -10 6.68 
L thalamus N/A 162 -18 4 14 6.36 
Bil. precuneus 7 179 -2 -62 44 6.24 
Bil. medial frontal gyrus, bil. 
superior frontal gyrus 
6, 8 352 10 34 46 6.19 
R middle frontal gyrus 9, 46 84 52 28 30 5.98 
R middle frontal gyrus, R superior 
frontal gyrus 
10 110 30 58 10 5.72 
 
Notes. a Voxel sizes amounted to 2 x 2 x 2 mm. 
           
b T-values are given at a corrected p-value of p ≤.05.
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Figure 6.6. Significantly increased brain activity in the false-belief condition when compared to the 
true-belief condition. Significant activity is shown on a template brain at a voxel-wise threshold of T 
= 4 and a corrected p-value of p ≤ .05 (cluster-level). Please refer to table 6.3 for a detailed 
description of activated brain areas. 
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Figure 6.7. A sectional view of significant brain activity in the contrast False-Belief > True-Belief at 
MNI coordinates x = 3, y = 60 and z = 35. Brain activity in this contrast is shown at a voxel-wise 
threshold of T = 4 and a corrected p-value of p ≤ .05 on cluster-level. Numbers correspond to 
significantly active brain regions (1 = bilateral medial frontal gyrus and superior frontal gyrus (BA 6, 
8), 2 = bilateral medial frontal gyrus (BA 9, 10), 3 = bilateral precuneus, 4 = left middle frontal gyrus, 
5 = right middle frontal gyrus, 6 = left TPJ, 7 = right TPJ). The color bar depicts corresponding T-
values. 
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6.2.2 Inhibitory Control Experiment 
 
6.2.2.1 No-go > Go 
 
Activity in the condition Go was subtracted from activity related to the No-go condition in 
order to isolate brain areas associated with response inhibition. A voxel-wise threshold of 
T = 4 and a p-value of p ≤ .05 on cluster level was used for this comparison. Brain activity 
related to IC was found in a largely right-hemispheric network consisting of right inferior 
and middle frontal gyrus, right middle and superior temporal gyrus, right medial frontal 
gyrus, right superior frontal gyrus, and the right TPJ. The only significantly activated area 
in the left hemisphere was the left TPJ. Brain areas as revealed in the contrast No-go > 
Go are described in more detail in table 6.4. Figure 6.8 depicts this IC-related pattern of 
activity superimposed on a template brain. Significant brain activity in areas below the 
surface of the brain is displayed in a sectional view in figure 6.9. 
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Table 6.4. Significantly increased brain activity in the contrast No-go > Go. Depicted here are the 
names and hemisphere of activated brain regions, associated Brodmann areas, cluster sizes in 
voxels, MNI coordinates, and T-values corresponding to every cluster peak voxel. 
 
No-go  > Go 
Hemisphere & region Brodmann 
areas 
Cluster size in 
voxelsa  
MNI coordinates 
   x       y       z 
T-valuesb  
R inferior frontal gyrus, R middle 
frontal gyrus 
8, 9, 44, 45, 
47 
2390 48 20 -4 9.93 
L supramarginal gyrus, L inferior 
parietal lobule (includes TPJ 
region) 
40 138 -62 -56 36 8.78 
R middle temporal gyrus, R 
superior temporal gyrus, R 
angular gyrus, R supramarginal 
gyrus, R inferior parietal lobule 
(includes TPJ region) 
21, 22, 40 2664 64 -46 30 8.20 
R medial frontal gyrus, R superior 
frontal gyrus 
6, 8 559 6 24 62 6.87 
 
Notes. a Voxel sizes amounted to 2 x 2 x 2 mm. 
           
b T-values are given at a corrected p-value of p ≤.05. 
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Figure 6.8. Significantly increased brain activity in the No-go condition when compared to the Go 
condition is depicted here. Activity is shown on a template brain at a voxel-wise threshold of T = 4 
and a corrected p-value of p ≤ .05 on cluster-level. For a detailed description of active brain regions 
please refer to table 6.4. 
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Figure 6.9. This image depicts a sectional view of significant brain activity in the contrast No-go > 
Go at MNI coordinates x = 3, y = 39 and z = 38. Brain activity in this contrast is depicted at a voxel-
wise threshold of T = 4 and a corrected p-value of p ≤ .05 on cluster-level. Numbers correspond to 
significantly active brain regions (1 = right medial and superior frontal gyrus, 2 = right TPJ region 
and middle and superior temporal gyrus, 3 = left TPJ region, 4 = right inferior and middle frontal 
gyrus). The color bar depicts corresponding T-values. 
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6.2.3 Common Activity in the Belief-Reasoning and the Inhibitory Control Experiment 
 
Activity in the comparison False-Belief > True-Belief and No-go > Go was overlaid on a 
template brain in order to show areas that are implicated in both comparisons. These 
common areas are thus associated with IC processes and a decoupling mechanism 
between reality and someone else’s false belief alike. Overlapping activity was found in 
the bilateral TPJ, right middle temporal gyrus, medial PFC and right middle and superior 
frontal gyrus. Respective areas are shown in yellow shading on a template brain in figure 
6.10. Areas solely active in the contrast False-Belief > True-Belief are depicted in red 
shading. Areas exclusively activated in the contrast No-go > Go are shown in green 
shading. Both contrasts show significant clusters only at a voxel-wise threshold of T = 4 
and a p-value of p ≤ .05 (cluster level). This finding is also depicted in a sectional view of 
the brain in figure 6.11. 
It has to be noted that the presented comparison of the two latter contrasts is not the 
result of a statistical comparison. Images with corresponding brain activity were merely 
superimposed on a template brain. The two contrasts False-Belief > True-Belief and No-
go > Go could not be compared statistically as the two experiments differed in terms of 
parameters such as stimulus duration, sequence of stimulus presentation, or differing pre- 
and succeeding visual stimuli. However, the visual stimulus underlying both contrasts was 
identical for all regressors making up the latter contrasts. 
A sectional view depicting common and differing activity for the latter contrasts in 
medial and right lateral areas of the brain can also be found in the following discussion 
section of this thesis (figure 7.4). 
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Figure 6.10. Significant brain activity in the contrasts False-Belief > True-Belief (red shading) and 
No-go > Go (green shading) superimposed on a template brain. Areas in yellow shading depict 
significantly increased activity in both contrasts. A voxel-wise threshold of T = 4 and a p-value of p ≤ 
.05 on cluster level was set for both comparisons. 
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Figure 6.11. Activity related to response inhibition as revealed in the contrast No-go > Go (green 
shading) and to a decoupling between reality and a false belief as revealed in the contrast False-
Belief > True Belief (red shading) in the medial prefrontal cortex. Significantly increased activity 
from the group-analysis is depicted on a sagittal view of the brain at a voxel-wise threshold of T > 4 
and a cluster-defining threshold of p ≤ .05.  
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7. Discussion 
 
The study presented in this thesis attempted to identify neural correlates of belief-
reasoning and IC within a single study, using a within-subjects approach and stimuli that 
differed only marginally between conditions. This was done in order to further clarify a 
frequently described connection between response inhibition and belief attribution that has 
become apparent in countless behavioral studies, independent imaging studies, and 
accounts of compromised belief-reasoning and IC abilities in ASD. Also, this study 
attempted to probe whether a specialized ToM reasoning module might exist in previously 
disputed candidate regions such as the TPJ or medial PFC. Ultimately, results from the 
present study may also be suitable for replicating previous findings of brain regions 
constituting the neural network for belief-reasoning and IC. 
In order to measure neural activity related to the attribution of beliefs, all subjects 
conducted a belief-reasoning experiment that showed a cartoon character acting on the 
basis of a true or false belief. Also, a Go / No-go experiment was employed in order to 
assess neural activity related to IC. 
Before discussing the obtained results in more detail, the most important findings 
from this study will briefly be delineated again. 
In the belief-reasoning experiment baseline activity was subtracted from the true-
belief condition in order to identify areas associated with general task demands 
independent of a decoupling mechanism between reality and a false belief. This 
comparison revealed activity in bilateral lateral and medial frontal areas as well as in 
precuneus, right middle temporal gyrus, bilateral occipital gyrus, post- and precentral 
gyrus, and the bilateral TPJ (figure 6.3). 
Significantly increased activity in the false-belief condition when compared to 
baseline was found in almost identical areas as in the contrast True-Belief > Baseline 
(figure 6.4). However, a graphical comparison of both contrasts (figure 6.5) shows that 
activity in the contrast False-Belief > Baseline was more widespread than in the True-
Belief > Baseline comparison in areas such as bilateral middle frontal gyrus, left TPJ, and 
lateral and medial BA 10. The False-Belief > Baseline contrast was conducted in order to 
reveal areas related to both general task demands as well as to a decoupling between a 
false belief and reality.  
Also, activity in the true-belief condition was subtracted from the false-belief condition 
in order to reveal areas specifically dedicated to the attribution of beliefs independent of 
general task demands. This contrast revealed, among others, significantly increased 
activity in the bilateral TPJ, bilateral medial frontal gyrus, bilateral middle and superior 
frontal gyrus, bilateral middle temporal gyrus and bilateral precuneus (figures 6.6 and 6.7). 
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In the IC experiment, activity associated with response inhibition was revealed by 
subtracting activity in the Go condition from activity in the No-go condition. This 
comparison showed significant increases in brain activity in a right-hemispheric network 
consisting of inferior, middle and superior frontal gyrus, medial frontal gyrus, superior 
temporal gyrus and TPJ. Significantly increased activity in the left hemisphere was only 
revealed in the left TPJ (figures 6.8 and 6.9). 
A comparison between IC-related areas (No-go > Go) and areas dedicated to a 
decoupling between a false belief and reality (False-Belief > True Belief) showed 
overlapping activity in areas such as the bilateral TPJ, parts of the medial PFC, right 
middle temporal gyrus, and right middle and superior frontal gyrus (figures 6.10 and 6.11). 
Behaviorally, there was no significant difference among conditions in the belief-
reasoning experiment in terms of accuracy or reaction times. In the IC experiment, there 
was a statistical tendency towards higher accuracy in the Go condition when compared to 
the No-go condition. 
The following discussion section is divided into several sections. First, significant 
activity in all of the contrasts mentioned above is discussed in more detail. This study’s 
findings of common areas related to both IC and belief-reasoning are then discussed in 
terms of possible common underlying cognitive mechanisms. This section is followed by 
an attempt to integrate the present findings into a unified hypothesis about the relationship 
between IC and belief-reasoning. The following section then discusses the impact of this 
study’s results on accounts of hypothesized modular brain regions for the attribution of 
beliefs. The implications of the current findings for compromised belief-reasoning (such as 
in ASD) are discussed next, followed by a discussion of the “Papilio” project, an ongoing 
project that offers kindergarten children training in both social skills and EF abilities. 
Ultimately, an outlook for future research is given. 
 
7.1 Belief-Reasoning Networks 
 
7.1.1 True-Belief > Baseline: Does True-Belief Reasoning Require Belief-Reasoning? 
 
In the belief-reasoning experiment, baseline activity throughout the experiment was 
subtracted from activity in the true-belief condition in order to identify areas related to 
general task demands independent of a decoupling mechanism between reality and a 
protagonist’s false belief, which is the crucial component in false-belief tasks.  
In the true-belief condition the story protagonist watches the other child transfer the 
object of interest. The last picture then shows this character looking for the previous object 
in one of the two containers. When the subject is prompted as to whether he or she 
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expected the protagonist’s behavior, the subject can answer this question by merely 
comparing the location searched by the protagonist to the actual state of reality. Clearly, 
this does not require attributing a mental state to the protagonist. Thus, answering a 
question related to a protagonist’s true belief does not require the attribution of a belief, as 
it is sufficient and more parsimonious to respond to such a question by merely comparing 
someone else’s action to the true state of reality. Therefore, the contrast True-Belief > 
Baseline should in theory result in activation that is independent of any sort of mental state 
attribution. It may therefore be argued that the term “true-belief reasoning” is somewhat 
misleading as it does not necessarily require the attribution of a belief. Nevertheless, this 
contrast should depict activity that is related to general task demands that occur in the 
second story picture, as the statistical analysis of imaging data specifically focused on this 
period. General task demands in the second story picture involve cognitive processes 
such as viewing a complex visual scene, shifting attention towards the number of people 
present in the room (i.e. determining whether the trial depicts a true-belief or a false-belief 
condition), paying attention to the location that the object is transferred to, and storing both 
of these scenes in working memory for immediate recall in the third picture. Also, a motor 
response (i.e. pressing a button with the right index or middle finger) that is required 
thereafter may already be prepared at this point. 
Activity in the contrast True-Belief > Baseline was revealed in bilateral lateral and 
medial frontal areas as well as in precuneus, right middle temporal gyrus, bilateral occipital 
gyrus, post- and precentral gyrus, and the bilateral TPJ (figure 6.3). 
Some of the brain regions showing significantly increased activity in this contrast 
have long been known to be related to some of the general task demands assumed for the 
present true-belief condition.  
Activity in the bilateral occipital cortex in the present comparison may represent the 
story picture’s higher degree of visual complexity in comparison to the overall experiment’s 
baseline as well as a possible storing process of visual items into visual working memory. 
The role of the occipital cortex for visual perception but also for visual working memory 
has widely been acknowledged (e.g., Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000; Pasternak & Greenlee, 
2005; Rothmayr et al., 2007). 
Activity in lateral frontal areas (such as superior, medial and inferior frontal cortex) is 
also likely to reflect the storage of visually presented items into working memory. In order 
to successfully respond as to whether the cartoon character’s behavior was expected or 
not in the third story picture, the subject has to memorize several aspects of the second 
story picture. These include facts such as whether there are one or two children present in 
the room (thus determining whether a true-belief or a false-belief task is presented) and 
remembering the location of the container that now holds the transferred object. Lateral 
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frontal regions active in the contrast True-Belief > Baseline, among them BAs 6, 8, 9, 44, 
and 45, are known to play a prominent role in working memory processes. This view has 
also been confirmed in review studies including a large number or relevant studies on 
working memory (e.g., Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000; D'Esposito, 2007). 
Activity in the precuneus area (BA 7) was also revealed in the present contrast. 
Activity in the precuneus has frequently been reported in studies investigating working 
memory and attentional processes (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000). Thus, the precuneus activity 
observed may be associated with working memory demands present in the second story 
picture. Also, this activity may reflect an increased level of selective attention necessary to 
respond to the experimental task. Also, activity in the precuneus has been associated with 
an internal switching process between a first-person and a third-person perspective and 
with interpreting actions as being controlled by oneself or by someone else (Cavanna, 
2007; Cavanna & Trimble, 2006; Vogeley & Fink, 2003). Precuneus activity as revealed in 
the present contrast may thus be associated with attending to a third person (i.e. the story 
character transferring the object) who is in control of the actions depicted in the cartoon 
story presented. Clearly, this interpretation is highly speculative and needs further 
investigation. The data obtained in the present experiment are unable to clarify whether 
increased precuneus activity could be related to attentional or memory-dependant 
processes or even to processes related to a sense of agency. 
Significantly increased activity was also revealed in the pre- and postcentral gyrus 
with emphasis on the left hemisphere. This area represents primary and secondary 
sensory motor areas of the contra-lateral fingers and the hand (Kleinschmidt et al., 1997). 
Thus, the left-hemispheric activity observed is very likely to relate to the preparation of an 
imminent motor response as well as to a hypothesized preparatory increase in sensitivity 
in the right hand. In the experiment, subjects were instructed to use their right middle and 
index fingers in order to press one of two buttons of a response pad in the following third 
story picture.  
Increased activity in the true-belief condition compared to baseline was also revealed 
in the medial PFC (BA 6, 8) and the bilateral TPJ (BA 39, 40). As delineated in chapter 
2.2.2.2, activity in these areas has frequently been reported in studies investigating the 
attribution of beliefs (e.g., Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000; Saxe et al., 2006; 
Sommer et al., 2007). At first this seems surprising as this experiment’s true-belief 
condition did not require a decoupling between reality and another person’s belief. A mere 
comparison of the protagonist’s action to the real state of affairs was sufficient to answer 
the present true-belief task. However, activity in areas previously related to belief-
reasoning does not necessarily mean that this specific task also required the attribution of 
beliefs. It is true, however, that areas such as the TPJ and the medial PFC have been 
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related by some to mental state attribution only, claiming that either one of these specific 
regions may even constitute the neural substrate of a belief-reasoning module (Frith & 
Frith, 2003; Saxe, 2006). This view, however, seems outdated. As more recent studies 
have shown, the dorsal medial PFC and the TPJ are also implicated in other cognitive 
processes independent of mental state attribution (Corbetta et al., 2008; Mitchell, 2008). 
Among these processes are the ability to detect and inhibit conflicting stimuli (dorsal 
medial PFC) as well as the ability to reorient attention to behaviourally relevant stimuli in 
the environment (right TPJ; Aron, 2007; Corbetta et al., 2008; Gilbert et al., 2008). It can 
be argued that the true-belief condition does also require subjects to reorient their 
attention towards the events shown in the second story picture. Clearly these events 
presented in the subject’s environment are behaviourally relevant, as some of the 
information presented in this picture is crucial for being able to respond to the story 
character’s action in the following third story picture. Thus, activity in areas previously 
identified in areas related to mental state attribution may rather represent reorienting 
processes, as this study’s true-belief condition did not require the attribution of beliefs. 
This view is also corroborated by findings from the study presented here. IC, which is 
related to attentional reorienting, seems to engage areas such as the TPJ and the medial 
PFC, which have also been found to be dedicated to mental state attribution. This 
important finding will be discussed in more detail in one of the following sections that deal 
with the common neural networks for belief-reasoning and IC as revealed in the present 
study. 
 
7.1.1.1 True-Belief Reasoning: Comparing Present Data to Previous Findings 
 
Another aim of this study was to replicate previous findings on the neural networks for true 
and false-belief reasoning. In the present case of true-belief reasoning, however, it is 
hardly possible to determine whether this has been achieved. Of the belief-reasoning 
studies reviewed, only one study implemented a true-belief condition (Sommer et al., 
2007). In this specific study, neural correlates related to mere true-belief reasoning were 
identified by contrasting two pictures depicting an observed object transfer to four pictures 
depicting the events leading to this object transfer. Also, Sommer and colleagues used 
seven pictures for their story compared to the three pictures used in the present study. In 
the present study the second story picture (depicting the object transfer) could not be 
contrasted to the first story picture, which would have been analogous to Sommer et al.’s 
procedure. This is due to the fact that the second story picture in the present study follows 
immediately after the first picture. Due to this circumstance no statistical comparison of 
imaging data can be conducted. This is caused by the large covariance of the BOLD-
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response elicited by both pictures, thus leading to a blurring of two BOLD-responses that 
cannot be separated reliably in order to attribute them to the specific pictures. Thus, the 
present study compared the true-belief condition to baseline activity. Unfortunately, the 
comparison presented here and Sommer et al.’s contrast can hardly be compared, as the 
regressors that the true-belief conditions were contrasted to differed largely. The baseline 
activity, as used in the present investigation, thus reflects other cognitive processes than 
Sommer et al.’s regressor consisting of four story pictures. 
The comparison of Sommer et al.’s direct contrasts between the false and true-belief 
conditions to the same contrast in the current study, however, is statistically meaningful 
and will be discussed in one of the following sections.  
Next, the present study’s results in the comparison between the false-belief condition 
and the baseline are discussed. 
 
7.1.2 False-Belief > Baseline: Decoupling and General Task Demands 
 
When subtracting activity in the experiment’s baseline from activity in the false-belief 
condition, significantly increased activation was revealed in the bilateral TPJ, bilateral 
lateral and medial frontal areas, bilateral precuneus, right middle temporal gyrus, bilateral 
occipital gyrus, and post- and precentral gyrus (figure 6.4). Interestingly, activity in this 
contrast was found in almost identical areas as in the comparison True-Belief > Baseline. 
However, a graphical comparison between both contrasts shows that activity in the false-
belief condition is more widespread in areas such as the right TPJ, left lateral frontal areas 
and the medial PFC (figure 6.5). This finding is also reflected in a statistical comparison of 
both conditions that is discussed in the following chapter. 
Compared to the true-belief condition, the false-belief condition additionally requires 
subjects to decouple the true state of affairs from another person’s false belief. However, 
the false-belief task also includes general task demands that are also reflected in the True-
Belief > Baseline contrast. Among these are cognitive processes such as the viewing of a 
complex visual scene, the focusing of attention towards the number of people present in 
the room (i.e. determining whether a true-belief or a false-belief trial is shown), paying 
attention to the location that the object is transferred to, and storing both of these scenes 
in working memory for immediate recall in the third picture. Also, the contrast False-Belief 
> Baseline is likely to reflect contra-lateral neural activity related to the preparation of a 
motor response. Activity related to these more general task demands has been discussed 
in more detail in the previous chapter discussing the contrast True-Belief > Baseline and 
also applies largely to the contrast False-Belief > Baseline. As such, activity in the occipital 
cortex may be dedicated to focusing attention on a behaviorally relevant visual scene and 
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to storage of crucial visual information in visual working memory. Increased activity in 
lateral frontal areas is likely to represent working memory-related storage processes for 
immediate recall in the third story picture. This activity may be more widespread in the 
false-belief condition as compared to the true-belief condition due to increased working 
memory demands which additionally require subjects to store the representation of a false 
belief in working memory. Precuneus activity as observed in the present contrast may be 
related to either selective attentional processes or processes associated with the taking 
over of a third-person perspective.  
As previously mentioned, activity in the medial PFC (BAs 6, 8, 10) and the bilateral 
TPJ was more widespread when graphically comparing true and false-belief reasoning by 
superimposing both contrasts on a template brain (figure 6.5). This observation that also 
becomes apparent in the statistical comparison can only be explained by an additional 
cognitive process required by the false-belief task. Obviously, this process constitutes the 
decoupling of another person’s mental state from reality. This is a crucial precondition in 
order to respond to the third story picture. However, a mere graphical comparison is 
unable to state whether this decoupling process relies on specialized belief-reasoning 
mechanisms or whether this activation can be explained by a process of attention 
reorientation that is more elaborate and demanding in the false-belief condition when 
compared to the true-belief condition. As this question constitutes one of the main focuses 
of the present study, an IC experiment was conducted here in order to test whether these 
specific areas may also be engaged in attentional reorienting independent of mental state 
attribution. These findings suggest that attentional reorienting and other processes do 
indeed play a major role in belief-reasoning. Therefore, it is likely that more widespread 
activity especially in the TPJ in the false-belief condition as opposed to the true-belief 
condition largely reflects increased demands on the reorienting of attention to behaviorally 
relevant stimuli in the environment and other processes. This assumption is discussed in 
more detail in one of the following sections which discusses the implication of the 
observed common networks for IC and belief-reasoning. 
Furthermore, a graphical comparison between the contrasts False-Belief > Baseline 
and True-Belief > Baseline may give hints about an underlying decoupling mechanism 
between reality and a false belief. Nevertheless, this graphical comparison cannot 
constitute sufficient evidence in terms of a possible replication of previous studies. 
Previous studies investigating belief-reasoning have for the most part contrasted a false-
belief condition against a control condition and not against baseline as conducted in the 
present contrast. Whether the present study may thus have succeeded in replicating 
previous accounts of the neural basis of false-belief reasoning will therefore be discussed 
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in one of the following chapters comparing true-belief and false-belief reasoning directly 
and statistically.  
 
7.1.2.1 Did the False-Belief Task Really Measure False-Belief Reasoning? 
 
The interpretation of current data presented above is based on the assumption that the 
false-belief condition actually measured the attribution of a false belief to one of the 
cartoon characters (experimental validity). However, theoretically it could also be argued 
that the false-belief task used in the current paradigm could be solved by applying a 
cognitive strategy without having to impute a mental state to the story’s protagonist. In 
theory, subjects are also able to successfully master both belief tasks by merely applying a 
set of rules. For instance, if only one person was present (false-belief) in the second story 
picture and if in the third picture the story protagonist searched the container that 
contained the object at last, then the subject could use the following rule in order to find 
out that this observed behavior was unexpected: One person – search in last container 
unexpected. Three additional rules would then be sufficient to answer all true and false-
belief tasks correctly: one person – no search in last container  expected; two people – 
search in last container  expected; two people – no search in last container  
unexpected. Although applying a set of four three-tiered rules would in theory be sufficient 
to correctly respond to all belief-reasoning conditions, it seems very unlikely that this 
strategy was adopted by any of the subjects. It can be argued that it is far more 
parsimonious in terms of mental effort to merely observe the false-belief trials and respond 
to the third picture by relying on taking over the protagonist’s perspective in order to 
decouple his belief from the true state of reality. The attribution of beliefs is a highly-
specialized and automated process that is probably used by humans countless times 
every day in order to predict other people’s intentions, desires and beliefs (Frith & Frith, 
2007). It is very likely that this process is faster, more reliable and more economical in 
terms of mental effort than applying a rather complicated set of rules that the subject 
would have had to discover first. Evidence for this assumption comes from a study that 
required subjects to use specified rules similar to the ones stated above in order to solve a 
false-belief task. In a different experimental condition, the same set of subjects was then 
also instructed to solve the same task by merely attributing beliefs to the story character 
(Saxe et al., 2006). When later asked which “rule” seemed easier to them, 11 out 12 
subjects stated that the attribution of beliefs as opposed to the application of the rules felt 
easier to them.  
Due to these considerations it can be argued that the false-belief task used in the 
current experiment is a valid measure of the attribution of false-beliefs. It seems highly 
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unlikely that subjects may have discovered a possible though rather difficult set of rules in 
order to solve the tasks presented. Nevertheless, it may be that false-belief reasoning in 
general does rely on covert, unconscious and automated rules that may be structured in a 
similar fashion as the rules stated above. Underlying basic processes that could possibly 
support false-belief reasoning will be discussed in more detail in one of the following 
sections. 
 
Taken together, results in the contrast False-Belief > Baseline reflect activity in brain areas 
related to more general task demands such as working memory, selective attention, or a 
preparation of motor areas. In addition, this contrast also reflects activity of a decoupling 
mechanism between reality and mental states, which may in part rely on attention 
reorienting and other processes. Furthermore, present and previous data suggest that 
subjects solved the false-belief task used here by imputing a mental state to the 
protagonist and not by using a rather complicated set of rules. The false-belief task used in 
the present condition is thus a valid measure of belief attribution. 
Next, results from the statistical comparison between the false-belief and the true-
belief condition are discussed. 
 
7.1.3 False-Belief > True Belief: Neural Networks of a Decoupling Mechanism  
 
Activity in the true-belief condition was subtracted from activity in the false-belief condition 
to specifically identify the neural correlates of a decoupling mechanism between the true 
state of reality and another person’s false belief. Activity in this comparison was revealed 
in the bilateral TPJ, medial frontal gyrus, bilateral middle and superior frontal gyrus, 
bilateral middle temporal gyrus, left thalamus, and bilateral precuneus. As activity in the 
true-belief condition was subtracted from the false-belief condition, activity in the above 
areas is not likely to reflect task demands that are also present in the true-belief condition. 
Thus, activity in these latter areas is specifically dedicated to cognitive functions 
supporting the attribution of false beliefs. Nevertheless, the areas revealed in the present 
contrast may also in part or entirely support other basic cognitive processes that may also 
be present in other cognitive tasks. The contrast False-Belief > True-Belief can thus make 
no inferences as to whether any of the areas revealed constitute the neural correlate of a 
highly-specialized belief-reasoning module. 
Next, the areas revealed in the statistical comparison False-Belief > True-Belief are 
discussed in more detail. This is followed by an assessment of whether the current results 
are in accordance with previous studies employing similar experimental paradigms.  
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Middle Temporal Gyrus 
 
As mentioned above, one of the areas with significantly increased activity in the 
decoupling between reality and another person’s false-belief is bilateral middle temporal 
gyrus. This area is equivalent to BA 21. A review of relevant imaging literature reveals that 
this area is predominantly found in tasks requiring the encoding of semantic material into 
working memory (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000; Hickok & Poeppel, 2004). Furthermore, this 
region is among other areas that are active during the processing of sentence and text 
material (Vigneau et al., 2006). It may be that subjects decode the visually presented 
scene in the second picture by covertly recounting the depicted events. Such a procedure 
may help subjects with storing the depicted event in working memory for recall in the 
subsequent third picture. This covert retelling of the depicted situated may happen in the 
fashion “girl puts teddy in box, other girl is outside the room, thinks it’s in the drawer 
though”. This verbal recounting of the events depicted may help subjects to process the 
viewed scene more deeply and thereby enhance storage into working memory (Craik & 
Lockhart, 1972). Possibly, such a retelling of the story events in the true-belief task may 
either not exist or be less extensive since this task can merely be solved by comparing the 
location searched by the character with the object’s real location, i.e. comparing two 
locations in the third and final story picture. Although speculative, bilateral middle temporal 
gyrus activity in the false-belief condition may thus reflect more elaborate semantic 
processing of the visually presented story events than is the case in the true-belief 
condition. This could reflect the subject’s effort to successfully store the false-belief task’s 
more complex content into working memory.  
Interestingly, middle temporal and superior temporal gyrus are also activated in the 
analysis of facial and bodily features (Allison et al., 2000). Putatively, the subjects may pay 
more attention to the events presented in the false-belief condition, as this condition 
additionally requires the attribution of a false belief. This increased focusing of attention 
may also lead to a more elaborate yet automatic analysis of the bodily properties of the 
story characters.  
However, it can only be speculated here whether the observed increased middle 
temporal gyrus activity in the false-belief condition as opposed to the true-belief condition 
is due to increased operations of working memory, an analysis of bodily features, or a 
combination of both. 
 
Middle Frontal Gyrus 
 
Activity in the false-belief condition when compared to the true-belief condition was also 
significantly increased in the bilateral middle frontal gyrus. In the left hemisphere there 
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were three clusters of activation throughout the middle frontal gyrus. One cluster was 
situated within the boundaries of BAs 6 and 8, another one in BA 9, and another one in 
lateral BA 10. In the right hemisphere, middle frontal gyrus activity was confined to two 
clusters, one including BAs 8 and 9 and the other one in lateral BA 10. Activity in the 
dorsal middle frontal gyrus region (BAs 6, 8, 9) has typically been associated in the past 
with storage and retrieval processes of working memory (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000; 
D'Esposito, 2007). Presumably, the false-belief condition may pose higher working 
memory demands on the subjects than the true-belief condition. While it is sufficient in the 
true-belief task to compare the location that is searched by the story character to the 
actual object location, the false-belief task poses higher demands on the subjects. Next to 
remembering the new location of the object the subject also has to remember the story 
character’s false-belief about the object location.  
However, dorsal middle frontal gyrus activity when attributing beliefs may also be 
explained differently. Recent converging evidence suggests that the middle frontal gyrus 
may constitute part of a so-called ventral attention network (Corbetta et al., 2008; Corbetta 
& Shulman, 2002). Next to the middle frontal gyrus, this network also comprises the TPJ 
and the inferior frontal gyrus. This attentional network is dedicated to detecting and 
reorienting attention towards behaviorally relevant objects. Activity in the ventral 
attentional network is for instance observed in paradigms requiring subjects to attend to a 
novel unattended and behaviorally relevant stimulus (e.g., Bledowski et al., 2004). 
Although accounts of a ventral attention network are based on data from visual 
experiments, more recent evidence points to a supramodal function beyond visual stimuli 
(e.g., Stevens et al., 2005). The false-belief task in the present study may require activity 
of the ventral attention system, possibly more so than the true-belief task does. Additional 
attention has to be dedicated to the fact that the story’s protagonist is not present in the 
room at the time of object transfer, thus requiring the subject to additionally attribute a 
false belief to this person. This mental process is required due to the situation depicted in 
the second story picture. This picture may thus trigger activity of the ventral attention 
network by requiring the subject to reorient attention to this behaviorally relevant stimulus 
which in turn leads to the attribution of a false belief. Although the subject has to focus on 
the events presented in the true-belief task as well, it does not require a reorienting of 
attention to the protagonist’s false belief. The true-belief task can be solved by merely 
comparing the true state of reality (i.e. the object location) with the location where the 
subject looks in the third picture. Activity of the ventral attentional system may constitute 
one of the basic processes underlying belief-reasoning. Also, it may be one of the basic 
processes supporting IC. This possible link between belief-reasoning and IC will be 
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discussed more thoroughly in one of the following sections on the common networks of 
belief-reasoning and IC (chapter 7.3.3). 
Activity in the more ventral bilateral lateral PFC (BA 10) as detected in the current 
comparison has been revealed in previous studies as a neural correlate of working 
memory and episodic memory retrieval (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000). This view has been 
corroborated in a recent meta-analysis on the subdivisions of BA 10 (Gilbert et al., 2006). 
As delineated above, the false-belief task may pose higher working memory demands on 
the subject than the true-belief task. Speculatively, the false-belief task may require 
subjects to additionally form and store a representation of another person’s false belief in 
working memory. This encoding and storing process of the newly formed representation of 
a false belief may be reflected in increased activity in ventral lateral PFC comprising lateral 
BA 10. Clearly, this highly speculative assumption needs further empirical testing. 
 
Precuneus 
 
Next to the lateral frontal activations discussed above, significantly increased activity for 
the false belief condition was also found in the bilateral precuneus. As mentioned earlier, 
the precuneus as part of the parietal cortex is a region that is associated with a variety of 
cognitive concepts ranging from visuo-spatial imagery, attentional processes, sense of 
agency and perspective taking to recall from episodic memory (Blakemore et al., 2007; 
Cavanna, 2007; Cavanna & Trimble, 2006). In the current false-belief task, the observed 
precuneus activity may be associated with taking over another person’s perspective, a 
crucial component of belief-reasoning (Vogeley et al., 2001), or an increased focusing of 
attention towards an external stimulus (i.e. the scene depicted in the second story picture). 
However, the precuneus is not a component of the recently proposed ventral attentional 
system (Corbetta et al., 2008) dedicated to the reorienting or attention towards 
behaviorally relevant stimuli in the environment. Thus, the precuneus activity that was 
observed in the present study may play a more specific role in the attribution of beliefs. It 
is likely that the precuneus may support perspective taking as well as self-processing 
operations, which in the present case would entail switching from a self perspective to a 
third person perspective (i.e. the cartoon character’s perspective).  
 
Bilateral TPJ 
 
Activity in the bilateral TPJ region was also significantly increased in the false-belief 
condition when compared to the true-belief condition. The right TPJ is among the most 
vividly discussed candidate regions for a possible specific belief-reasoning module (e.g., 
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Mitchell, 2008; Saxe et al., 2006). Although this region was significantly active in the 
contrast presented, this does not necessarily imply that either the left or the right TPJ 
constitute a belief-reasoning module that meets the specificity and the generality criterion 
for such a region (Saxe et al., 2004). Previous research has shown that the TPJ is also 
implemented in a variety of other tasks, ranging from IC, the processing of semantic 
material and attentional reorienting to the analysis of biological motion (Allison et al., 2000; 
Buchsbaum et al., 2005; Constable et al., 2004; Serences et al., 2005). An area that has 
been investigated less extensively is the left TPJ, which also seems to play an important 
role for the attribution of beliefs. This view is especially corroborated by a lesion study that 
found three patients with damage to the left TPJ significantly impaired in two measures of 
false-belief reasoning (Samson et al., 2004). Furthermore, the left TPJ is not considered a 
part of the ventral attentional network that supports the reorienting of attention to 
behaviorally relevant stimuli (Corbetta et al., 2008). This evidence suggests that the left 
TPJ may play a specific role in the attribution of beliefs that may not necessarily be 
explained by attentional processes. The possibly differing roles of the left and the right TPJ 
in belief-reasoning and also IC are discussed more extensively in one of the following 
chapters. 
 
Medial PFC 
 
In the present study, the medial PFC emerged as another significantly active region for the 
attribution of false beliefs. This activation extended over two neighboring clusters. One 
more ventral cluster encompassed BAs 9 and 10. The other more dorsal cluster was 
restricted to BAs 6 and 8. Next to the TPJ, the medial PFC is one of the most frequently 
observed regions associated with the attribution of beliefs (Fletcher et al., 1995; Frith, 
2008; Gallagher et al., 2000).  
Interestingly, most studies investigating the attribution of mental states revealed 
medial PFC activity in more ventral prefrontal areas (BAs 9 and 10). These results 
unfortunately stem from studies that largely differed in terms of experimental paradigms, 
contrasted conditions and the actual concepts investigated. Many studies also fail to 
specifically state the location of the observed activations. Nevertheless, a review of 
respective studies indicates that especially BAs 9 and 10 are associated with belief-
reasoning. This view is also supported by a meta-analysis of 104 functional imaging 
studies conducted by Gilbert et al. (2006) who found that the medial areas of BA 10 are 
implicated in the attribution of mental states. Interestingly, medial BA 10 activity is also 
significantly increased in tasks requiring a switching between stimulus-oriented and 
stimulus-independent thought (Gilbert et al., 2008). It can be argued that in the present 
false-belief tasks subjects are required to reorient their attention and thought towards an 
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outside stimulus, namely the protagonist’s false belief. This orientation towards a stimulus 
may be more pronounced than it is the case in the true-belief task, which does not require 
an additional belief attribution in order to solve the task.  
Response inhibition has also been associated with medial PFC activity (see also 
chapter 3.2). However, activity in experiments investigating IC is usually confined to more 
dorsal areas of the medial PFC (BAs 6, 8) as well as to the dorsal part of the ACC (BA 32). 
This view is also corroborated by two lesion studies showing that among patients with 
frontal brain lesions, dorsal medial frontal lesions have the largest impact on the ability to 
inhibit a response (Floden & Stuss, 2006; Stuss et al., 2001a). Possibly, activity in this 
study’s dorsal medial PFC cluster (BAs 6, 8) for belief-reasoning could be related to 
inhibitory demands required for the attribution of a false belief. Although not a part of the 
ventral attentional network, the dorsal medial PFC could also be dedicated to low-level 
processes supporting both IC and belief-reasoning. A discussion of the possible nature of 
such low-level processes is presented in one of the subsequent sections.  
Summing up, medial PFC activity associated with a decoupling mechanism was 
revealed in two distinct clusters, a dorsal cluster consisting of BAs 6 and 8 and a more 
ventral cluster consisting of BAs 9 and 10. Activity in the dorsal cluster may be related to 
inhibitory processes supporting belief-reasoning and IC alike. Previous research suggests 
that the ventral medial PFC on the other hand may be related to a more specific function 
possibly exclusively implicated in the attribution of beliefs. 
 
Thalamus 
 
A part of the thalamus was another, yet unexpected cluster of activity in the present 
contrast False-Belief > True-Belief. Up to now no accounts of thalamus activity in the 
attribution of beliefs have either been reported or discussed. The thalamus as part of the 
diencephalon serves multiple functions in the brain and maintains nerve tracts to various 
parts of the cortex, including the PFC. One of the thalamus’s main functions is to relay 
sensory signals for further processing in other parts of the brain. However, the thalamus 
also supports attentional processes underlying arousal, sleep, wakefulness and selective 
attention (Schiff, 2008). The thalamus activity observed in the present study is likely to be 
associated with increased attentional demands in the false-belief task when compared to 
the true-belief task. Next to general task demands also present in the true-belief task, the 
false-belief task requires an additional attribution of a false-belief, which may be 
associated with an increased demand for attentional processes. This increased level of 
selective attention is likely to be reflected in thalamic activity as found in the present 
comparison. Possibly, the thalamus initiates an attentional arousal of PFC regions that 
seem to be of special importance in belief-reasoning. Activity of the thalamus as part of an 
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attention system in the brain may not have been revealed in previous belief-reasoning 
studies due to the imaging modalities used to detect brain activity. The current study may 
have succeeded in measuring thalamic activity due to the use of 3-Tesla high-field 
functional magnetic imaging, whereas most previous studies have relied on field strengths 
of 1.5 Tesla or even on PET scanning. 
 
7.1.3.1 Replication of Previous Studies 
 
Replication of Lesion and TMS Studies 
 
One of the aims of the present study was to replicate previous findings of neural networks 
associated with the attribution of beliefs. Lesion studies for instance were able to 
underscore the significant influence of a number of regions directly related to the 
attribution of beliefs. Among these areas were the left TPJ, the PFC (with emphasis on the 
medial part) and the amygdala (Apperly et al., 2004b; Fine et al., 2001; Rowe et al., 2001; 
Samson et al., 2004; Stuss et al., 2001a; Stuss et al., 2001b). The only TMS study 
conducted so far found a significant impairment in the attribution of beliefs when “knocking 
out” the bilateral dorso-lateral PFC and the right TPJ (Costa et al., 2008).  
The data obtained in the current study were thus able to replicate the existing results 
from lesion studies almost entirely. Furthermore, areas not investigated in previous lesion 
and TMS studies were revealed in the present study as additional components of a neural 
network for the attribution of beliefs. Taken together, the current study found false-belief 
reasoning-related activity in, among other areas, the right TPJ, the medial PFC and the 
bilateral dorso-lateral PFC. All of these areas were also identified in existing lesion and 
TMS studies as part of a neural belief-reasoning network.  
However, the present study did not find activity in the amygdala region, which may 
also play a role in belief-reasoning, as one lesion study suggests (Fine et al., 2001). This 
lesion study’s findings are nevertheless based on the data of only one subject with 
congenital amygdala damage and may therefore be considered as only vague evidence 
for a role of the amygdala in belief-reasoning. Also, not a single fMRI study has so far 
reported amygdala activity in belief-reasoning. Nevertheless, it may be that the present 
study did not capture amygdala activity due to the properties of the functional scanning 
method used here. Difficulties in capturing amygdala activity in high-field magnetic imaging 
due to susceptibility artefacts have widely been acknowledged and may also have resulted 
in the present study’s inability to detect amygdala activity (Morawetz et al., 2008). In 
addition to this methodological challenge, previous studies suggest that the amygdala is 
implicated in other aspects of social cognition, including the processing of social visual 
stimuli (Adolphs & Spezio, 2006). This finding and the lack of reported amygdala activity in 
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the current and previous studies suggest that the amygdala may not be specifically 
implicated in the attribution of beliefs. Improved scanning procedures in the future may 
result in clarifying a possible contribution of the amygdala in ToM reasoning. Taken 
together, the present study was by and large able to replicate lesion-based findings of a 
belief-reasoning network consisting, among others, of the right TPJ, medial PFC and the 
dorso-lateral PFC. 
 
Replication of Functional Imaging Studies 
 
The belief-reasoning areas identified in the current study are also in accordance with most 
of the previous functional imaging studies that have investigated belief-reasoning by 
means of PET and fMRI. Furthermore, the current study also identified areas of the brain 
that have previously not as frequently been associated with the attribution of beliefs. 
A detailed overview of imaging studies investigating belief-reasoning is found in 
chapter 2.2.2.2. This review suggests that the bilateral TPJ, the medial PFC (with 
preponderance in ventral areas such as BAs 9 and 10) and lateral prefrontal areas 
constitute the core components of a neural belief-reasoning network. It was also argued 
previously that probably only five imaging studies may have yielded valid results in terms 
of identifying a neural belief-reasoning network (Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 
2000; Gobbini et al., 2007; Perner et al., 2006; Sommer et al., 2007). Although other 
studies attempted to measure the attribution of beliefs as well, these studies may in reality 
have tapped other concepts such as the attribution of desires or intentions or may even 
have failed to investigate any sort of ToM reasoning at all. 
The only PET study among these three investigated the neural correlate of belief-
reasoning by comparing belief-reasoning stories to physical control stories that did not 
require any reasoning about beliefs (Fletcher et al., 1995). This comparison resulted in 
increased activity in the belief-reasoning condition in the medial PFC (BA 8). The current 
study also found activity related to belief attribution in BA 8. This replication of previous 
findings thus underscores the prominent role of medial PFC in the attribution of beliefs. 
The role of the dorsal medial PFC will be further discussed in one of the subsequent 
sections of this thesis. 
One of two ToM conditions utilized in an fMRI study by Gallagher et al. (2000) may 
also have captured brain activity related to the attribution of beliefs by using stories 
requiring belief-attribution as well as control stories that did not require the attribution of 
beliefs. Gallagher and colleagues found increased activity related to belief-reasoning in the 
medial PFC (BAs 8, 9), bilateral TPJ, precuneus, and the temporal poles. With the 
exception of the temporal poles, the current study was able to replicate findings of the 
bilateral TPJ, medial PFC and precuneus as parts of a neural network underlying the 
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attribution of beliefs. A recent review suggests that the temporal poles (BA 38) may play a 
role in processes such as semantic memory, face recognition or emotional processing 
(Olson et al., 2007). The present study may have been unable to capture temporal pole 
activity due to the use of a head-only high-field fMRI scanner resulting in a relatively small 
field-of-view (192 X 192 mm). A review of individual data from this study suggests that 
most subjects’ temporal poles were outside this field-of-view. Thus, the present study is 
unable to determine the role of the temporal poles in either belief-reasoning or inhibitory 
control. 
Another study conducted by Gobbini et al. (2007) used the identical stimuli to 
investigate belief-reasoning as in the Gallagher et al. study discussed above. Gobbini et 
al.’s results point to a network dedicated to belief-reasoning consisting of medial PFC (BAs 
9 and 10), bilateral TPJ, left precuneus, and the bilateral temporal poles. As discussed 
above, the current study was thus also able to replicate Gobbini et al.’s findings almost 
entirely, with the exception of the temporal poles. As recently mentioned, this may have 
been due to the methodological issues presented above or due to an unspecific role of the 
temporal poles in belief-reasoning. 
A study also using an appropriate methodology to capture belief-reasoning was 
conducted by Perner et al. (2006). Their comparison of false-belief stories to false 
photograph stories resulted in a belief-reasoning-related activity in the bilateral TPJ, the 
right middle and superior temporal gyrus, precuneus, and medial PFC (BA 9). The current 
study revealed activity over and above these areas. Perner and colleagues also compared 
activity in the false-belief task to a false sign task which may only differ to the false-belief 
tasks in the belief attribution component. This comparison resulted in increased activity for 
belief-reasoning in the right TPJ which was also found in the current study. Although 
Perner et al. argue that this points to a specific role of the right TPJ in belief-reasoning, 
this result could also be explained by an additional attentional reorienting process as 
described earlier in this section. The issue of the right TPJ as a possible belief-reasoning 
module will be discussed in more detail in one of the following chapters. 
The current study also attempted to replicate findings of a study conducted by 
Sommer et al. (2007) that used a similar approach to identify the neural correlates of a 
belief-reasoning network. In Sommer et al.’s study, correlates of a belief-reasoning 
network were identified by subtracting activity in a true-belief condition from activity in a 
false-belief task. The same cartoon stories as in the present study were used, however 
containing seven instead of the three pictures used in this story. Sommer et al. revealed a 
neural network for a decoupling between reality and a false belief in the right DLPFC (BA 
9), right middle frontal cortex (BA 6), right lateral PFC (BA 10), right middle temporal 
gyrus, right TPJ, and ACC (BA 32). With exception of the ACC the current study was able 
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to replicate the findings from Sommer et al.’s study and even reveal further components of 
a belief-reasoning network. The hypothesized roles of the brain areas commonly identified 
in both studies have been discussed above. The observed ACC activity in Sommer et al.’s 
study has been explained by increased action monitoring demands for the false-belief 
task. Action monitoring in this sense refers to situations involving response conflicts 
including IC. As has been delineated further above, IC is also related to a more dorsal yet 
neighboring area encompassing BA 8. The peak activity voxel for the ACC as revealed in 
Sommer et al.’s study was located at MNI coordinates –18, 16, 46 and is thus 1.8 
centimeters lower than the possibly corresponding medial PFC cluster at MNI coordinates 
10, 34, 46 that has been revealed in the present study. Although the peak voxels of the 
clusters differ across the two studies, a graphical comparison of the two clusters reveals 
that some of the active voxels revealed in both studies may actually overlap. Although the 
respective dorsal medial cluster activated in the current study may be located primarily in 
BAs 8 and 6, some minor parts of it also seem to be located in the ACC. The ACC cluster 
revealed in Sommer et al.’s study on the other hand seems to have voxels located in BAs 
8 and 6 as well. Thus, it is likely that the two clusters revealed in the two differing studies 
may actually represent a functionally homogenous region. This specific region may 
however have shown up in slightly differing locations due to differences between subjects 
in the anatomic allocation of this specific functional area. This differing peak voxel 
allocation ultimately becomes apparent in the group analysis representing an average of 
individual data. Furthermore, the current and Sommer et al.’s study have utilized slightly 
different statistical regressors in order to isolate a neural network dedicated to the 
attribution of beliefs. While Sommer et al.’s study included two pictures in their statistical 
analysis, the current study focused on one story picture during which belief-reasoning was 
assumed to take place. Thus, both the methodological issues of varying regressors as well 
as inter-individual differences may have contributed to the fact of finding a possibly 
functionally homogenous yet not perfectly overlapping region which seems to be 
associated with belief-reasoning. Taken together, Sommer et al.’s and the current study 
accordingly point to a neural belief-reasoning network consisting of the right TPJ, right 
lateral PFC, right middle temporal gyrus, right dorso-lateral cortex, precuneus, and dorsal 
medial PFC. Furthermore, the current study revealed that also the left TPJ, left lateral 
PFC, ventral medial PFC, left thalamus, and left middle temporal gyrus are implicated in 
the attribution of beliefs. 
A review of several studies investigating belief-reasoning thus suggests that the 
current study succeeded in replicating previously identified components of a neural belief-
reasoning network. In accordance with previous studies, the study presented here found 
activity related to belief-reasoning in the right TPJ, medial PFC, lateral PFC, precuneus, 
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and the middle temporal gyrus. Also, activity related to belief-reasoning was found in areas 
previously not related to the attribution of beliefs, such as the thalamus for instance. 
 
Summing up, the current study succeeded in identifying a neural network associated with 
belief-reasoning by subtracting activity in the true-belief condition from activity in the false-
belief condition. This hereby identified neural network consists of the bilateral TPJ, ventral 
and dorsal medial PFC, bilateral lateral PFC, bilateral middle temporal gyrus, and bilateral 
precuneus. Converging evidence including existing studies suggests that the right TPJ, 
bilateral middle temporal gyrus, dorsal medial PFC (BAs 8, 6), and lateral PFC seem to be 
implicated in the attribution of beliefs. However, these areas also support cognitive 
functions such as working memory, inhibition and attentional processes. These functions 
may thus constitute basic processes of belief attribution. Previous data further indicate that 
the left TPJ and ventral medial PFC (BAs 10 and 9) may play a role that could be more 
specific to the attribution of beliefs. Furthermore, the current study was able to replicate 
previous findings from lesion and functional imaging studies and identify areas that have 
previously not been associated with belief-reasoning. 
Concurrent evidence points to a close relation between belief-reasoning and IC both 
behaviorally and on the neural level. This is why in addition to belief-reasoning the current 
study also investigated the neural correlates of IC. Brain regions revealed in this study as 
neural correlates for response inhibition are thus discussed in the following chapter. 
 
7.2 Brain Areas Related to IC 
 
7.2.1 No-Go > Go: A Neural Network for Response Inhibition 
 
In an attempt to identify brain areas showing significantly increased activity associated 
with IC, a Go / No-go paradigm was utilized in the present study. This Go / No-go 
paradigm used the identical visual stimuli that were presented as the second story picture 
in the belief-reasoning experiment. IC-related activity was revealed by subtracting activity 
in the Go condition from activity in the No-go condition. This contrast revealed a largely 
right-hemispheric network dedicated to IC consisting of inferior, middle and superior frontal 
gyrus, medial frontal gyrus, superior temporal gyrus, and TPJ. The only significantly active 
region in the left hemisphere was the left TPJ. 
A review of previous studies that employed a similar approach to investigate IC by 
means of Go / No-go or related tasks revealed activity in areas that were surprisingly 
similar to the areas identified in the current study. Interestingly, virtually all previous 
studies that focused on the neural correlate of response inhibition also revealed activity in 
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a largely right-hemispheric network (Blasi et al., 2006; Casey et al., 1997; Ciesielski et al., 
2006; Garavan et al., 2006; Kelly et al., 2004; Liddle et al., 2001; Menon et al., 2001; 
Mostofsky et al., 2003; Stevens et al., 2007; Wager et al., 2005; Watanabe et al., 2002). 
This result which is depicted in various studies investigating IC is also depicted in two 
recent meta-analyses that comprised a total of 29 different studies (Buchsbaum et al., 
2005; Simmonds et al., 2008). According to these data, a network consisting of the right 
dorso-lateral PFC (BAs 9, 46), the right inferior frontal cortex (BAs 44, 46), the superior 
medial frontal cortex (BAs 6, 8, 32), and the bilateral TPJ constitute the core components 
of the neural correlate for IC. 
IC is possibly a process that is supported by various underlying cognitive functions 
that are in turn reflected in activity in distinct regions of the brain. 
The right DLPFC (BAs 9 and 46), which has also been found for IC in the present 
study and virtually all previous IC studies, seems to support working memory which is also 
a necessary component for successful response inhibition (e.g., D'Esposito, 2000). In 
order to successfully inhibit a response in the present IC task, the subject has to 
remember the information given in the previous picture (i.e. number of children present) 
and compare it to the present picture. Subsequently, the subject also has to retrieve the 
previously learned rule for pressing a button (i.e. refrain from pressing the button if number 
of children is identical as in previous picture) from working memory in order to successfully 
master the task. In addition to forming these stimulus-response associations, the DLPFC 
also exerts top-down control on motor areas which need to refrain from performing a motor 
response that is only required in the Go condition (Curtis & D'Esposito, 2003; Simmonds 
et al., 2008). Although these memory and control processes are also necessary in the Go 
condition, these processes may be more automatic in the Go trials which outnumber the 
No-go trials by far. Therefore, the No-go condition may require more elaborate operations 
in working memory for both picture and task rule retrieval which are reflected in DLPFC 
activity for response inhibition. 
Another significantly active region for IC as revealed in the current study is superior 
and middle temporal gyrus, which in the present study were part of a larger cluster also 
encompassing the TPJ region. As discussed in one of the previous chapters, this area has 
been found in previous studies investigating the processing of sentence and text material 
as well as the encoding and retrieval of semantic material into and from working memory 
(Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000; Hickok & Poeppel, 2004; Vigneau et al., 2006). It is likely that 
subjects use a verbal, albeit covert strategy to correctly respond to the requirements of the 
present IC task. The subjects may code the information presented to them (i.e. number of 
children present in the picture) by covertly rehearsing the number words “one” and “two”. 
In the No-go condition the verbal switching between the words “one” and “two” is 
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interrupted, thus requiring the subjects to override an impulse to use the opposite number 
word and to instead decode the information given to the appropriate word. Thus, middle 
and superior temporal gyrus activity could reflect the verbal decoding of the picture stimuli 
presented as well as verbal working memory processes. Interestingly, the superior 
temporal gyrus, a region that was not active for decoupling mentality from reality in the 
belief-reasoning experiment, has also been associated with social perception (Allison et 
al., 2000). Several studies report superior temporal gyrus activity in subjects observing 
biological movements (e.g., Grezes et al., 2001). Furthermore, the same region is also 
activated by static images of face and body as well as by stimuli indicating an individual’s 
action (e.g., Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000; Morris et al., 2006). Presumably, increased 
attention towards the behaviorally relevant No-go stimuli may also result in an automatic 
processing of the social information contained in the picture presented (i.e. processing 
faces, bodies, intended movements and actions). This more elaborate processing of the 
picture content may result in increased superior temporal gyrus activity for IC in the current 
experiment. Taken together, superior and middle temporal gyrus activity as part of an IC 
network may either reflect verbal working memory processes, social stimulus processing, 
or a combination of both. 
Another significantly active region associated with IC in the present as well as 
previous studies is the right inferior frontal gyrus region encompassing BAs 44 and 45 
(Buchsbaum et al., 2005; Kelly et al., 2004; Simmonds et al., 2008). While the DLPFC for 
example may play a more specific role in working memory, the inferior frontal gyrus region 
could be more related to an actual inhibitory process. This view is also shared by a review 
article dealing with the function of this specific region (Aron et al., 2004). According to the 
results reviewed in this paper, the inferior frontal cortex may constitute the only area in the 
brain dedicated to IC. Although the DLPFC and the dorsal medial cortex were also 
reviewed in this article as they are also part of a hypothesized IC network, the authors 
argue that these two areas support working memory and conflict detection, respectively. 
Further support for a distinct role of the right inferior frontal cortex in response inhibition 
also comes from a study showing that the extent of damage to this region (but not to other 
prefrontal regions) shows a significant negative correlation with performance in an IC task 
(Aron et al., 2003).  
Activity related to IC was also revealed in the medial PFC in BAs 6 and 8. This result 
is in accordance with previous studies and meta-analyses reporting IC-related activity in a 
similar area (Buchsbaum et al., 2005; Kelly et al., 2004; Mostofsky et al., 2003; Simmonds 
et al., 2008). Both meta-analyses reviewed here consisting of a total of 29 IC-related 
studies revealed concurring activity in BA 6, an area that has also been referred to by 
some as pre-SMA (supplementary motor area). A large body of electrophysiological, lesion 
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and imaging studies point to a prominent role of the dorsal (or superior) medial PFC in IC. 
Two lesion studies, for example, were able to show that among patients with damage to 
the PFC, only the patients with damage to the right superior frontal gyrus were significantly 
impaired in tasks assessing response inhibition (Floden & Stuss, 2006; Stuss et al., 
2001a). Also, patients with ADHD, a disorder that involves poor IC abilities, show a 
dysfunctional activity pattern in dorsal medial PFC, thus corroborating accounts that this 
region serves as a key area for response inhibition (Dickstein et al., 2006).  
Due to these accounts it is argued here that the dorsal medial PFC activity and the 
right inferior frontal cortex activity as observed in the current experiment reflects activity of 
a region that constitutes an area specifically implicated in response inhibition. 
The bilateral TPJ was another region that was significantly active in the contrast No-
go > Go. Although the TPJ is associated primarily with ToM reasoning experiments, a 
close examination of relevant literature reveals that it is also frequently reported in studies 
assessing IC. A recent meta-analysis conducted by Simmonds et al. (2008) that included 
results from 11 IC studies reported concurrent bilateral TPJ activity. Another meta-analysis 
that included 18 studies related to IC (“attentional reorienting”) found activity in the right 
TPJ that was almost identical to activity elicited by ToM reasoning tasks (Decety & Lamm, 
2007). Converging evidence suggests that at least the right TPJ may support processes 
that are necessary for both IC and belief-reasoning. Respective studies point to a role of 
the right TPJ in breaking the current attentional set to orient to task-relevant stimuli 
(Decety & Lamm, 2007; Mitchell, 2008). Furthermore, the right TPJ (and possibly the left 
TPJ, which however shows less frequent activations) seem to be part of a hypothesized 
ventral attention network which reorients attention to behaviorally relevant stimuli in the 
environment. In the present Go / No-go task the No-go stimulus presents such a novel and 
behaviorally relevant stimulus. The No-go stimulus requires subjects to reorient attention 
to this specific stimulus. Subsequently, the subject is required to inhibit a prepotent motor 
response which he or she has previously gotten used to due to its frequent occurrence. 
This process is likely to require additional attentional resources. Taken together, activity of 
the right and possibly the left TPJ may reflect activity of an attention reorienting system 
involved in IC that redirects attention to a behaviorally relevant stimulus, represented in 
the present case by the No-go stimulus. This reorienting response may also be a 
component of belief attribution and will be discussed in one of the subsequent chapters. 
Summing up, the comparison No-go > Go revealed a predominantly right-
hemispheric network consisting of the DLPFC, the middle and superior temporal cortex, 
the inferior frontal gyrus, dorsal medial PFC, and bilateral TPJ. The areas identified match 
previous findings of IC-related brain regions almost entirely. While the DLPFC and the 
middle temporal gyrus may support necessary and increased working memory demands, 
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the superior temporal gyrus may additionally and automatically process the social 
information contained in the picture presented. The inferior frontal cortex and the dorsal 
medial PFC on the other hand may constitute regions that are specific to response 
suppression. Ultimately, the bilateral TPJ may support processes necessary to reorient 
attention to a task-relevant stimulus. 
The following section discusses common and distinct areas for belief-reasoning and 
IC as revealed in the present study. Furthermore, these findings will be discussed in terms 
of common underlying cognitive processes for both concepts as well as in light of 
modularity accounts for belief-reasoning 
 
7.3 Common and Distinct Areas for Belief-Reasoning and IC 
 
A graphical comparison of areas significantly active in the decoupling between reality and 
a false belief (as revealed in the comparison False-Belief > True-Belief) and areas 
dedicated to IC (No-go > go) was conducted in the present study. This comparison was 
conducted in an attempt to clarify the frequently reported behavioral and functional 
connections between the two latter concepts. The finding of common brain areas could 
indicate possible underlying cognitive commonalities that are present in both concepts. 
Finding distinct brain areas on the other hand might give hints about specific properties of 
the one or the other cognitive ability. Furthermore, the current comparison is able to give 
further evidence for or against a specific ToM module in the brain. For a region to qualify 
as a specific ToM module, this region must not be activated in any other cognitive process 
but the attribution of mental states (Saxe et al., 2004). 
The following paragraph first delineates distinct brain areas activated in one or the 
other process, followed by a discussion of the possible role of these specific areas. This is 
followed by a description of areas that have been identified in the current study as being 
part of both a belief-reasoning as well as an IC network. Furthermore, the implications of 
overlapping neural activity in both concepts towards a revised theory of the IC / belief-
reasoning connection are discussed. 
 
7.3.1 Distinct Areas Related to a Decoupling Between Mentality and Reality 
 
Activity related to a hypothesized decoupling mechanism between the true state of affairs 
and a false belief as revealed by the contrast False-Belief > True-Belief was found in the 
bilateral TPJ, medial frontal gyrus, bilateral middle and superior frontal gyrus, bilateral 
middle temporal gyrus, left thalamus, and bilateral precuneus. When comparing this 
pattern of activation to the corresponding IC-related comparison (No-go > Go), distinct 
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activity for the decoupling-related comparison became apparent in the bilateral precuneus, 
left thalamus, left middle temporal gyrus, left middle frontal gyrus (BAs 6, 8, 10), right 
middle frontal gyrus (BA 10), and ventral medial frontal gyrus (BAs 9, 10). This finding is 
also depicted in figures 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3.  
The above areas, which do not seem to play a role in the current response 
inhibition task, have also been discussed in detail in a previous section of this paper and 
are reviewed here briefly. 
The bilateral precuneus was engaged in the present belief-reasoning task but not 
for inhibitory control. This finding can be accounted for by viewing the precuneus as an 
area possibly implicated in perspective taking. Perspective taking may constitute a crucial 
component of false-belief reasoning but not play a role in inhibitory control (e.g., 
Blakemore et al., 2007; Vogeley et al., 2001). 
The left thalamus as another structure implicated in belief-reasoning but not in IC 
may be engaged in the attentional arousal of medial prefrontal areas which in turn seem to 
be of special importance for mental state attribution. However, the thalamus does not 
seem to play a specific role for belief-reasoning but rather serve as a multi-functional 
component of the brain’s attentional system that is also recruited during other cognitive 
processes (Schiff, 2008) 
Left middle temporal gyrus activity during the attribution of beliefs may be related to a 
verbal rehearsal strategy that is more elaborate in the more demanding false-belief 
condition than in the true-belief condition (Hickok & Poeppel, 2004). As the left hemisphere 
is specific for language-related processes, this indicates that subjects might rely on verbal 
working memory processes especially for belief attribution but only to a lesser extent for 
response inhibition. 
Left middle frontal gyrus (BAs 6, 8, 10) and right middle frontal gyrus (BA 10) may 
reflect activity of storage and retrieval processes in working memory that are distinctly 
active for false-belief reasoning but not for IC (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000; D'Esposito, 2007). 
While the medial part of BA 10 may be more specific to the attribution of beliefs, lateral BA 
10 activity may reflect working memory demands necessary for belief attribution (Gilbert et 
al., 2006). Putatively, lateral BA 10 may be dedicated to the storage of the mental 
representation of a false belief and thus not be engaged in working memory during 
response inhibition. 
 Furthermore, an area in the ventral medial PFC (BAs 9, 10) showed significantly 
increased activation in the belief-reasoning but not in the IC comparison. This finding is 
once again depicted in a sectional view in figure 7.1.  
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Figure 7.1. Sagittal view of a template brain depicting activity in the comparison No-go > Go (green 
and yellow shading) and False-Belief > True-Belief (red and yellow shading) at a voxel-wise 
threshold of T > 4 and a cluster-defining threshold of p ≤ .05. As can be seen here, a region in the 
medial ventral PFC cortex was distinctly activated by the comparison False-Belief > True-Belief. 
 
Ventral medial PFC (BA 10) seems to support self-referential processes that may be 
considered crucial for belief-reasoning (Northoff et al., 2006). More dorsal areas of the 
medial PFC (BAs 6, 8) on the other hand seem to play a role in the inhibition of unwanted 
responses as various imaging and lesion studies have suggested (e.g., Floden et al., 
2006). This distinction in the medial PFC that becomes apparent when reviewing relevant 
data is also supported by a meta-analysis of 104 functional imaging studies (Gilbert et al., 
2006). Furthermore, this is also what the current study has found. Activity related to IC 
was more prevalent in the dorsal medial PFC whereas belief-reasoning associated activity 
was more confined to ventral areas. 
The left TPJ was activated by both a decoupling mechanism as well as by response 
inhibition. However, there was only a minor overlap between the two clusters of activation. 
As stated before, the exact role of the left TPJ for belief attribution and its functional 
distinction to its counterpart in the right hemisphere remains unclear. However, the left 
TPJ does not seem to constitute an area specific to belief attribution as it is also engaged 
in IC paradigms.  
Summing up, distinct activations in the decoupling mechanism-related comparison 
but not in the IC-related comparison were revealed in bilateral precuneus, left thalamus, 
left middle temporal gyrus, left middle frontal gyrus (BAs 6, 8, 10), right middle frontal 
gyrus (BA 10), ventral medial frontal gyrus (BAs 9, 10), and left TPJ. All of the above areas 
seem to support processes related to the attribution of false beliefs that may not 
necessarily be important in response inhibition. A review of previous studies indicates that 
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distinct or more elaborate processes for false-belief reasoning when compared to 
response inhibition may include working memory (middle temporal and middle frontal 
gyrus), attentional arousal (thalamus), perspective taking (precuneus) and self-referential 
processes (ventral medial PFC). The role of the left TPJ for belief attribution, however, 
remains unclear. 
 
7.3.2 Distinct Areas Related to Inhibition 
 
In the IC condition, significantly increased activity related to response inhibition was 
revealed in a largely right-hemispheric network consisting of inferior, middle and superior 
frontal gyrus, medial frontal gyrus, superior and middle temporal gyrus, and TPJ. The only 
significantly active region in the left hemisphere was the left TPJ. When compared to 
activity related to a decoupling between reality and a false belief (False-Belief > True-
Belief), response inhibition recruited distinct brain areas in the superior temporal gyrus and 
the right inferior, middle and superior frontal gyrus. In the middle temporal gyrus and the 
TPJ of the right hemisphere IC-related activity was more widespread than in areas related 
to a decoupling process specific for false-belief reasoning. This finding is once again 
shown in figure 7.2. IC-related activity is depicted in green and yellow color, activity related 
to a decoupling mechanism is shown in red and yellow color. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2. Activity in the right and the left hemisphere related to IC (green shading) and a 
decoupling process between reality and a false belief (red shading) as revealed in the current 
study. Common activity is depicted in yellow shading. Activity is depicted on a template brain at a 
voxel-wise threshold of T > 4 and a cluster-defining threshold of p ≤ .05.  
 
Further activity related to response inhibition was revealed in the left TPJ. Activity in the 
belief-reasoning task related to a decoupling mechanism was also revealed in the left TPJ. 
However, activity in the IC task in this region was confined to one rather small cluster of 
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activity (138 voxels) that was located towards the brain’s surface. Activity in the 
corresponding belief-reasoning comparison in this region was more widespread (543 
voxels) and further below the surface of the brain. There was only a small overlap of active 
voxels for response inhibition and a decoupling mechanism. Thus, although both contrasts 
of interest showed activity in the left TPJ region, the two foci of activation were situated in 
largely distinct areas. This finding is depicted on a coronal and a sagittal view of the brain 
in figure 7.3. Activity related to response inhibition is depicted in green shading. Activity 
related to a decoupling mechanism between reality and a false belief is shown in red. On 
the other hand this figure also shows that in the right TPJ activity in the false-belief related 
cluster was almost entirely immersed in the significant cluster related to response 
inhibition. 
 
Figure 7.3. Activity related to response inhibition (green shading) and to a decoupling between 
reality and a false belief (red shading) in the left TPJ region on a coronal (left picture) and a sagittal 
view of the brain (right picture). Common activity is depicted in yellow shading. Although both 
cognitive concepts showed significant activations in the left TPJ, there was no substantial overlap 
between the two in this region. In the right TPJ, however, there was an almost complete overlap 
between the two respective clusters (only shown in the left picture here). Nevertheless, activity in 
the right TPJ was more widespread for IC. 
 
The description given above of brain areas distinctly or at least predominantly active in 
response inhibition yields possible assumptions about underlying components included in 
response inhibition but not necessarily in the attribution of beliefs. Distinct activity for IC in 
the current study has been discussed in more detail in previous chapters and will only 
briefly be reviewed here. Taken together, previous studies indicate that all of the areas 
distinctly activated in IC but not for false-belief reasoning are indeed related to processes 
associated with various aspects of executive functioning (e.g., D'Esposito, 2000; 
D'Esposito, 2007).  
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Right superior temporal gyrus as an area distinctly activated in IC but not belief-
reasoning has for instance been associated with working memory for verbal stimuli and 
may reflect increased verbal decoding of the picture content that may be less prevalent in 
the attribution of false-beliefs (Vigneau et al., 2006). Right inferior, middle and superior 
frontal gyrus on the other hand may reflect further activity of working memory processes 
or, as in the case of the inferior frontal cortex, of a relatively specialized inhibition area. 
These processes may constitute necessary components of IC but not of belief-reasoning. 
The exact nature of these processes implicated in IC but not in belief-reasoning, however, 
remains unclear and cannot be resolved by the present study. Although left TPJ activity 
was found in both the IC-related and the belief-reasoning-related comparison, there was 
only a small overlap between the two activated clusters. The exact role of the left TPJ in 
response inhibition remains unclear. While the right TPJ seems to constitute a part of a 
hypothesized ventral attention system, the left TPJ is to date not considered part of this 
system (Corbetta et al., 2008).  Future research thus needs to explicitly focus on the role 
of the left TPJ in response inhibition. 
Taken together, distinctly activated areas for IC such as the right superior temporal 
gyrus and the right lateral PFC seem to specifically support functions such as working 
memory (superior temporal and middle and superior frontal gyrus) or the inhibition of 
automated responses (inferior frontal gyrus). Areas with some minor overlap for activity 
related to belief-reasoning include the left TPJ. To date, the exact role of the left TPJ for 
response inhibition remains an enigma. 
Next, common activity for both a decoupling mechanism between reality and a false 
belief as well as for response inhibition will be delineated and discussed with respect to 
common underlying processes involved in both cognitive concepts. 
 
7.3.3 Common Neural Networks and Processes Involved in False-Belief Reasoning and IC 
 
The assessment of possible common underlying processes for IC and false-belief 
reasoning is based on this study’s finding of common activity in both concepts. As 
previously stated, an overlap of activation for the comparison No-go > Go and False-Belief 
> True-Belief was revealed in right middle temporal gyrus, right TPJ and dorsal medial 
PFC. The current findings and previous data show that the above areas support cognitive 
functions that are part of both the ability to inhibit responses as well as of the ability to 
attribute a false belief.  
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Right Middle Temporal Gyrus 
 
Right middle temporal gyrus as a common region for both false-belief reasoning and 
response inhibition may reflect a process that is necessary in both concepts. As previously 
described in more detail, the middle temporal gyrus seems to be engaged in tasks 
requiring encoding and storage processes into verbal working memory. As subjects may 
try to improve their performance in both tasks by using a verbal rehearsal strategy, the 
common middle temporal gyrus activity may reflect operations of verbal working memory. 
Several studies also indicate that the superior temporal sulcus region encompassing the 
middle temporal gyrus is recruited when perceiving and analyzing biological motion as well 
as static images of face and body (Allison et al., 2000). All conditions presented in this 
study have used images containing at least outlines of human faces and bodies. Also, 
these images depicted still images of humans performing goal-directed motions. This was 
also true for the IC conditions which also showed images of humans in order to keep the 
visual input closely matched to its corresponding belief-reasoning condition. Although 
activity in the Go condition was subtracted from the No-go condition, No-go stimuli may 
have been analyzed more deeply due to their task relevance. In the belief-reasoning 
experiment, the false-belief stimuli may also have been processed more elaborately than 
the stimuli presented in the true-belief task. This may have been due to the fact that 
subjects dedicated more attentional resources towards this task as it additionally required 
the representation of a false belief. Taken together, middle temporal gyrus activity in both 
the IC and the belief-reasoning comparisons may also reflect processing of specific human 
facial and bodily properties as well as the intended biological movements contained 
therein. Possibly, such processing of facial and bodily features may be an automatic 
process and not necessarily be a crucial component of either mental state attribution or 
response inhibition. Middle temporal gyrus activity in these tasks may only be revealed if 
these tasks contain depictions or descriptions of faces and bodies. This question, 
however, remains open to further investigation. Also, it can only be speculated here 
whether using a response inhibition task without depicting humans may have resulted in a 
similar result. In the current study this was knowingly avoided. Differing brain activity could 
otherwise be attributed to largely differing stimulus properties and not to differences 
between the cognitive mechanisms investigated. Summing up, both inhibitory control and 
belief-reasoning seem to rely on processes of working memory mediated by the right 
middle temporal gyrus. Possibly, this activity might also reflect analyses of face and body 
features as well as of biological motion. This analysis may be automatic and not be a 
crucial component of either false-belief reasoning or IC. 
 
Discussion 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 121 
Right TPJ 
 
Common activity for both the belief-reasoning and the IC comparison was also revealed in 
the right TPJ (figure 7.4). Converging evidence suggests that the right TPJ may be part of 
an attention reorienting system of the human brain (Corbetta et al., 2008). Attentional 
reorienting also seems to be a crucial component of the ability to attribute false beliefs. 
Response inhibition seems to rely on this attention reorienting system as well. 
Evidence that the right TPJ may support attentional reorienting comes from studies 
that required the subjects to reorient their attention to behaviorally relevant stimuli. In one 
of these studies, for example, the location of an upcoming target stimulus was cued in one 
condition whereas in another condition the target stimulus appeared at an unexpected 
location that had not been cued beforehand (Kincade et al., 2005). Compared to the cued 
target condition, the uncued target condition requiring attentional shifting to a behaviorally 
relevant stimulus resulted in significantly increased activity in the right TPJ. Interestingly, 
the right TPJ was not modulated in additional conditions that presented stimuli that were 
irrelevant to solving the task. This study and others thus suggest that the right TPJ plays a 
crucial role in the reorienting of attention to exogenous stimuli. However, the right TPJ is 
only engaged if these stimuli are behaviorally relevant (Corbetta et al., 2008). As 
previously discussed, attention reorienting seems to be required for successful false-belief 
reasoning. In the false-belief task additional attention has to be directed to the events 
presented in this study’s second story picture. While in the true-belief task internal 
predictions based on the state of reality can be made about the story outcome in the third 
story picture, the false-belief task also requires that the subjects represent a protagonist’s 
false-belief. The information that one of the protagonists may possess a false belief is 
given to the subjects by the information that at the time of object transfer only one 
character is present in the room. This information thus represents an exogenous stimulus 
that is clearly of behavioral relevance to the subject. While the current true-belief task may 
possibly also require attentional reorienting to some extent (as reflected in right TPJ 
activity in the comparison True-Belief > Baseline), the demands on the reorienting of 
attention towards a protagonist’s false belief are probably more elaborate. 
Furthermore, the reorienting of attention to a behaviorally relevant stimulus seems to 
constitute a crucial part of response inhibition. Due to the majority of Go trials subjects 
tend to emerge with an almost automated routine in responding by the press of a button to 
the stimuli presented. This routine is only interrupted by the appearance of a No-go 
stimulus. The No-go stimulus thus represents an exogenous stimulus of behavioral 
relevance as it requires the withholding of a motor response. Therefore, the No-go 
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condition can be viewed as a task that may rely in large parts on the reorienting of 
attention towards a behaviorally relevant stimulus. 
Summing up, both false-belief reasoning and response inhibition require an 
attentional shifting to exogenous and behaviorally relevant stimuli. This common process 
is likely to be supported by the right TPJ. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4. Activity related to response inhibition (blue shading) and a decoupling between reality 
and mentality (orange shading) in the right parietal and medial prefrontal cortices. Significantly 
increased activation as revealed in the present study is depicted on a template brain contained in 
MRIcro software (www.mricro.com). This figure shows common activity for both mechanisms in the 
right TPJ (BA 39, 40) and dorsal medial PFC (BA 6, 8). Distinct activity for a decoupling mechanism 
was revealed in the ventral medial PFC (BA 10). 
 
Dorsal Medial PFC 
 
Last but not least, common activity for false-belief reasoning and IC was also revealed in 
dorsal medial PFC in BAs 6 and 8 (figure 7.4). Independent studies investigating belief-
reasoning or IC have also found activity in this area (e.g., Gallagher et al., 2000; Garavan 
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et al., 2006; Sommer et al., 2007; Stevens et al., 2007). Activity of the dorsal part of the 
medial PFC has been related in numerous studies to cognitive processes such as error 
detection, motor response selection, conflict detection and inhibition (e.g., Mostofsky et al., 
2003; O'Connell et al., 2007; Rubia et al., 2003; Simmonds et al., 2007). It is assumed that 
these processes are actually closely related (Simmonds et al., 2008). Taken together, it 
can be assumed that the dorsal medial PFC is involved in conflict detection and 
subsequent inhibition of a prepotent response (Aron, 2007). 
Conflict detection and the inhibition of a prepotent answer are clearly the core 
mechanisms of response inhibition as captured in the present Go / No-go comparison. 
This task requires subject to first detect the conflicting No-go stimulus and to then inhibit a 
prepotent tendency to respond by pressing a button.  
The false-belief reasoning task may also require some sort of conflict detection as 
well as a possible inhibitory component. As has been delineated in Leslie et al. (2004, p. 
528), “…people’s mundane beliefs are usually true, the best guess about another person’s 
belief is that it is the same as one’s own.” Accordingly, subjects will have a prepotent 
tendency to respond even to the false-belief task according to the true state of reality. 
However, in order to respond to this task correctly, subjects have to detect the conflicting 
belief presented to them, namely that one of the story protagonists is not present in the 
room and that he or she thus possesses a false belief about reality. After having detected 
this circumstance subjects may subsequently need to inhibit their prepotent tendency to 
respond according to their own true belief equaling to the true state of reality. It is thus 
likely that the dorsal medial PFC activity as revealed in the present study may represent 
operations of an inhibitory control process. 
Summing up, both belief-reasoning and IC at least in adulthood seem to rely on a 
common error detection and inhibition process which may be mediated by dorsal medial 
PFC.  
 
In conclusion, the hereby presented discussion of common underlying processes for false-
belief reasoning and response inhibition was based on the finding of common activity in 
three major brain regions. A close look at the possible roles of these prominent brain areas 
indicates that both false-belief reasoning and response inhibition may depend on basic 
processes such as working memory of possibly the verbal domain, attention reorienting to 
behaviorally relevant stimuli in the environment as well as conflict detection and 
subsequent inhibition of a prepotent response. 
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7.4 Integration of Current and Existing Data towards a Unified Theory for the Belief-
Reasoning / IC Relation  
 
In this following section this study’s findings in light of previous data will be used to 
characterize a hypothesized connection between IC and belief-reasoning. As this study’s 
results are based on the data of healthy adults, the current findings primarily apply to this 
relationship in adulthood.  
Based on the current findings and previous studies from all fields of neuroscience, 
the components of both a false-belief reasoning and response inhibition network may have 
become clearer. These components and processes will be delineated in more detail in the 
following section and are depicted schematically in the brain’s right and left hemisphere in 
figures 7.5 and 7.6, respectively. Components related to a decoupling between reality and 
a false belief are depicted in red. IC-related components are shown in green. Components 
shared by both networks are displayed in yellow ellipses. 
Although IC as investigated in the presented Go / No-go paradigm may already 
constitute a rather basic cognitive process, this process may nevertheless be made up of 
several underlying components. As the involved brain areas suggest, IC may rely on 
working memory operations, the reorienting of attention, conflict detection and a 
specialized inhibitory mechanism.  
The decoupling between mentality and reality as the crucial component of false-
belief reasoning on the other hand may rely on increased attentional arousal, working 
memory operations (differing in part from those involved in IC), attentional reorienting, 
conflict detection, inhibitory mechanisms, and self-referential processes including 
perspective taking.  
The present data also suggest that the neural networks for false-belief reasoning and 
IC rely on common components. These components may support processes such as 
attention reorienting towards stimuli in the environment, distinct working memory 
operations, and specific mechanisms involved in conflict detection and subsequent 
inhibition.  
Based on these findings, the following paragraph represents an attempt to integrate 
these findings with existing results on the IC / belief-reasoning connection in adulthood.  
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Figure 7.5. Schematic outline of the hypothesized neural networks for a decoupling between reality 
and a false belief (red color) and response inhibition (green color) in the right hemisphere based on 
the findings from the current study. Yellow ellipses depict common processes and structures 
possibly shared by both cognitive concepts. 
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Figure 7.6. Components and hypothesized functions of the neural networks for inhibitory control 
and a decoupling between mentality and reality (red shading) in the brain’s left hemisphere. Yellow 
ellipses represent components shared by both processes. 
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It has been assumed that working memory may be at the core of the observed IC / Belief-
Reasoning relationship. Based on previous findings, however, it seems unlikely that 
working memory only may explain the correlation between belief-reasoning and inhibition. 
As several studies have revealed, working memory does not show any substantial 
correlations with belief-reasoning (Perner & Lang, 1999). Albeit in the present study an 
overlap for both concepts was found in the middle temporal gyrus that has previously been 
associated with working memory. This, however, may have been due to the middle 
temporal gyrus’s also described role in the analysis of facial and bodily features. Since the 
present Go / No-go task contained depictions of people, this may have caused an 
automatic processing of the facial and bodily features contained therein. Middle temporal 
gyrus activity in the IC task may thus be due to the analysis of facial and bodily features 
and may not necessarily constitute a crucial part of the ability to inhibit responses. 
Attention reorienting on the other hand clearly seems to constitute a component of 
both false-belief reasoning and IC. Both concepts require the switching of attention to a 
stimulus in the environment. As far as IC is concerned, this outside stimulus is represented 
by the No-go stimulus requiring the withholding of a response. The exogenous stimulus 
represented in false-belief reasoning on the other hand may be comprised of the events 
presented in the environment. This observation of outside events (e.g., object transfer with 
one of the protagonists not present) then subsequently leads to the forming of a 
representation of false belief. Thus, attention reorienting mediated by the TPJ may be a 
common component in both concepts and could explain the close relationship of both. 
Another area implicated in both cognitive processes is dorsal medial PFC, which 
seems to support broader functions such as conflict detection and possibly a specialized 
inhibitory component. In the No-go condition, the No-go stimulus has to be detected and 
identified as a conflicting stimulus and a subsequent inhibition of a motor response has to 
be initiated. In the false-belief task on the other hand, it has to be detected that an event 
leads to false belief which also conflicts with the true belief (i.e. the representation of 
reality). The false belief may represent a conflicting stimulus as subjects may by default 
assume that beliefs are generally true. After detecting this conflict the representation of 
reality and a motor response according to this state has to be inhibited. Taken together, 
there is some indication that the relationship between IC and belief-reasoning is also 
mediated by a cognitive process involving conflict detection and possibly initiating 
subsequent inhibition. 
The explanation attempts presented above are only partially included in so called 
expression theory which has also attempted to explain the connection between IC and 
belief-reasoning in adulthood  (Kloo & Perner, 2003; Perner & Lang, 1999; Siegal & 
Varley, 2002; Sodian & Hülsken, 2005). Due to conflicting results, expression theory 
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provides little explanatory power for behavioral findings in childhood (Hughes, 1998; 
Perner et al., 2002a; Perner & Lang, 1999). According to expression theory, belief-
reasoning tasks require the suppression of the true state of affairs in favor of one’s own or 
others’ mental states by means of IC (Hughes & Russell, 1993; Russell et al., 1991). For 
adults, the results from this study however suggest that in addition to a possible role of a 
conflict detection and inhibition process, there may also be another process at the core of 
this relationship: attention reorienting. This breaking down of components included in both 
concepts may be able to explain phenomena that have in the past not sufficiently been 
accounted for by expression theory. For instance, it has been shown that ADHD patients 
with typically low IC abilities do not show a substantially poor performance in false-belief 
tasks. However, expression theory would predict a significant ToM impairment under the 
assumption that IC as a whole could be part of mental state attribution. By splitting up the 
components involved in both IC and belief-reasoning and thus finding common 
components involved in both concepts, behavioral phenomena as in the case of 
unimpaired belief-reasoning with compromised IC may be explained. Such an attempt in 
the case of ADHD is presented in one of the following sections. 
As previously mentioned, conclusions concerning the nature of the belief-reasoning / 
IC connection in childhood are limited. As some researchers have reported stronger 
correlations between the two concepts in childhood than in adulthood (Chasiotis & 
Kiessling, 2004), it may be that the differing components implicated in both concepts may 
be of differing importance in childhood. Previous studies indicate that children under the 
age of about 3 years may not possess any concept of belief at all, thus maybe not sharing 
any common processes at all due to undeveloped networks for belief-reasoning. This view 
is backed by the observation that these children answer false-belief questions at chance 
level and not always with the true state of reality (Wellman et al., 2001). This contradicts 
accounts that the children’s failure in false-belief tasks may be due to a lack of inhibition of 
the real state of affairs. In the further course of development children are aided in false-
belief tasks when decreasing the tasks’ inhibitory demands (Wellman et al., 2001). This 
indicates that at an intermediate level of false-belief performance only (and thus at the 
beginning stages of forming a concept of false belief) children may rely more heavily on 
conflict detection and inhibitory processes. In the further developmental course into 
adulthood false-belief reasoning may become more automatic and rely even less on 
conflict detection and inhibition. The remaining yet weaker correlation between IC and 
belief-reasoning in adulthood may be explained by the finding that both cognitive abilities 
may also rely on a common component responsible for reorienting attention towards 
stimuli of importance in the environment. 
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Summing up, two basic cognitive processes may be at the core of the frequently 
observed relationship between IC and belief-reasoning. One of these processes is 
attention reorienting towards a behaviorally relevant stimulus in the environment. This 
process seems to be supported by the right TPJ, possibly also involving the left TPJ. 
Another process that mediates this relationship may also be conflict detection and the 
initiation of inhibition. The neural correlate of this process seems to be situated in the 
dorsal medial PFC.  
The subsequent section discusses the impact of the here presented findings on 
accounts assuming the existence of highly-specialized modularized areas for belief-
reasoning in the brain. 
 
7.5 Impact of the Current Findings on Modularity Accounts of Belief-Reasoning 
 
An area in the brain needs to fulfil two crucial requirements in order to qualify as a specific 
module for belief attribution: generality and specificity. This implies that such an area is 
engaged in any task requiring the attribution of beliefs and that this area is not recruited in 
any other distinct cognitive process. Two areas have so far been discussed as possible 
ToM modules in the brain: the right TPJ and the medial PFC (Frith & Frith, 2003; Saxe et 
al., 2004). 
The right TPJ has for quite some time been considered as specific for the attribution 
of mental states especially by a group of researchers around Rebecca Saxe at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This research group reported to have found in 
various studies that the right TPJ is recruited in mental state attribution but not during 
control tasks that do not require mental state attribution. Although other studies have also 
frequently reported right TPJ activity as part of a neural network for belief-reasoning, these 
studies have not argued that this region may necessarily be specific to the attribution of 
beliefs (e.g., Gallagher et al., 2000; Gobbini et al., 2007; Sommer et al., 2007). Taken 
together, the right TPJ does therefore indeed seem to meet the generality criterion which 
has to be considered indispensable for this region to qualify as a specific ToM module. 
However, ample converging evidence exists that the right TPJ does not meet the 
requirements of the specificity criterion in order to qualify as an independent ToM module. 
As Mitchell has pointed out, researchers investigating the neural correlates of mentalizing 
have “…neglected substantial evidence that this region may also subserve a set of 
attentional processes that are not specific to social contexts.” (Mitchell, 2007; p. 262). A 
review of studies investigating response inhibition and other concepts related to attentional 
processes shows indeed that most of these report activity of the right TPJ region. This 
view is also corroborated by a meta-analysis that has focused specifically on the right TPJ 
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(Decety & Lamm, 2007). This extensive meta-analysis found virtually identical right TPJ 
activations for ToM and attention reorienting tasks (see figure 4.1). Also, a single study 
investigating the neural correlates of belief-reasoning and attentional reorienting found 
overlapping activity in the right TPJ, thus refuting accounts of this area to be specific for 
mental state attribution (Mitchell, 2007). Ultimately, the current study was also unable to 
confirm accounts of the right TPJ as a ToM module. In the present study the right TPJ was 
recruited by both IC and false-belief reasoning as reflected by largely overlapping activity 
(e.g., figure 7.3). Thus, the right TPJ does not meet the specificity criterion necessary for 
this region to qualify as a specific module for belief attribution. Overwhelming evidence 
corroborated by the current findings suggests that the right TPJ is not specific for the 
attribution of beliefs. As Mitchell (2007) has pointed out, the issue of the right TPJ as a 
possible specific area shows parallels to the fusiform face area, which was in the past 
assumed to be a specific area for the detection of faces. However, recent evidence 
suggests that the fusiform face area is also recruited when subjects are presented with 
non-face stimuli that the subjects have become accustomed to (e.g., Bukach et al., 2006). 
The right TPJ may be doomed to the same fate. As delineated above, the right TPJ may 
not be specific to the attribution of mental states but support a broader function in terms of 
attentional reorienting.  
Next to the right TPJ, the medial PFC has also been dubbed a candidate region for a 
specialized ToM module. As Frith & Frith (2003) have suggested, the medial PFC is 
activated in tasks that require subjects to attend to mental states of the self or others. This 
view is confirmed by the fact that most imaging studies investigating mental state 
attribution have indeed found activity in the medial PFC. Unfortunately, Frith & Frith do not 
explicitly specify as to which part of the medial PFC their assessment is aimed at. The 
medial PFC is a large and heterogeneous anatomical area with various possible foci of 
activation. However, the rather unspecific reference to “the medial PFC” may also have 
been due to the largely differing locations of activity throughout the medial PFC in studies 
investigating mental state attribution. A thorough review of relevant literature however 
reveals that activity attributed to mental state attribution is usually confined to the ventral 
medial PFC. Activity in the dorsal medial PFC on the other hand has for the most part 
been associated with inhibitory processes (Simmonds et al., 2008). In the present study 
there was a significant overlap of activity in the dorsal medial PFC for IC and belief-
reasoning. This finding and previous reports thus indicate that at least the dorsal medial 
PFC is not specific for mental state attribution. Although this dorsal part of the medial PFC 
fulfils the generality criterion required to qualify as a specific ToM module, it does not fulfil 
the specificity criterion due to its role in tasks with no mentalizing content such as 
response inhibition.  
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Hypotheses regarding the functions of the ventral medial PFC (BA 10) are much 
more vague. The majority of studies investigating mental state attribution report increased 
activity in this area for mental state attribution (Gilbert et al., 2006). Also in the present 
study, this area exhibited increased activity in the belief-reasoning comparison. This 
finding indicates that the ventral medial PFC may indeed show a general recruitment 
during the attribution of beliefs. However, is this area also specifically recruited for the 
attribution of beliefs? Indeed, the IC-related comparison of the study presented here did 
not show any increased activity in this area. Other accounts of activity in this area for 
cognitive processes other than mental state attribution are scarce. However, ventral 
medial PFC has previously been reported in cognitive mechanisms that could also be a 
crucial part of the ability to attribute beliefs. For instance, a meta-analysis conducted by 
Northoff et al. (2006) revealed that an area in the ventral medial PFC similar to the area 
found in the current and previous studies might support self-referential processes of the 
verbal domain. Results of this meta-analysis of self-referential tasks are depicted in figure 
7.7.   
 
 
 
Figure 7.7. Activity as revealed in several imaging studies investigating self-referential processes. 
Picture taken from Northoff et al. (2006). Reprinted with permission from Elsevier. 
 
However, most of the studies included in Northoff et al.’s meta-analysis may have also 
included mental state attribution of some sort. This would also imply that self-referential 
processes may be either largely equivalent to mental state attribution or at least be a 
crucial part of it. If one considered processes of self – non-self distinction a separate ability 
also necessary for other cognitive abilities independent of mental state attribution, then 
this would imply that the ventral medial PFC cannot be specific for mental state attribution. 
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If on the other hand self-referential processes were considered a necessary prerequisite 
for mental state attribution only (and not for other concepts), this would in turn allow the 
hypothesis that ventral medial PFC might actually constitute a specific ToM module. Other 
studies, however, have also reported activity in ventral medial PFC in tasks that did not 
require any mental state attribution. A study investigating executive functioning in autistic 
patients and healthy controls revealed that the ventral medial PFC may be implicated in 
the switching between stimulus-oriented versus stimulus-independent attention (Gilbert et 
al., 2008). This switching process related to self-referential processes hints that these 
basic processes may indeed also support other cognitive mechanisms independent of 
mental state attribution, thus refuting accounts of this area as possible module for mental 
state attribution. 
Taken together, solid evidence corroborated by the data from the present study 
indicates that the right TPJ is not specific for mental state attribution. Furthermore, the 
dorsal medial PFC also does not seem to represent a neural module specific for the 
attribution of beliefs. This view is based on previous findings as well as on the current 
study’s results. The ventral medial PFC on the other hand does not play a role in response 
inhibition and may support self-referential processes that are a crucial part of mental state 
attribution and possibly of other cognitive mechanisms. If not the neural correlate of a 
specific ToM module, this area could be specific to self-referential processes. The exact 
role of the ventral medial PFC with respect to belief attribution needs to be further 
investigated. 
The following chapter focuses on the impact of the current findings for instances of 
compromised belief-reasoning as is the case in developmental disorders such as autism 
and ADHD. 
 
7.6 Implications for the Understanding and Treatment of Compromised Belief-
Reasoning 
 
7.6.1 Autism  
 
Autism is a developmental life long disorder with a pronounced impairment in social 
functioning. It has widely been acknowledged that autistic patients show compromised 
belief-reasoning abilities in experimental tasks as well as in daily life (e.g., Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1985; Ozonoff et al., 1991; Sodian & Frith, 1992). Interestingly, this deficit in ToM 
reasoning is accompanied by an impairment in executive functioning (e.g., Domes et al., 
2008; Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996; Sinzig et al., 2008). Working memory as a part of 
Discussion 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 133 
executive functioning, however, seems to be relatively unimpaired in autistic individuals 
(Ozonoff & Strayer, 2001). 
Neuroimaging studies investigating ToM reasoning in autistic patients are relatively 
scarce. However, two studies have shown that autistic individuals compared to healthy 
controls show less extensive activations especially in the ventral medial PFC when solving 
ToM tasks (Happe et al., 1996; Nieminen-von Wendt et al., 2003). While Happe et al.’s 
study investigated the attribution of intentions, Nieminen-von Wendt et al.’s study focused 
on the attribution of beliefs. A subsequent regions-of-interest approach conducted in this 
study revealed less belief-reasoning related activity in the ventral medial PFC. This result 
is also depicted in figure 7.8. 
 
Figure 7.8. Activity in the ventral medial PFC in the comparison ToM Stories > Physical Stories in 8 
autistic patients and 8 healthy controls in a study conducted by Nieminen-von Wendt et al. (2003). 
Image is taken from Nieminen-von Wendt et al. (2003). Reproduced with friendly permission from 
Springer. 
 
Another study conducted by Kennedy et al. (2006) investigated resting state activations in 
autistic individuals. Compared to healthy controls, autistic controls showed pronounced 
dysfunctional activations particularly in the ventral medial PFC. Furthermore, measures of 
social impairment in autistic individuals were highly correlated with the degree of 
neurofunctional abnormality in the ventral medial PFC. Patients with higher social 
impairment scores showed higher levels of abnormal brain functioning in ventral medial 
PFC. 
The above results are in line with the findings of the current study showing that 
ventral medial PFC may constitute a crucial component of a neural belief-reasoning 
network. The ventral medial PFC seems to support functions related to self-referential 
processes and may as such be considered a necessary prerequisite for false-belief 
attribution. The current findings thus indicate that autistic individuals may be impaired in 
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their ability to attribute beliefs due to a dysfunction of self-referential processes mediated 
by the ventral medial PFC. Although this may explain the observed ToM reasoning 
impairment in autism, it does not sufficiently explain why this impairment is accompanied 
by poor executive functioning abilities. This circumstance could possibly be accounted for 
by assuming that not only may the ventral medial PFC show dysfunctional activity in 
autism but that this dysfunction could also apply to more dorsal areas of the medial PFC. 
As has been widely acknowledged, the dorsal medial PFC is engaged in response 
inhibition (e.g., Simmonds et al., 2008). This is also what the present study has found. 
There is evidence that this region of the medial PFC may support conflict detection as well 
as an actual inhibitory response (Aron et al., 2004). The present study also revealed that 
both false-belief-reasoning and response inhibition recruit the dorsal medial PFC. It is thus 
argued here that the dysfunctional activation observed in autism may not be restricted to 
the ventral medial PFC only. Possibly more widespread areas of the medial PFC may be 
affected, thus resulting in the belief-reasoning and executive functioning impairment 
observed. While the executive dysfunctioning in autism may be explained by an 
impairment of a conflict detection and inhibition component located in dorsal medial PFC 
and maybe DLPFC, the observed belief-reasoning deficit in autism may be mediated by an 
impairment in the ventral medial PFC. Furthermore, an impairment in dorsal medial PFC 
may also contribute to the observed belief-reasoning problems in autism, as the present 
study was able to show that dorsal medial PFC constitutes a common component of the 
neural networks for belief-reasoning and response inhibition. 
It is tentatively argued here that taken together, the observed impairment in belief-
reasoning and response inhibition in autistic individuals may be mediated by the medial 
PFC. The present study revealed that both response inhibition and false-belief-reasoning 
recruit the medial PFC. This finding is in line with previous results indicating dysfunctional 
medial prefrontal patterns of activation in these cognitive abilities in autistic patients. 
The next section discusses ADHD in light of the current results. Although patients 
with ADHD show pronounced difficulties in their overall executive functioning, they seem 
to be relatively unimpaired in their ability to attribute beliefs. This observation also 
indicates that belief-reasoning abilities in autism may not be due entirely to difficulties in 
executive functioning. 
 
7.6.2 ADHD 
 
ADHD is a disorder with an impairment in executive functioning abilities such as 
inattention, impulsive behavior, hyperactivity, distractibility, and an impairment in inhibitory 
control (Sodian et al., 2003). However, belief-reasoning abilities in individuals with this 
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disorder seem to be relatively unimpaired. There is evidence that children diagnosed with 
ADHD are only impaired in belief-reasoning tasks containing relatively high inhibitory 
demands (Sodian & Hülsken, 2005).  
As the present and previous studies suggest, response inhibition as one of the 
executive functioning abilities affected in ADHD seems to recruit right-lateralized fronto-
parietal regions of the brain. Furthermore, response inhibition recruits areas in the dorsal 
part of the medial PFC. A large body of studies with ADHD patients suggests that among 
other areas, the dorsal medial PFC exhibits less activation compared to healthy controls in 
response inhibition tasks (e.g., Sinzig et al., 2008). An ALE meta-analysis including 16 
neuroimaging studies on executive functioning revealed significantly decreased activity for 
ADHD patients in dorsal medial PFC when compared to healthy controls (Dickstein et al., 
2006). A review of relevant studies also suggests that more ventral medial PFC regions 
are largely unimpaired. These and the present results indicate that patients with ADHD 
may not exhibit pronounced belief-reasoning difficulties because the disorder may not 
affect areas in the brain that seem to be crucial for belief-reasoning. One of these areas 
possibly not affected in ADHD seems to be the ventral medial PFC mediating self-
referential processes. While this process may be crucial for belief-reasoning, the current 
findings indicate that this process is not implicated in response inhibition.  
Although dorsal medial PFC on the other hand is recruited by both belief-reasoning 
and response inhibition in healthy adults and although it shows dysfunctional activity in 
ADHD, it may not constitute a crucial component for belief-reasoning. As there are 
additional areas of the brain implicated in conflict detection and inhibition, the activation of 
these areas may be sufficient to provide the necessary conflict detection and inhibition 
resources also required for belief-reasoning in ADHD. It is likely that only belief-reasoning 
tasks with high inhibitory demands require the additional recruitment of the dorsal medial 
PFC, thus explaining the observed difficulties for ADHD patients in tasks with high 
inhibitory demands.  
 
Summing up, areas such as the ventral medial PFC that are crucial for belief-reasoning 
may not be affected in ADHD and thus explain the relatively unimpaired belief-reasoning 
capacities despite an impairment in executive functioning. Although ADHD seems to affect 
areas implicated in belief-reasoning and IC, such as dorsal medial PFC, these areas do 
not seem to be a crucial component for belief-reasoning and may be compensated by 
other areas. Autism on the other hand seems to show a dysfunction in a crucial area for 
belief-reasoning, namely the ventral medial PFC. This area seems to support self-
referential processes. As the dysfunctional engagement of the medial PFC in autism may 
also extend to the dorsal medial PFC, this could explain the frequently described 
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impairment of executive functions in this developmental disorder. Without doubt this 
assessment of possible neural underpinnings of ADHD and autism is highly speculative 
and needs further and more sophisticated research. Future research also needs to 
investigate the engagement of other areas of the brain and explore how these different 
areas work in common. 
The following section describes a training program for young children in social skills 
that seems to have an effect on executive functioning and behavioral problems. This 
practical application of existing findings in light of previous and the current findings is 
critically assessed. Furthermore, the following section discusses possible applications of 
the current findings with respect to developmental disorders. 
 
7.6.3 The Papilio Project 
 
The Papilio project is a program aimed at reducing behavioral problems and fostering 
social and emotional abilities in kindergarten children. The program was developed in 
2002 and subsequently applied in several German kindergartens. First results have 
previously been released and will be discussed in this section (Scheithauer et al., 2008). 
 The idea that training in social skills but also in executive functioning skills may 
possibly show benefits for future social functioning as well as towards reducing behavioral 
problems is based on a large body of research. As has been delineated in detail 
throughout this whole thesis, data stemming from behavioral and neuroimaging studies 
have revealed that ToM reasoning as a crucial component for social functioning and 
executive functioning as the key compromised set of functions in behavioral disorders 
such as ADHD are indeed closely related. Furthermore, it has also been shown in young 
children that training in an IC task improves performance in a ToM task and vice versa 
(Kloo & Perner, 2003). The present study also revealed that IC and belief-reasoning are 
indeed closely related on a neural basis. Both processes engage neural networks that 
show a surprising overlap in a number of key regions. As has been argued in the thesis 
presented here, these common areas seem to support basic functions such as attentional 
reorienting or conflict detection and subsequent inhibition. 
The core training in the Papilio project involves three measures aimed at improving 
the three to six year olds’ skills in attributing emotions, desires and beliefs as well as 
improving further social skills and fostering moral behavior. However, the training program 
does not include a specific training in executive functioning. 
One of the measures included in the program involves stories that are enacted by 
dolls impersonating goblins. These goblins engage in social interactions that entail 
emotions such as anger, guilt, happiness, or sadness. Children are also taught about 
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facial and bodily gestures associated with certain emotions. Furthermore, the children are 
instructed about possible actions necessary whenever they encounter someone exhibiting 
these emotions. As the stories also depict the characters acting on the basis of intentions 
and beliefs, this measure is aimed at improving the children’s abilities to attribute 
emotions, intentions and beliefs to themselves and others.  
Another measure contained in the Papilio training program is the “toys are on 
vacation game”. This training requires children to come up with creative ideas on how to 
play games with other children without having any toys available. Although this training is 
supposed to foster social relations with others, it may also require children to recruit 
executive functions such as the ability to plan ahead. 
The last training measure contained in the program is the “good behavior game” that 
teaches children about social rules and ethical behavior. Such behavior is then reinforced 
throughout a period of two weeks by means of positive reinforcement. This training 
method is thus aimed at fostering ethical behavior but may also help children in 
understanding the effects of their actions on others. As ethical behavior seems to rely on 
processes also included in mental state attribution (e.g., Young & Saxe, 2008), this 
training may also improve ToM reasoning in the children. 
In the Papilio program, the children’s social and emotional skills as well as behavioral 
problems were assessed prior to the training phase and 4 months after the beginning of 
the training by means of standardized questionnaires given to the children’s trainers. 
These results were compared to the data of children who were randomly assigned to a 
waiting control group. The subsequent analysis included the data of 716 three to six year 
old children from 25 kindergartens. The results revealed a significant decrease in the 
training group when compared to the control group in terms of behavioral problems and 
hyperactivity and attention deficit syndromes. Also, the children of the training group 
showed higher levels of ethical behavior after completion of the training program. The 
study revealed no difference between the groups after the training phase in terms of 
aggressive behavior or emotional skills (http://www.papilio.de/download/papilio-
ergebnisse.pdf).  
Taken together, the results of the Papilio program as an example of a training 
program in social and emotional skills did find a positive effect, particularly on behavioral 
problems. These results indicate that a standardized training program for children in social 
skills may actually also improve executive functioning as a key component in behavioral 
and attention deficit problems. Although the scientific evaluation of the program presented 
here was subject to a number of methodological flaws (e.g., children were assessed by the 
trainers, statistical analyses, etc.), it also hints that executive functioning and ToM 
reasoning may be closely related. Furthermore, it shows that training programs may 
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improve children’s executive functioning and ToM reasoning alike. When taking the 
findings presented in this thesis into account, it seems that this effect may be mediated by 
common mechanisms shared by both functions. These include attention reorienting and 
conflict detection and inhibition. As the present study suggests, the latter mechanisms may 
be mediated by the bilateral TPJ and the dorsal medial PFC, respectively. Although the 
findings from the present study stem from an adult sample, there is ample evidence that in 
children the observed connection may even be stronger (Chasiotis & Kiessling, 2004) and 
that the current findings thus also apply to the Papilio program’s results. 
Future training programs with children may thus be improved by especially focusing 
on the training of tasks that require attention reorienting abilities as well as conflict 
detection and inhibition. Such training may prove beneficial for future executive 
functioning, a decreased likelihood of behavioral problems such as ADHD, and enhanced 
ToM abilities which could in turn result in improved ethical behavior.  
While the Papilio program is aimed at protecting healthy children from behavioral 
problems and teaching social skills, there are also several training programs for children 
exhibiting existing behavioral problems as well as an impairment in social functioning (e.g., 
Ozonoff & Miller, 1995; Sinzig et al., 2008). These programs, which entail a number of 
different training techniques, comprise methods for fostering both executive functioning as 
well as social functioning. In autism, for instance, training programs such as Lovaas 
technique have proven to be effective in improving autistic individuals’ social and 
executive functioning skills (e.g., Lovaas, 1987; Ospina et al., 2008). 
The next and final section contains a brief review of the current findings, an outlook 
towards possible applications of the research presented here, and a discussion of possible 
future directions in ToM reasoning research. 
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7.7 Outlook 
 
An abundance of behavioral, imaging and lesion studies have indicated in the past that 
response inhibition and belief-reasoning are closely related. It has been shown that 
training in either a belief-reasoning or an IC task improves performance in both tasks. 
Furthermore, an impairment in ToM reasoning as the key impairment in ASD is frequently 
accompanied by an impairment in IC. The nature of this relationship on the neural level 
and the debate over whether there is a module in the brain specific to the attribution of 
beliefs, however, has remained puzzling. The functional imaging study presented within 
this thesis was therefore aimed at clarifying these questions by investigating both IC and 
false-belief reasoning within a single study in the same set of subjects. The results 
revealed a largely right-hemispheric fronto-parietal network for IC consisting of brain 
regions supporting working memory, conflict detection and inhibition, and attention 
reorienting. A neural network for a decoupling between mentality and reality as a crucial 
component for false-belief reasoning revealed a neural network consisting of several 
components. These components seem to subserve basic cognitive processes such as 
perspective taking, self-referencing, working memory, conflict detection and inhibition, 
attentional arousal, and possibly an automated analysis of bodily and facial features. 
These results indicate that the attribution of beliefs and IC may be related to each 
other via a recruitment of common underlying basic processes including attention 
reorienting, conflict detection and specific inhibition, and working memory. Furthermore, 
the results have shown that the right TPJ and medial PFC which had previously been 
discussed as possible ToM modules in the brain are not specific to the attribution of 
beliefs. The right TPJ was active in the present study for both false-belief reasoning as 
well as response inhibition, thus refuting accounts that this area is specific to mental state 
attribution. Medial PFC also does not seem to qualify as a specific module for the 
attribution of beliefs. While the dorsal part was active in the current study in both IC and 
belief-reasoning, previous studies have shown that the ventral part, although not active in 
the present IC comparison, is also frequently recruited in self-referential processes.  These 
results indicate that future research needs to focus on the underlying processes of belief-
reasoning and stop searching for a specific ToM module. It has widely been acknowledged 
that cognitive functions in the brain rely on networks consisting of components also used 
in other processes. Belief attribution is unlikely to be an exception to this parsimonious 
mode of operation in the brain. Future research thus needs to further clarify the roles of 
the differing components of the neural network for belief attribution that have been 
identified in the current study. There is also little known about how these components work 
in common to support the attribution of beliefs. Future imaging studies should therefore 
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analyze their data in terms of functional connectivity between the various components of 
these networks. Already existing statistical methods suitable for such an approach include 
psycho-physiological interaction analysis (PPI) or dynamic causal modelling (DCM).  
Future research also needs to be dedicated in particular to the role of the left TPJ in 
false-belief reasoning and IC. Although both concepts recruited parts of the left TPJ in the 
present study, there was only a minor overlap between the two. It remains unclear at this 
point whether this area is part of a ventral attention network or whether this area may play 
a more specific role in the attribution of beliefs, as previous lesion studies suggests. 
Based on existing and present findings, it has furthermore been hypothesized in this 
thesis that social and behavioral problems in autistic individuals may be due to a 
dysfunction of medial PFC. Compromised belief-reasoning in this disorder may be 
mediated by the ventral part of the medial PFC. This region seems to support self 
referencing as a crucial component of ToM reasoning. The also affected dorsal part of the 
medial PFC supports conflict detection and inhibition and may explain a frequently 
reported impairment in autistic executive functioning. In ADHD, however, medial prefrontal 
dysfunctions may be limited to the dorsal part only and spare the more ventral area of 
medial PFC which seems to be indispensable for ToM reasoning. This may be the reason 
why patients with ADHD show no impairment in ToM reasoning tasks unless they include 
high inhibitory demands. 
Future applications of present and previous results should therefore be applied to 
improve already existing training programs for both healthy children and children with 
disorders such as ADHD and ASD. The findings indicate that training in attentional 
reorienting as well as conflict detection and inhibition may prove beneficial for executive 
functioning and ToM reasoning throughout adulthood. 
As mentioned, previous and current results indicate that compromised belief-
reasoning in ASD may be due to a dysfunction of ventral medial PFC. This finding may 
lead to the development of novel treatment approaches. Possibly, one such novel 
approach may be the application of deep brain stimulation techniques for autistic 
individuals. Deep brain stimulation is a method that has successfully been used in a 
variety of psychiatric and neurological disorders such as Parkinson’s disease, chronic 
pain, major depression, and obsessive-compulsive disorder (e.g., Larson, 2008). In deep 
brain stimulation, a specific area in the brain is stimulated by an implant in the brain 
emitting electrical impulses. In ASD, a stimulation of ventral medial PFC may possibly 
have beneficial effects on the patient’s ability to attend to stimuli in the environment and 
thereby improve their ability to attribute mental states. However, such an application would 
clearly need further research into which other structures may also contribute to this 
developmental disorder. Furthermore, it is not sufficient to focus exclusively on the 
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dysfunction of specific brain structures in ASD. In addition to focusing on how different 
areas work together in common networks, future research also needs to further investigate 
how this dysfunction is mediated on the neurotransmitter level. There is some indication, 
for example, that autistic patients exhibit increased levels of serotonin in certain areas of 
the brain (e.g., Kolevzon et al., 2006; Prasad et al., 2008). Furthermore, recent studies 
indicate that the neurohypophyseal peptide oxytocin may enhance affective mental state 
attribution in healthy adults (Domes et al., 2007). This and other novel findings indicate 
that oxytocin may also have a beneficial effect on compromised ToM reasoning in autistic 
patients (Bartz & Hollander, 2008; Heinrichs & Domes, 2008). 
Taken together, the study presented here was able to provide clarifying insights into 
the nature of the connection between belief-reasoning and IC in adulthood. While the 
study has indicated that both concepts consist of a variety of differing components with an 
overlap in some substantial areas, it has also raised several new questions. Among these 
yet to be investigated topics is the nature of the connection between belief-reasoning and 
IC in childhood. Furthermore, it needs to be clarified how the neural networks for belief-
reasoning and IC are altered in compromised ToM, as is the case in individuals with 
autism. In addition, future research in these complex topics needs to be open to other 
approaches and integrate existing findings from diverse fields such as genetics, 
neurophysiology, neuroinformatics, neuroimaging, psychology, psychiatry, and special 
education. 
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9. Index of Figures 
 
Figure 2.1. Digital reconstruction of brain damage to railroad worker Phineas Gage due to an iron 
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11. Appendices 
 
Appendix A. Informed consent form for participation in the fMRI experiment. 
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Appendix B. Standardized instruction for the Belief-Reasoning and the Inhibitory Control 
Task. Shown here is the version for the 6 out of 12 subjects starting with the Belief-
Reasoning Experiment first. The subjects randomly assigned to start with the Inhibition 
experiment received an identical instruction however describing the Inhibitory Control task 
first. 
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